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Weapons of Mass Destruction-related materials,
technologies, means of delivery and expertise are
more accessible today than ever before.
Globalization and liberalization of trade also give
better possibilities for countries or non-state actors to
seek Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The
threat of terrorist attacks, involving use of these types
of weapons is growing.  
United Nation’s Security Council Resolution 1540 of
28 April 2004 is a new and crucial internationally
binding legal instrument for combating proliferation
of WMD, their means of production and delivery. 
The Resolution expresses "grave concern because of
the threat resulting from illicit trafficking in nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons and their means of
delivery, and related materials". The Resolution:
 calls "all States to refrain from providing any form
of support to non-State actors that attempt to
develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,
transfer or use WMD";
 defines general principles and effective measures
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons as well as their means of
delivery;
 promotes a world-wide awareness of the danger
posed by WMD and develops practical responses;
 gives an impetus to a more dynamic and proactive
approach to prevent proliferation of WMD, their
means of delivery and related technologies; 
 offers a solid basis for further accommodation and
broader involvement of all non-proliferation
mechanisms in fight against proliferation of WMD; 
 requires States to take all necessary steps to adopt
and enforce appropriate internal regulations
against traffickers. 
The effective implementation of the Resolution 1540
requires a co-ordinated approach from all the UN
members; involvement and support of international
bodies, drawing on all the legal and operational instru-
ments at their disposal; enhances legal, diplomatic
and administrative tools at disposal to work against
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
Poland supports the strengthening of the multilateral
disarmament and non-proliferation regime through
the effective implementation and verification of
WMD related treaties, strengthening the export con-
trol regimes, and maintaining national export con-
trol and enforcement tools. Poland takes an active
stance to develop them into effective tools to stop
proliferation of WMD. 
Active promotion and implementation of UNSC
Resolution 1540 and participation in the non-prolif-
eration and disarmament efforts reaffirm Poland’s
conviction that a multilateralist approach to securi-
ty, including non-proliferation and disarmament, is
the best approach to maintain international order.
Given the common recognition that proliferation of
WMD and means of their delivery is a growing
threat to international peace and security, the United
Nations shall seek the ways and means of fostering
the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. 
The UN "High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and
Change" recognized a need to take active measures
against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This report coincides with the relevant proposals
included in the draft of a New Political Act for the
United Nations, put forward by the Foreign Minister
of Poland. Both documents favor the strengthening of
the United Nations, which shall lead to enhancement
of its capacities in dealing with threats of the prolifer-
ation of WMD and their means of delivery.
The purpose of this publication is to promote the
knowledge and experience of Poland’s involvement
in the non-proliferation efforts, as part of its security
policy.
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Editor’s Note
The volume contains a Polish National Report on
the Implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540,
which covers all Poland’s activities in the sphere of
WMD non-proliferation and refers to obligations
stemming from the Resolution. The Report is a visi-
ble confirmation that Poland actively implements
the provisions of the Resolution. 
The volume also presents documents on Poland’s
legal and administrative framework for non-prolifera-
tion of WMD and anti-terrorist activities. 
Warsaw, January 2005
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Security Policy Department
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1) Introduction
Poland has applauded the adoption of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).
The Resolution states that proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their
means of delivery constitutes a threat to international
peace and security.  Terrorism and illicit trafficking
add new dimensions to this threat.  The Resolution
identifies additional steps that states should take to
counter these threats. Poland is determined to meet its
obligations under this Resolution and is prepared to
assist other states in doing the same.  Poland has
undertaken actions, where necessary, to strengthen
and enforce effective laws to prohibit the manufac-
ture, acquisition, possession, development, transport,
or transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by
non-state actors.  In addition, by implementing the
European Union Strategy against Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and its Action Plan,
Poland has further supported the full implementation
of the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).  Poland will
also continue to enforce domestic controls to prevent
proliferation, including physical protection, border,
and export, and transhipment controls. 
The Resolution highlights the need for the interna-
tional community to take active international and
national measures against the proliferation of WMD.
Given the impact that the Resolution has on all
member states of the United Nations, Poland will
strive to promote implementation and compliance
with this Resolution by all UN Member States. 
Universal implementation of UNSC Resolution
1540 (2004), which relates both to non-proliferation
and disarmament, will strengthen the role of the
United Nations Security Council. Active promotion
of the Resolution reaffirms Poland’s commitment to
a multilateral approach to security, including non-
proliferation, as the best way to maintain interna-
tional peace and order. The effective implementa-
tion and universal support for the UNSC Resolution
1540 (2004) will enhance the role of United Nations
in countering threats of the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and means of delivery. Therefore,
within the United Nations system, its organs and bod-
ies we shall also seek the ways and means of foster-
ing the Resolution. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Poland, W‡odzimierz Cimoszewicz, stated at the
recent session of the United Nations General
Assembly:  "...The Republic of Poland has voiced, on
numerous occasions, its deepest conviction that we
have to do a comprehensive, strategic review of the
role of the United Nations, in its both normative and
institutional aspects. It was with this in mind that, on
behalf of the Republic of Poland, I had the privilege
to put forward two years ago the idea of a New
Political Act for the United Nations....". Given the
common recognition that proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and means of their delivery is a
growing threat to international peace and security,
promotion of and support for implementation of the
UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), shall constitute an
important element in revitalising the role and struc-
tures of the United Nations. This would reassure
members of the United Nations that the eminent dan-
gers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
will be addressed in a transparent and co-operative
manner. 
Poland will aim at fostering the role of the UN
Security Council and UNSC Resolution 1540
(2004). Poland’s actions will include political and
diplomatic activities in support of the full and time-
ly implementation of the Resolution. Poland is ready
to host, by the end of 2005, an international confer-
ence on the Resolution. The conference aims shall
include promoting dialogue and co-operation on
non-proliferation and providing overall support to
UNSCR 1540 (2004) implementation. 
2) Poland’s activity in the areas related to the Reso-
lution
The increasing danger that terrorists can obtain
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II. REPORT OF THE POLAND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE UNSC 1540 (2004) RESOLUTION 
weapons of mass destruction has reinforced con-
cerns over growing proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It constitutes a serious threat to interna-
tional peace and security and can seriously under-
mine non-proliferation and arms control efforts. It is,
therefore, important to build upon and strengthen
existing non-proliferation treaties and arrangements. 
Poland is a party or member of all treaties and
arrangements in the sphere of non-proliferation,
including Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention.
These multilateral treaties are completed by a num-
ber of agreements between those countries which
are able to supply technology required for the devel-
opment of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and means of their delivery.
In addition, Poland actively participates in new ini-
tiatives aimed at preventing proliferation of WMD,
namely Proliferation Security Initiative, known also
as the Cracow Initiative (announced in Krakow,
Poland, on 31 May 2003), Global Partnership
against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (2002) and The Hague Code of Conduct
against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (2002) 
The new international environment allows for glob-
al access to technologies, information and expertise
that can be used both to development and deploy-
ment of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and ballistic missiles, and we therefore require a
global approach and consistent implementation of
credible export controls. 
Within the multilateral non-proliferation efforts there
is therefore a global move towards more controls of
exports of arms and technologies and expertise in
weapons of mass destruction and means of their
delivery. 
The national export controls providing for both
appropriate legislation and mechanism enforcing its
implementation make an important contribution to
non-proliferation efforts. They constitute a key con-
dition of upholding legal obligations of States under-
taken in the global and multilateral non-proliferation
regimes not to assist anyone in developing weapons
of mass destruction. 
Poland has introduced an effective national system
of export controls of technology and expertise
required for the development and manufacture of
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or
unmanned delivery systems. We also co-operate
closely with our partners within exports control
regimes and through bilateral contacts with other
States to extend and promote measures to reduce
access to technology and expertise in weapons of
mass destruction and means of their delivery.
Poland continues to play its role in promoting thor-
ough and effective implementation of obligations
contracted under global disarmament and non-pro-
liferation treaties and international arrangements. 
International non-proliferation agreements ratified
by Poland:
1. Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of
bacteriological methods of warfare (Geneva
Protocol)
2. Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water
(Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT)
3. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons (NPT)
Note: Poland also ratified Additional Protocol to the
Agreement on Safeguards with the IAEA
Ratified: 5.05.2000
4. Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor
and in the subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)
5. Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production and stockpiling of bacteriologi-
cal (biological) and toxin weapons and on their
destruction (BWC)
6. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear
material
7. Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, stockpiling and use of chemi-
cal weapons and on their destruction (Chemical
Weapons Convention, CWC)
8. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Poland is also a member of the following export
control regimes:
1) Zangger Committee 
2) Nuclear Suppliers Group
3) Australia Group
4) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
5) Wassenaar Arrangement
Poland actively participates in new initiatives
aimed at preventing proliferation of WMD:
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1) Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation
of Ballistic Missiles (2002)
2) Proliferation Security Initiative, (known also as
the Cracow Initiative, announced in Cracow,
Poland, on 31 May 2003)
3) Global Partnership against the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002)
Poland in the Cracow Initiative
Poland considers the Cracow Initiative (CI) -
Proliferation Security Initiative as an important ele-
ment in building an effective mechanism to prevent
and counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, their means of production and delivery.
The Initiative serves as an action-oriented tool in
accommodating non-proliferation mechanisms and
structures to new security threats and challenges. 
Poland will continue its active engagement in the
development and implementation of CI. Our priori-
ties include, inter alia: 
1) Promoting regional implementation of the
Initiative goals, conducting bilateral meetings and
co-organizing exercises in 2005, including a mar-
itime exercise in the Baltic Sea and a ground exer-
cise. 
2) Furthering and promoting the results of the First
Anniversary PSI Meeting in Cracow, by publish-
ing a booklet and a CD-Rom with a collection of
speeches presented during that event. 
3) Developing internal mechanism of effective
implementation of the Initiative, through the
improvement of inter-agency mechanism of
cooperation; 
4) Building on bilateral relations on interdiction with
interested states at the operational level.
First Anniversary Proliferation Security Initiative
Meeting 
The Meeting was held in Krakow on 31 May - 1 June
2004 with participation of 61 countries and repre-
sentatives from the EU and NATO. It was agreed that
the Proliferation Security Initiative would also be
known as the Cracow Initiative.
The Meeting presented the PSI as a global initiative,
which develops and receives strong international
support. All participants confirmed their will to sup-
port the objectives of the PSI and to act in accor-
dance with their national laws and UNSC Resolution
1540. 
The Chairman’s Statement from the Meeting stressed
that since its launch a year ago the Proliferation
Security Initiative has been transformed from a
vision into an active network of partnership and
practical cooperation. Common principles have
been defined, interdiction capabilities developed
and tested, and regional activities undertaken. The
Statement reminded that the PSI builds on efforts by
the international community to prevent the prolifer-
ation of WMD, their delivery systems or related
materials and complements existing treaties and
regimes. It is consistent with newly adopted United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) of
28 April 2004. The Resolution states that the
Council is "gravely concerned by the threat of illic-
it trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, and related
materials". It calls upon all states "to take co-opera-
tive actions to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons, their means of
delivery and related materials". 
With an aim to promote and implement the Initiative’s
provisions Poland has also hosted a regional confer-
ence for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
(January 2004) and organised a first ground inter-
diction exercise in Wroclaw (April 2004). 
Poland’s participation in the Global Partnership
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction
In the Initiative on Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction, approved by the G-8 leaders during
Kananaskis Summit, on June 27th, 2002 it was
decided to support specific co-operation projects,
initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, dis-
armament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety
issues. The Government of Poland expressed readi-
ness to join this Initiative. Subsequently, Poland was
formally invited to the Global Partnership at the G-8
Summit in Evian, in June 2003. 
Two Polish projects were included into the frame-
works of Global Partnership: 
• The Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Poland and the Government of the
Russian Federation on co-operation in the field of
chemical weapons destruction;
• The concept of the Polish-Russian Technological
and Industrial Park in Tarnow, Poland.
11
Poland in MTCR 
During the chairmanship of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) in the years 2002-2003,
Poland undertook intensive efforts aimed at the pro-
motion of non-proliferation of missiles and related
technologies as well as dual use goods and systems
restricted by this regime.   
In the framework of the outreach activities, the Chair
carried out visits to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Israel, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Pakistan,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and conducted two
rounds of talks with representatives of the govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China. The Chair
presented the basic purpose of the MTCR and elab-
orated upon the implementation of export licenses,
end-user undertakings, inter-partner trade and
national space programs. The Chair also stressed the
importance of voluntary transposition of the
Guidelines and the Technical Annex by non-mem-
bers to national legislation.
Several visits were paid to countries which have
applied for MTCR membership. Their main goal was
to verify the level of preparations of these states for
possible accession to the MTCR. In general terms,
the Chair advised the hosts about the membership
criteria and procedures, discussed issues of prolifer-
ation of missiles and related technology, transit, tran-
shipment, brokering and adherence to the MTCR
Guidelines and Technical Annex. During his meet-
ings, the Chair highlighted the goals and priorities of
the MTCR: strengthening the work on regional non-
proliferation; enhancing outreach activities; consul-
tations with non-member states on ballistic missile
issues; enlargement; strengthening the implementa-
tion and enforcement of Guidelines and the
Technical Annex into national export control sys-
tems; use of MTCR as a tool to combat terrorism. 
Poland as the sponsor of UN Resolution on the
implementation of Chemical Weapons Convention
Poland remains a sole sponsor of the UN Resolution
on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The Resolution supports and promotes
CWC objectives and purposes as well as its full and
effective implementation.  
The Resolution stresses that the full and effective
implementation of all provisions of the Convention
is in itself an important contribution to the efforts of
the United Nations in the global fight against terror-
ism in all its forms and manifestations. 
At the same time, the Resolution underlines that the
Convention and its implementation contribute to
enhancing international peace and security. It
emphasizes that full, universal and effective imple-
mentation of the Convention will contribute further
to that purpose by excluding completely, for the
sake of all humankind, the possibility of the use of
chemical weapons. It urges all States parties to the
Convention to meet in full and on time their obliga-
tions under the Convention and to support the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons in its implementation activities. 
3) European Union context of Poland’s non-proli-
feration policy
Since 1 May 2004, Republic of Poland is a member
of the European Union. Therefore, the EU Report on
implementation of the Resolution complements the
present Report. 
Poland actively participated in the process of prepar-
ing the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD
and the Action Plan for its implementation. Now,
Poland supports full and comprehensive implementa-
tion both of the Strategy and Action Plan.
The main areas of Poland’s engagement in realisa-
tion of the EU provisions against proliferation are:
 promoting universalization of international non-
proliferation treaties;
 supporting the EU non-proliferation clause in
bilateral contacts with third countries;
 encouraging other states to give their national
input for the development and implementation of
provisions of such international instruments like
the Krakow Initiative (PSI) and G8 Global
Partnership;
 promoting EU regulations on export controls in
this regard among partners in the region.
Active measures by the EU (taking active stand on
various forums, elaborating different Plans of Action,
demarches on universalization, programmes of assis-
tance etc.) are, in the view of Poland, an excellent
tool for the development of strong and unanimous
policy in Europe addressing non-proliferation threats. 
Poland’s membership in the European Union has
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prompted modifications of legal regulations, mecha-
nisms and procedures relevant to its external trade in
armaments and military equipment, as well as dual-
use goods and technologies.
Present export controls regulations in Poland are
based on the European Council Regulation No.
1334/2000. The same document remains a basis for
appropriate parts of the Customs Code. 
4) Poland’s legislative and administrative mea-
sures in the areas related to the Resolution
a.  Legislation related to WMD 
General legal acts
General provisions related to the activities prohibit-
ed under international law, including penalties for
the use, production, acquiring, selling, storage and
transport of weapons of mass destruction are envis-
aged by the Penal Code of 6 June 1997 (Journal of
Laws of the Republic of Poland of 1997, No. 88,
item 553). Text of the relevant provisions:
"Chapter XVI. Crimes against peace, humanity and
war crimes
Art. 120.  A person, who uses the weapon of mass
destruction prohibited by international law, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for the time not shorter
than 10 years, for 25 years or for life.
Art. 121. 1. A person, who in contradiction to the
prohibitions of the international law or provisions of
law (statute), manufactures, collects, acquires, sells,
stores, transports or transmits the weapons of mass
destruction or develops them with the view to their
manufacturing or use, shall be sentenced to impris-
onment for 1 year up to 10 years.
2. The same penalty shall be applicable to a person,
who allows the commitment of the act referred to in
paragraph 1."
Detailed procedures with respect to export control
of weapons of mass destruction, related materials
and technologies are covered by the Law on exter-
nal trade in goods, technologies and services of
strategic importance for the state security and for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
adopted on 29 November 2000, with amendments
adopted on 2 July 2004. 
Polish governmental agencies’ legal competences
on interdiction of WMD and related materials to
States and non-States actors, including terrorists
The powers of the bodies
The Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpie-
czeæstwa WewnŒtrznego, ABW), the Foreign
Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu, AW), the
Border Guard (Stra¿ Graniczna), the Police (Policja)
and the Customs Service (S‡u¿ba Celna) are the bod-
ies that are authorised to perform the activities con-
nected with interdiction.
Internal Security Agency
According to Article 5 of The Internal Security
Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency Act of May
24, 2002, the tasks of the Internal Security Agency
include identifying, preventing and detecting the
crimes of illegal production, possession and trade in
weapons, ammunition and explosives, weapons of
mass destruction, narcotics and psychotropic agents
in international trade (subparagraph 2 of the present
Article)
Within the scope of their tasks, the officers of the
Internal Security Agency perform (Art. 21 of the Act):
 criminal intelligence and investigation/inquiry
activities in order to identify, prevent and detect
crimes and pursue their perpetrators,
 criminal intelligence and analytic/informative
activities in order to acquire and process informa-
tion vital to the protection of state security and its
constitutional order.
The Internal Security Agency officers perform the
activities only within the scope of competence of
the Agency and in this scope they have the powers
in criminal proceedings of policemen vested in
them, stemming from the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
According to the Act (art. 23), the Internal Security
Agency officers are authorised to detain persons
under the circumstances and in the cases defined in
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to
search persons and premises, perform body checks
or search through luggage and inspect cargo in the
means of land, air and water transport, in case of a   
well-grounded suspicion that a forbidden act subject
to penalty has been committed. 
Foreign Intelligence Agency
Art. 6 of the above-mentioned Act elaborates on the
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tasks of the Foreign Intelligence Agency, which
include identifying illicit international trade in
weapons, ammunition and explosives, narcotics and
psychotropic agents and goods, technologies and
services of strategic importance to the state’s securi-
ty, identifying international trade in weapons of
mass destruction and the threats related to the pro-
liferation of these weapons and their carriers.
Border Guard
According to the Act on Border Guard of October
12, 1990, its tasks include national border protec-
tion; organising and implementing the border traffic
control regime; identifying, preventing and detect-
ing crimes and petty offences as well as investigating
the perpetrators, within the scope of competence of
the Border Guard, in particular: crimes and petty
offences concerning crossing the national border or
carrying weapons and ammunition across the bor-
der, preventing the transportation across the border
of nuclear and radioactive materials for which no
permit obligatory under other regulations has been
granted. 
The Police
According to Art. 1 item 2 of the Act on Police of
April 6, 1990, one of the most fundamental tasks of
the Police is the detection of crimes and petty
offences and the pursuit of their perpetrators, as well
as performing activities stemming from international
treaties and agreements, under the principles and
within the scope defined in them (item 3).
In order to identify, prevent and detect crimes and
petty offences, the Police perform the following
activities within the scope of its duties: criminal
intelligence, investigation/inquiry and administra-
tive/order-keeping, aimed at recognising, preventing
and detecting the crimes. According to Art. 15 of the
Act, when performing the above-mentioned activi-
ties, the policemen have the right to, among others:
 search people and premises under the circum-
stances and in the cases defined in the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other acts
(Art. 15 item 1 subparagraph 4),
 perform body check as well as search through lug-
gage and inspect cargo in ports and stations, as
well as in the means of land, air and water trans-
port, in case of a well-grounded suspicion that a
forbidden act subject to penalty has been commit-
ted (Art. 15 item 1 subparagraph 5).
While performing criminal intelligence activities
undertaken by the Police in order to prevent, detect,
identify the perpetrators, as well as acquire and pre-
serve evidence of intentional offences prosecuted by
a public prosecutor, among others illegal produc-
tion, possession or trade in weapons, ammunition,
explosives, narcotics or psychotropic agents or their
precursors and nuclear or radioactive materials,
prosecuted by virtue of international treaties and
agreements.
Under certain circumstances the circuit court can
administer operational control, performed by the
Police (Art. 19)
Customs Service 
According to the Law on Customs Service of July 24,
1999 (Journal of Law of 2004, no. 156, item 1641),
the main task of the Customs Service is to ensure
that importation of goods into and exportation from
the European Union customs territory is in confor-
mity with the law (Art. 1 item 1).
One of the tasks of the Customs Service is the imple-
mentation of the State customs policy within the
scope of importation and exportation of goods,
which includes identification, detection, combating
and prevention of crimes and petty offences that
relate to introducing into and removing from the
European Union customs territory of goods subject
to restrictions or prohibitions, in particular such as:
harmful wastes, chemical substances, nuclear and
radioactive materials, narcotics and psychotropic
agents and weapons, ammunition, explosives and
technologies subject to international control, as well
as of crimes infringing on the law of protection of
cultural goods and intellectual property. (Art. 1 item
2 subparagraph 5).
The performance of the activities accompanying the
implementation of the above-mentioned tasks is
closely linked to undertaking criminal intelligence
and control activities in line with the provisions of
the Customs Code and to leading the preparatory
proceedings in line with the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and Fiscal Penal Code.
Territorial competence
The above-mentioned Polish bodies exercise their
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powers on the territory of the Republic of Poland,
which encompasses the land territory, sea internal
waters, territorial waters, as well as the airspace
above them. With regard to sea transport, there
exists a possibility, according to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10,
1982, for these bodies to be able to perform their
tasks also beyond the borders of the territorial sea, in
the framework of the so-called hot pursuit, in the cir-
cumstances when a given sea boat left the territorial
waters of the Republic of Poland, and the infringe-
ment of law is suspected. 
According to the Internal Security Agency and
Foreign Intelligence Agency Act, the Internal
Security Agency can perform its tasks also beyond
the borders of the Republic of Poland. The Foreign
Intelligence Agency, which usually performs its
activities beyond the borders of the State, can also
exercise its powers on the territory of Poland, pro-
vided that such activities are related to its foreign
activities. 
Criminal liability
With regard to punishing the cases of transfer of
weapons of mass destruction or their elements, Art.
121 of the Penal Code is relevant. According to it,
the person producing, amassing, purchasing, selling,
storing, transferring or sending the means of mass
destruction or means of combat, or conducting
research aiming at the production or application of
such means, is liable to a penalty of imprisonment of
duration between one year and ten years. A person
who allows for the above-mentioned acts to be
committed is liable to the same penalty.
According to the Act on foreign trade in goods, tech-
nologies, and services of strategic importance to the
state’s security and to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, and on the amendments
to certain acts of November 29, 2000, the trade in
the relevant goods and technologies without an
appropriate permit or against the principles laid out
in the permit is penalised in imprisonment of a dura-
tion of between one year and ten years (Art. 33 item
1 of the Act). 
The list of goods and technologies of strategic
importance is included in the Ordinance of the
Minister of Economy on the list of goods of strategic
importance of October 2, 2002. With regard to
weapons of mass destruction,  Annex no. 3 contains
the list of toxicological agents, "tear gasses", ade-
quate equipment, components, materials and tech-
nologies (among others biological agents and
radioactive materials adjusted to the use at war to
cause casualties in humans and animals, damage to
equipment, destruction of plots or natural environ-
ment and combat toxic means).
According to the provisions of the Act, trade consists
in any transfer across the border of the Republic of
Poland of goods of strategic importance, in particu-
lar through exportation, importation, transit or con-
clusion of the contract of leasing, donation, loan
agreement, lending for use contract or company
contribution, as well as the services of mediation,
commercial counselling, assistance in the conclu-
sion of contracts and participation in any form of the
above-mentioned activities, including beyond the
borders of the Republic of Poland.
According to the Act on Nuclear Law of November
29, 2000, unless an appropriate permit has been
granted, it is prohibited to perform the activities con-
nected with the exposure, consisting in producing,
processing, storing, transporting or applying nuclear
materials, radioactive sources and waste and spent
nuclear fuel and the trade in them (Art. 4 item 1 sub-
paragraph 1), as well as importation into the Polish
customs territory and exportation out of the Polish
customs territory of nuclear materials, radioactive
sources and devices generating such sources, and
the importation of products of common use emitting
ionising radiation, as well as the importation and
exportation of radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel (Art. 62 item 1).
The head of an organisational unit who performs the
activities defined in Art. 4 item 1 or effectuate impor-
tation or exportation mentioned in Art. 62 item 1
without a required permit or against its terms, is sub-
ject to a financial penalty of the amount not exceed-
ing five average monthly salaries in national economy
over the period of three quarters of the year preceding
the perpetration of the deed, announced by the
President of the Central Statistical Office on the basis
of the Act on income tax of July 26, 1991.
Legislation or other measures to prohibit offences
in Poland related to recruitment to terrorist groups
and the supply of weapons, including WMD to ter-
rorists
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In case of measures to prohibit offences related to
recruitment to terrorist groups the key provision is
contained in Art. 258 of the Penal Code:
"Chapter XXXII. Crimes against public order
Art. 258. 1. A person who participates in organised
group or association, which aim is to commit crimes
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
2. If the group or association referred to in para. 1 is
of military nature the perpetrator shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for 3 months up to 5
years.
3. A person who establishes the group or association
referred to in para. 1 or 2 or manages such a
group or association shall be sentenced to impris-
onment from 6 months up to 8 years."
Mechanisms and procedures of control of trade in
strategic goods, technologies and services relevant
to national security, as well as to the maintenance of
international peace and security are also applicable
to the issue of the supply of weapons to terrorists.
Detailed information including translation of Law of
22 June 2001 on the implementation of the
Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons and their destruction and Law of 29
November 2000 on external trade in goods, tech-
nologies and services of strategic importance both
for state security and for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and amending certain
laws are attached to the present report.                    
Legislation and procedures existing in Poland for
denying safe haven to terrorists active in nuclear
field 
Legal means and other arrangements for counteract-
ing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
used by the National Atomic Energy Agency:
a. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons ratified on 8 March 1972.
b. Agreement between Poland and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - INFCIRC
179 (based on the IAEA INFCIRC/153) which
entered into force on 11 of October 1972. This doc-
ument establishes the rules for nuclear safeguards in
Poland prohibiting access to nuclear materials to
non-state entities.
c. Atomic Law of 29 November 2000, (Journal of
Laws of 2001,  No. 3 item 18), last update: Journal
of Laws of 2004, No. 70 and No. 96
The Law requires that activities involving use of
radioactive materials shall be licensed and requires
physical protection of nuclear materials as well as
safeguards procedures for their control.
d. Regulation of Council of Ministers of 27 April
2004 on Nuclear Material Safeguards (Journal of
Laws of 2004, No. 98 item 982) pursuant to obliga-
tions contained in the Agreement on Safeguards
between Poland and the IAEA, ratified in 1972. 
The Agreement embodies main obligation under
Non-proliferation Treaty concerning nuclear materi-
als. The Regulation requires from users strict
accounting for quantities and types of nuclear mate-
rials in use and admitting inspections according to
requirements of the accountancy system of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
e. Regulation of Council of Ministers of 31 July 2004
on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (Journal
of Laws of 2001, No. 90 item 997), pursuant to
obligations under the Convention of Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials (open for signature
in 1980 and ratified  by Poland  on 3.03.1989) and
to requirements for a State System for physical pro-
tection of nuclear materials defined in the recom-
mendation INFCIRC/225 rev. 4 of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
The Regulation requires that users of nuclear materi-
als ensure their physical protection according to
principles of the IAEA. 
Starting 11 September 2001 more stringent proce-
dures of physical protection have been implement-
ed in the facilities of the Institute of Atomic Energy.
f. Additional Protocol to the Agreement on
Safeguards between Poland and the IAEA -
 INFCIRC 179 Add.1, which was ratified on 5 May
2000 and published in Journal of Laws of 2003,
No. 15 
The Protocol institutes a system of declarations and
inspections for entities where activities having some
relevance for nuclear cycle are carried out.
Declarations concern e.g. export of equipment and
non-nuclear material listed in Annex II.
g. Law of 29 November 2000, as amended on 2 July
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2004, on export control of trade in strategic goods
and technologies. The National Atomic Energy
Agency (PAA) provides opinions in the process of
licensing exports regarding nuclear goods and tech-
nologies as well as dual use items of nuclear rele-
vancy.
Poland·s legislation on biological weapons non-
proliferation
The Republic of Poland is a party to the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and has also ratified the 1972
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction. Poland has
always respected the relevant legal provisions, and 
in consequence - has never produced or stockpiled
such weapons on its territory.
Polish legislation addresses biological threats pri-
marily in the context of management of infectious
disease epidemics and poisonings, either being the
result of natural causes or intentionally perpetrated
by terrorist acts or military hostilities. 
The following legal acts have particular significance
with reference to implementation of the Conven-
tion’s provisions: 
The Polish criminal code incorporates penal sanc-
tions against any persons who - in violation of inter-
national law - produce, stockpile, acquire, sell, or
transport weapons of mass destruction or other
means of combat, or conduct research aimed at pro-
ducing or using such weapons. 
a. The Law on the Customs Code of 19th March
2004 (integrated text, Journal of Laws of 2004, No.
68, item 622)
• The Law makes it possible to demand explana-
tions and documents if doubts arise concerning
the permissibility of the customs destination of the
goods in question, including biological materials
and toxins. 
b. The Law of 29th November 2000 on foreign trade
in goods, technologies and services of strategic
importance for the security of the state, and also for
maintenance of international peace and security
(Journal of Laws No. 119, item 1250)
• The law determines the role of state organs in the
national system for strategic goods trade control,
including pathogenic micro-organisms, toxins,
and equipment for biotechnological processes. 
• However, pursuant to the Ordinance of the
Minister of Economy on goods of strategic impor-
tance of 2nd October 2002 (Journal of law No.
182, item 1518) most of the above goods are not
included in the so-called "import list" and are sub-
ject to restrictions only with regard to export from
the territory of the Republic of Poland and transit
across the Polish territory. A list of pathogens and
toxins included in the Ordinance reflects obliga-
tions adopted by Poland in the framework of the
Australia Group. 
• The legal regulations, rules and procedures for the
organization of the transportation of pathogens
and toxins are compatible with the international
regulations concerning the trade in and trans-
portation of hazardous materials, i.e.  the 1957
European Agreement - adopted by the Republic of
Poland - on the international transportation of haz-
ardous goods, with subsequent amendments. 
• In order to ensure effective control of possible
transfers or translocations of pathogens and toxins,
and to accelerate the detection of hazardous bio-
logical agents - state border sanitary inspectors
have been posted at all border crossings. The orga-
nization of 16 Border Sanitary-Epidemiological
Stations has also been initiated.
c.The Ordinance of the Minister of Health of 3rd
July 2002 concerning characteristics cards for haz-
ardous substances and preparations. 
• The Ordinance was issued on the basis of article
5, paragraph 5 of the Law of 11th January 2001 on
chemical substances and preparations (Journal of
Laws No. 11, item 84, No. 100, item 1085, No.
123, item 1350 and No. 125, item 1367, and of
2002 No. 135, item 1145). The Ordinance is of a
general character and can be applied to micro-
organisms and biologically derived toxins.
• The cards must contain information on the threats
connected with the use of the hazardous sub-
stance or hazardous preparation and instructions
on their safe application. In the event of the pro-
ducer, importer or distributor being based outside
the territory of the Republic of Poland, identifica-
tion of the person responsible for the import of the
substance or preparation into the Republic of
Poland must also be made in the card. This allows
for control of the substance’s transfer.
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The above provisions have substantial significance
for the implementation of Article III of the
Convention. 
The following legal acts are important for ensuring
the security and monitoring of pathogenic micro-
organisms and toxins: 
a. The Ordinance of the Minister of the Environment
of 29th November 2002 concerning the list of path-
ogenic organisms and their classification, and also
the measures required for the respective degrees of
containment (Journal of Laws of Laws of 16th
December 2002). 
• It contains a listing of pathogenic organisms and
their classification in accordance with their ability
to cause disease in humans, plants and animals,
and also defines the measures required for the
respective degrees of containment during execu-
tion of procedures in laboratories, greenhouses,
animal enclosures, and other procedures during
closed use of genetically modified organisms. 
b. The Ordinance of the Minister of Health of 11th
July 2002 (Journal of Laws No. 140, item 1173) on
the marking of packaging of hazardous substances
and hazardous preparations. 
• The Ordinance contains specimens of warning
markings, formulations defining conditions of safe
use of hazardous substances (preparations) and
ways of marking the packaging of such sub-
stances. The Ordinance does not refer to haz-
ardous biological substances. Upon modification
it would constitute a good basis for regulating this
issue with regard to biological substances. 
c. The Law ("gene law") of 22nd June 2001 (Journal
of Laws No. 76, item 811, and of 2002, No. 25 item
253, No. 41. item 365)
• The Law institutes control of closed use and
release into the environment of genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMO).
d. The Ordinance of the Minister of the Environment
of 6th June 2002 concerning applications for permits
to conduct activity involving GMOs. The Ordinance
contains detailed regulations dealing with the closed
use of GMOs, intended release of GMOs into the
environment, trade in GMOs, their export and tran-
sit across national territory. 
• These regulations primarily focus on the protec-
tion of health and environment, permitting the
penalization of prohibited forms of development,
production and release into the environment of
genetically modified micro-organisms. The issue
of intentional development of harmful genetically
modified micro-organisms for the purpose of caus-
ing harm to the health of humans, animals and
plants is not directly addressed.
e. The Law of 11th May 2001 on the health require-
ments for food and feeding.
• On the basis of this Law, the Minister of Health
determines the requirements with respect to inter-
nal control of the health quality and internal con-
trol of adherence to hygienic rules, incorporating
the system of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP). This system includes procedures
designed to ensure the safety of food through the
identification and assessment of hazards from the
point of view of the health quality of food and the
risk of hazards during all stages of the production
and handling of food.
• The Minister of Health determines the qualifica-
tions required for persons involved in the process
of production. Knowledge of production safety
measures to prevent intentional biological conta-
mination is not required yet. 
f. In accordance with the Law on infectious diseases
of 6th September 2001 (Journal of Laws of 2001 No.
126, item 1384) the national reference centers for
microbiological and serological diagnostics are those
entities which have obtained accreditation on the
basis of the Law of 28th April 2000 on the system of
compatibility, accreditation and amendment of cer-
tain laws (Journal of Laws No. 43, item 489, and of
2001 No. 63, item 636), and with which the Health
Minister has concluded contracts. So far, the contracts
do not incorporate clauses on the storage and moni-
toring of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins. 
g. The Ordinance of the Minister of Health of 2nd
June 2003 (Journal of Laws No. 116, item 1103) on
the criteria to be met by organizational units con-
ducting tests on chemical substances and prepara-
tions, and on control of the fulfilment of those criteria.
• The Ordinance was issued on the basis of the Law
of 11th January 2001 on chemical substances and
preparations (Journal of Laws No. 11, item 84 with
subsequent amendments) 
• The Ordinance elaborates the criteria that have to
be met by organizational units which conduct - as
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required by the Law - tests of the physicochemical
properties, toxicity and eco-toxicity of chemical
substances and preparations. The criteria, con-
tained in Attachment 1, constitute the principles of
Good Laboratory Practice. The Ordinance also
determines which unit is responsible for the con-
trol of adherence by the research units to the prin-
ciples of Good Laboratory Practice, and the pro-
cedure for granting and withdrawing the autho-
rization to conduct such research. 
• The Ordinance needs to be amended with provi-
sions relating to biological agents and toxins. 
Despite the absence of specialist legal regulations
concerning safety issues connected with pathogens
and toxins, there are general regulations in force
dealing with the storage and handling of hazardous
materials. 
National legislation on the implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention
On 22.07.2001, the Law on the implementation of
the Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons and on their destruction was enacted. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the above mentioned
Law, the National Authority in Poland, in the mean-
ing of the Convention, is the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. The tasks imposed under the Convention are
also performed by the Ministry of Economy and
Labor, the Ministry of National Defense and the
Ministry of Interior and Administration Affairs. An
analysis of tasks assigned to the individual ministries
shows that the crucial role falls with the Ministry of
Economy, Labour and Social Policy that is responsi-
ble for the supervision of implementation and
enforcement of the Convention at the national level. 
As the National Authority, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has the following responsibilities:
• Preparation and implementation of the Polish pol-
icy guidelines in relation to the OPCW,
• Maintenance of relationships with the OPCW and
other States Parties to the Convention with regard
to the matters of the Convention,
• Cooperation in preparation of the OPCW inspec-
tions in Poland,
• In cooperation with the Ministry of National
Defense, providing assistance to other States Parties
to the Convention in case of threat of use or the
actual use of chemical weapons against them. 
Responsibilities of the Ministry of Economy and
Labour includes in particular:
• Monitoring of the industry and its compliance with
the Convention,
• Monitoring of foreign trade in toxic chemicals list-
ed in the Schedule 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention,
•  Preparation of declarations required pursuant to
the Convention,
• Taking actions to prepare and carry out the OPCW
inspections on the Polish territory.
The Minister of National Defence ensures the com-
pliance of the Polish Armed Forces with the
Convention.
The Minister of Interior and Administration Affairs is
responsible for enforcing the provisions of the
Convention in the subordinated units.
Pursuant to the Polish law, it is forbidden on the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Poland to:
• develop, produce, process, use, procure, store and
transfer chemical weapons to anyone,
• use chemical weapons,
• undertake any military preparations for use of
chemical weapons,
• use riot control agents as a method of warfare.
Any activity involving the chemicals included in
Schedule 1 of the Convention may be conducted
only for purposes not prohibited under the
Convention, for allowed quantities and in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Conventions, sub-
ject to obtaining the appropriate permission for such
activity. The permission can be obtained from the
Minister of Economy and Labour (for civilian area)
or from the Minister of National Defense (for military
area). Export, import, and transit of Schedule 1
chemicals to and from States not Parties to the
Convention are prohibited, whereas to and from
States Parties to the Convention are permissible only
for the purpose not prohibited by the Convention
and in permissible quantities, if duly licensed by the
Minister of Economy and Labour.
Export, import, and transit of Schedule 2 or 3 chem-
icals are permitted exclusively in relation to the
States Parties to the Convention subject to obtaining
the license.
After the Convention of Chemical Weapons entered
into force, Poland has fulfilled the following obliga-
tions under the Convention:
• Submitted the initial declaration, the declaration
on past activities for the years 1997 - 2002 and on
anticipated activities for the years 1998 - 2003,
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• Notified the establishment of the National
Authority of Poland,
• Notified the point of entry/exit for the OPCW
inspection teams (there are three such points: the
airports in Warsaw, Wroclaw, and Krakow),
• Informed about national implementing legislation,
• Notified the offer of the assistance to the OPCW
according to the Article X of the Convention.
In Poland’s case, the provisions of the Convention
apply mainly to the industrial activities. Hence, even
before the Convention entered into force, the pre-
liminary work has been done to identify facilities
that may be subject to the Convention. Seventy
chemical and pharmaceutical companies were
selected, whose business activities are now careful-
ly monitored and controlled under the Convention.
Also, research and development institutes and trade
companies have been subjected to monitoring.
The legislation was followed by the respective exec-
utive legislation such as: 
• decree of the Minister of Economy detailing out
the permission of business activity where toxic
chemicals are used,
• decree of the Minister of Economy concerning
specific data to be included in the business reports
of entities dealing in chemical substances.
b. Counter-terrorism measures
Poland is party to 11 United Nations "antiterrorist"
conventions and protocols.
Poland is not yet party to one antiterrorist convention:
• Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal
on 1 March 1991. Ratification is on the way.
National policy
Terrorism is at present one of the most serious threats
the international and national security. Since terror-
ist actions have global dimension and they create
tensions and instability on many level, Poland’s pol-
icy underlines the importance of strengthening the
role of international co-operation, international law
and international organisations. Even the best
national structures are not able to unilaterally elimi-
nate this threat.
Due to the character of the terrorist threat, Poland is
also taking necessary measures at national level to
suppress and prevent terrorism. In 2004 the Polish
Penal Code was amended and the definition and
offence of the terrorist character was introduced. At
present, appropriate steps to assure the better insti-
tutional co-ordination are undertaken, involving the
establishment of the National Co-ordinator on
Combating Terrorism.
Legal framework
Penal law
The Polish penal law (Penal Code of the Republic of
Poland of 6th June 1997) penalises individual terror-
ist acts on the basis of general criminal provisions
(i.e. crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes,
crimes against the Republic of Poland, crimes
against defence, crimes against life and health,
crimes against public security, crimes against safety
of transportation, crimes against public order etc.)
The provisions of the law prohibit actions of such a
character, and sanctions are envisaged reflecting the
seriousness of such acts.
Article 115 (20) of the Penal Code of the Republic of
Poland contains the definition of an offence of ter-
rorist character. It is a criminal act subject to the
penalty up to 5 years or more of imprisonment,
committed with an aim to seriously intimidate the
population or to force the public authority of Poland
or other country or international organisation to act
or not to act, or to cause considerable interference
in the economy or constitutional structure of Poland
other country or international organisation. 
The above mentioned definition provides for a pos-
sibility to introduce more severe sanctions for the
perpetrator of an offence of terrorist character
(Article 65 (1) of the Penal Code) and to apply the
Polish Penal Code to Polish nationals, Polish organ-
isational entities and aliens who committed offence
of a terrorist character abroad (Article 110 (1) of the
Penal Code).
Article 258 of the Penal Code contains provisions
concerning terrorist organisation. It stipulates that
whoever participates in an organisation which
objective is to commit an offence of terrorist charac-
ter, shall be punished with 6 months up to 8 years of
imprisonment. Whoever forms or leads such an
organisation is subject to imprisonment for no less
than 3 years. 
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Procedural rules
There are no specific procedural rules applicable to
persons accused of committing terrorist offences. In
such cases, regular provisions of the Code of Penal
Procedure shall apply. 
In fighting the organised crime and terrorism a num-
ber of special legal instruments can be applied, i.e.
special investigating teams, special investigating
methods, the use of undercover agents, sting opera-
tions, key witness procedures, incognito witness,
witness protection programs. 
Prevention of financing terrorism
The Law on Counteracting Introduction into
Financial Circulation of Property Values Derived
from Illegal or Undisclosed Sources and on
Counteracting the Financing of Terrorism of 16
November 2000 (with amendments) sets forth stan-
dards of the procedure of combating money launder-
ing and financing of terrorism in Poland. On the basis
of the regulations of the Law, General Inspector of
Financial Information has been nominated and the
Department of Financial Information as Polish
Financial Intelligence Unit has been created.
The basic tasks of the General Inspector of Financial
Information and the Department of Financial
Information are to: collect, keep, process and
analyse information according to the procedures
provided for in the Law. The tasks encompass, in
particular:
• current co-operation with the domestic institutions
charged with preventing of money laundering and
financing of terrorism,
• current co-operation with domestic and interna-
tional institutions and organisations associated
with the Polish financial system,
• administration of the data received from obligated
institutions,
• analyzing information on controls carried out by
institutions indicated in the Law,
• drafting of relevant legal acts,
• drafting of periodical reports on General Inspector
of Financial Information activities.
Due to the Amendment to the Law on Counteracting
Introduction into Financial Circulation of Property
Values Derived from Illegal or Undisclosed Sources
and on Counteracting the financing of Terrorism of
27 September 2002 the General Inspector of
Financial Information is entitled to: 
• prevent financing of terrorism, 
• co-operate with foreign institutions dealing with
preventing the financing of terrorism,
• perform bank transaction suspension or bank
account blockade procedure concerning financ-
ing of terrorism,
• transmit to the obliged institution information
about entities reasonably suspected of having con-
nections with terrorist acts.
Pursuant to the Law the following institutions are
obliged to combat financing of terrorism:
• banks, foreign bank branches,
• brokerage houses, 
• banks carrying out brokerage activity and other
entities not being banks engaged in brokerage
activities,
• entities conducting activity involving games of
chance, mutual betting and automatic machine
games, 
• insurance companies, 
• main branches of foreign insurance companies, 
• investment funds, investment funds societies, 
• co-operative savings and credit banks, 
• state public utility enterprise - Polish Postal
Service, 
• notaries public (for the procedures concerning
deals in the property), 
• residents engaged in currency exchange,
• Entrepreneurs running: auction houses, antique
shops, conducting leasing and factoring activity,
activity in the scope of precious and semi-precious
metals and stones trade, commission sale, giving
loans on pawn (pawnshops), real estate agents.
The General Inspector collects information about
natural and legal persons who are suspect of the
offence of financing of terrorism. The data basis with
list of those persons and entities is actualised on the
regular basis. On the basis of possessed information
the General Inspector transmits to the obliged institu-
tions the information if there is a well-grounded sus-
picion that they are linked to the offence mentioned
above. Obligated institution shall inform the General
Inspector forthwith about keeping an account on
behalf of entity, mentioned above, and on transac-
tions, to which this entity appears as party.
The General Inspector is entitled to perform: trans-
action suspension procedure, i.e. temporary (period
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not exceeding 48 hours following the notification)
restrictions on the disposition and use of the materi-
al assets, consisting in preventing performance of a
specific transaction by an obligated institution and
blocking of an account procedure, i.e. temporary
(period not exceeding 48 hours following the notifi-
cation) preventing disposition and use of all materi-
al assets accumulated on the account, including also
by an obligated institution. 
Public prosecutor may, by a decision, suspend the
transaction or proceed with blocking of account for a
definite period, however not exceeding 3 months fol-
lowing the receipt of General Inspector’s notification.
Pursuant to the Chapter V of Penal Code the court
may decide on forfeiture of the objects directly
derived from the offence, which have been used or
have been supposed to be used for committing the
crime. The Law of September 9 2000 amending the
Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes the legal basis
for incoming and outgoing requests concerning for-
feiture. It creates a general possibility for forfeiture. 
Under Article 44 of the Penal Code the court shall
impose the forfeiture of items directly derived from
an offence, unless they are subject to return to the
injured person or to another entity. The court may
decide on the forfeiture of the items, which served
or were designed for committing the offence unless
they are subject to the return to another entity. The
forfeiture described above shall not be applied if its
imposition would not be commensurate with the
severity of the offence committed. In such situation
the court may impose a supplementary payment to
the State Treasury. The court may impose the oblig-
ation to pay a pecuniary equivalent of their value in
the event the perpetrator has intentionally prevented
the possibility of imposing the forfeiture of items
specified above. When the court comes to conclu-
sion that the conviction has pertained to an offence
of violating a prohibition of production, possession
or dealing in or transporting specific items, it may
decide on the forfeiture thereof. Property subject to
forfeiture, shall be transferred to the ownership of
the State Treasury at the time the sentence becomes
final and valid.
Legislation or other measures to prohibit offences
in Poland related to recruitment to terrorist
groups and the supply of weapons to terrorists 
In case of measures to prohibit offences related to
recruitment to terrorist groups the key provision is
contained in the Article 258 of the Penal Code 
Law of 29 November 2000 on external trade in
goods, technologies and services of strategic impor-
tance both for state security and for maintenance of
international peace and security applies to the issue
of supply weapons to terrorists, mechanisms and
procedures of control of trade in strategic goods,
technologies and services relevant to national secu-
rity, as well as to the maintenance of international
peace and security. Poland is also a party to the
Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons and their destruction.
Legislation and procedures existing in Poland for
denying safe haven to terrorists 
This is regulated by the Law on Aliens of 13 June
2003. Law on Aliens stipulates that an alien may be
refused visa or entry clearance on the territory of the
Republic of Poland if there is reasonable suspicion
that the alien engages in terrorist activity, partici-
pates in such an activity, organises it or is member of
a terrorist organisation. Additionally, the Law on
Aliens stipulates that an alien may be also refused
visa and entry if there is a reasonable suspicion that
he carries across the border, without required per-
mission, arms, munitions, explosive materials,
radioactive materials or drugs or psychotropic sub-
stances, participates in such an activity, organises it
or is a member of an organisation engaged in such
an activity. 
An alien may be denied entry to Poland if his entry
or stay is undesired due to the obligations resulting
from the provisions of ratified international treaties
to which Poland is party or if it is undesired due to
other threat to national security and defence or due
to the need to protect public order. The Chairman of
the Office for Repatriation and Aliens is, on the basis
of the subject law, the competent authority to main-
tain the list of undesired persons. The list, which is
updated on a regular basis, is forwarded to diplo-
matic missions and consular offices of Poland
abroad. Every visa application is verified with the list
and undesired persons will be denied visa or permit
for entry. The co-operation between competent
authorities ensures strict implementation of require-
ments of the international law binding Poland in this
matter. For the same reasons, on the basis of Article
52 an alien may be expelled from the territory of
22
Poland, on the basis of administrative decision
issued by the competent authority. 
Legislation and procedures existing in Poland to
prevent terrorists acting from Polish territory against
other states or citizens 
In this case provision of the Penal Code shall be
applicable as in relation with the response to para-
graph 2 (a), namely Article 258 (Chapter XXXII -
Crimes against public order). 
Legislation on Firearms, Explosives and Provisions
common to firearms and explosives
The Law of 21 May 1999 on arms and munitions
determines detailed principles of issuance and with-
drawal of permits for arms, acquisition, storage, dis-
posal and deposition of arms and munitions, trans-
port through the national territory, import and export
of arms and munitions and principles governing the
possession of arms and munitions by aliens. The
acquisition and possession of firearms is subject to
special permit issued by competent Police organ.
The Law specifies cases where permits cannot be
issued to persons who do not meet specific require-
ments or infringed conditions and obligations set
forth in the Law. The same conditions apply to the
withdrawal of permits. Firearms should be registered
and the owner has to have special document con-
firming possession of arms. The provisions of the Law
apply to aliens accordingly. There are specific provi-
sions in the Law related to possession of arms and
munitions in case of members of diplomatic missions
and consular offices, other persons with equal status,
who can possess arms and munitions on the basis of
international agreements or the principle of mutuali-
ty. In this case the possession of arms is subject to
temporary permit issued by competent Police organ.
The Law contains penal sanctions and provisions on
seizure of arms and munitions. There are executive
regulations to that Law, which relate inter alia to:
types of especially dangerous arms and munitions in
case of which permit may be issued; medical and
psychological examination of persons who apply for
or possess permit; model declaration of importation
from abroad of arms and munitions and procedure
for transmission of information to the Police on
importation of arms and munitions by customs ser-
vices; procedure and conditions for the issuance of
permits for arms to the members of diplomatic mis-
sions and consular offices and persons having equal
status; detailed principles of deposition of arms and
munitions; model required documents, etc. 
The Law of 21 June 2002 on explosives for civilian
use determines principles of issuance and withdraw-
al of permits for acquisition and storage of explo-
sives, basic requirements in relation with explosives
introduced to trade, principles governing the trans-
port of explosives and its control, conformity assess-
ment procedures and marking of explosives.
Acquisition and storage of explosives for civilian use
requires permit, issued by chief of provincial admin-
istration (representative of the Government in the
province), competent for the registered office of the
requesting person. The Law specifies the informa-
tion required for the issuance of permit, conditions
to be met by these persons to obtain the permit as
well as the cases when the permit should be denied
or withdrawn. Transport and transit of explosives
requires consent of the Minister for Economy and
Labour. There are executive regulations to that Law,
which determine inter alia: requirements of training
and examination of persons, who have access to
explosives, model register of explosives, and model
request for permit. There are separate legal provi-
sions relating to the possession and use of firearms
and explosives by state bodies and their officers
responsible for the maintenance of national security
and public order as well as Armed Forces.
The provisions concerning the principles of eco-
nomic activity relating to the manufacturing and
trade with explosives, arms, munitions and products
and technologies of military and police purposes are
contained in the Law of 22 June 2001. Executive reg-
ulations to that Law specify: conditions of sale of,
scope and manner of verification of consistency with
these requirements, requirements as to quality assess-
ment, registration of these sensitive materials, and
principles of management in terms of environmental
protection and protection of human life and health.
Institutional framework
There are two agencies playing a leading role in
anti-terrorists actions in Poland: Internal Security
Agency (ABW) and the Police. Although there is a
clear division between their responsibilities, the two
services co-operate very closely, since terrorism is a
serious threat of public concern.
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The Internal Security Agency is responsible for issues
connected with the protection of the State’s internal
security and its constitutional order. The main tasks
of the Agency include, among others, combating all
kinds of threats to the State’s internal security, such as
the crimes of espionage and terrorism, ABC prolifer-
ation and drug trafficking on an international scale.
The Agency has investigation powers allowing it to
conduct various legal procedures.
The Police, who is generally responsible for public
order, have within its structures the Central
Investigation Bureau (CBS), which deals with the
most serious crimes, and Antiterrorism Task Force
(ZOA KGP). 
Other institutions involved in anti-terrorist activities:
 the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW)
 the General Inspector of Financial Information
(GIIF)
 the Military Intelligence Services (WSI)
 the Border Guard (SG)
 the Government Protection Bureau (BOR)
 the Custom Service
Additionally, two other bodies, which do not take
part in operational activities, should be mentioned:
The National Security Council (RBN), which is an
advisory body to the President of the Republic of
Poland, responsible for setting general plans and
objectives concerning security, international rela-
tions and armed forces.
The National Security Bureau (BBN), which is a part
of the President’s Chancellery, provides technical
and merit support to the RBN and plays a role of a
think-tank.
The co-ordination of the activities of various bodies
and agencies and monitoring the threat of terrorism
is the task of the Inter-ministerial Centre for
Organised Crime and International Terrorism, which
is an auxiliary body to the Prime Minister. The
Government Intelligence Community acts as the
Prime Minister’s advisory body and is responsible for
foreign intelligence. Its main task is to exchange
information, analyse intelligence and producing
threat assessments. 
To ensure better consolidation and better opera-
tional co-ordination of terrorism-related work and
simplify the exchange of information and intelli-
gence, the Counter Terrorism Task Force for Co-ordi-
nation of Operational Cases was established. 
The Crisis Management Team consists of the repre-
sentatives of appropriate Ministries and is responsi-
ble for actions taken with regard to crisis situations
(e.g. terrorist’s attack, flood etc.). 
The task of The Team for Co-ordination of Opera-
tional Activities regarding Combating Political
Terrorism is to exchange information about terrorist
threat and persons suspected of terrorist activities.
The Task Force on acts of terror with the use of
explosives deals with analysis of the threat of terror-
ist activities with the use of explosives. 
International Co-operation
Poland regards international co-operation in the
fighting of terrorism as a matter of a great impor-
tance. Since terrorism is a phenomenon of interna-
tional dimension, the proper commitment on the
international level is essential to suppress the terror-
ists’ activities. 
From Poland’s point of view fostering the legal co-
operation between states is crucial. Therefore
Poland is a party to many bilateral agreements con-
cerning extradition, mutual assistance and counter-
ing organised crime. Poland is also a party to a num-
ber of multilateral treaties devoted to that subject.
Poland signed all twelve United Nations Anti-
Terrorism Conventions and has ratified 11 of them.
At present the ratification procedure of Convention
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose
of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March is the
pending issue. The ratification process of Amending
Protocol to the European Convention on the
Suppression of terrorism is in its final stage and the
instrument of ratification will be handed this year.
Poland has implemented 8 special recommendation
of the FATF and is pursuing an active policy with an
aim to join the Group. 
Measures in the EU framework
Poland supports strengthening anti-terrorist co-oper-
ation on the EU level. Poland shares the views
expressed in the European Council Declaration on
the fight against terrorism and Revised Plan of
Action on combating terrorism and introduces nec-
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essary changes in its national law. Moreover due to
implementation of the Framework Decision on
European arrest warrant, the appropriate changes to
the Code of Penal Procedure were introduced in
May 2004. 
Poland is of the opinion that the co-operation on the
European level, exchange of information and expe-
rience between States and appropriate legal solu-
tions are playing a key role. Taking into account free
movement of people, services, capital and ideas it is
impossible to observe security issues only from the
national point of view. In that case the broader per-
spective is indispensable.
c. Export Controls
The control of foreign trade in strategic goods is reg-
ulated by the 29 November 2000 Law on external
trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic
importance for national security and maintenance of
international peace and security, recently amended
on 2 July 2004.  The amendments mainly resulted
from the fact that starting from 1 May 2004 the
European Council Regulation No. 1334/2000 of 22
June 2000, setting up a Community regime for the
control of export of dual-use items and technology is
directly binding in the Polish legal system. 
Summarising, the export control regulations in
Polish law:
• introduce general and global licences covering
export, import or transit of goods or technologies
subject to control,
• extend control to commodities which do not fig-
ure on control lists if there is no certainty about
their end use,
• implement control of trade in "intangible" tech-
nologies, i.e. which can be transmitted by way of
computers, fax machines and telephones, or con-
veyed during training courses,
• make possible involvement of a company in the
exercise of control of foreign trade in strategic
goods,
• lay the groundwork for development of partner-
ship and co-operation of business operators with
government administration.
Important is that the ban on foreign trade in strategic
goods and services remains in force unless a busi-
ness operator has complied with all terms and
restrictions laid down in the said law, in other laws,
as well as other international agreements and
arrangements. A privilege of trade in sensitive goods
- which takes the form of a licence - can be with-
drawn or changed, or else, the enterprise owner
may be denied it at all.
Pursuant to the aforesaid law, the Ministry of
Economy and Labour demands that a Polish entre-
preneur submits an end-user’s international import
certificate or end-user statement, confirmed by the
relevant government authorities of a foreign
importer. The end-user’s statement is issued by a for-
eign end-user, and its contents must meet the
requirements of the Ministry of Economy and
Labour. This statement has to bear a confirmation of
both a foreign importer and the authorities of a
country of destination. The document is used in all
export transactions with the aim of transferring
responsibility on to foreign trading partners and their
authorities, as well as safeguarding goods against
being forwarded to unauthorised destinations.
A new law regulating the country’s foreign trade in
goods, technologies and services of strategic rele-
vance for its security, as well as for the maintenance
of international peace and security came in force on
1 January 2001. This law incorporates mechanisms
of the European Union Code of Conduct in Arms
Export, which in June 1998 won approval from the
EU’s General Affairs Council. The idea of Poland’s
foreign trade control system is underpinned by the
concept of industrial enterprises, trade companies
and research and development centres running their
own, internal control systems. Control on the
ground is to be organised by Polish manufacturers,
exporters, users, research and development centres,
etc. Control has to be exercised by brokers, dis-
patchers, haulers, operators of cargo-handling plants
and trade consultants on their own turf. The track
record of mature trade control systems highlights
motivations of manufacturers or exporters and the
two-way flow of information between the govern-
ment administration, business people and scientists.
The aim is to deploy control mechanisms and pro-
cedures, which meet international standards Poland’s
membership in NATO and in the European Union
has prompted modifications of legal regulations,
mechanisms and procedures relevant to its foreign
trade in armaments and military equipment, as well
as dual-use goods and technologies.
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Present export controls regulations concerning dual-
use goods in Poland are based on the European
Council Regulation No. 1334/2000, updated by the
Regulation No. 1504/2004 of 19 July 2004 (update
of control list). In respect of arms export, national
control list is applicable. As far as control of foreign
trade in dual-use goods is concerned the following
changes were introduced:
 withdrawing from licensing of import of dual-use
goods and introduction of import monitoring for
some items connected with telecommunications
and "information security", included in the catego-
ry 5 of the Community dual-use control list (Annex
I to the Council Regulation No. 1334/2000), due
to national security reasons;
 direct application of the control list included in
Annex I to the Regulation No. 1334/2000;
 inclusion of control of technical assistance and
brokering into provisions covering control of ser-
vices related to all goods of strategic relevance fol-
lowing the Council Common Position
2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of
arms brokering and Joint Action of 22 June 2000
concerning control of technical assistance related
to certain military end-uses;
 introduction of provisions enabling use of the
Community General Export Authorization;
 issuing of national general authorizations in the
form of regulation in accordance with indications
set out in Annex IIIb to the Regulation 1334/2000;
 issuing individual and global licenses on forms con-
sistent with Annex IIIa to the Regulation 1334/2000;
 possibility of granting global licenses for export of
spare-parts and some kind of services (mainly for
forwarding services);
 application of prior registration of companies
before the use of the Community General Export
Authorization and general national authorizations;
 removing all charges for granting licenses and all
certificates provided in the law.    
Import control
The Minister of Economy and Labour, pursuant to
the law of 29 November 2000, issues an import cer-
tificate or confirms the statement of end user, only
when the authorities of a foreign importer’s country
require so. The law further stipulates that the inter-
national import certificate and the end-user’s state-
ment are documents to be submitted to the appro-
priate authorities beyond Poland’s borders. They
confirm importer’s credibility and are subject to
control of the relevant agencies. Minister of
Economy and Labour refuses issuance of an import
certificate or denies a confirmation to end-user state-
ment in cases of lack of confirmation of control
being exercised over imports to Poland or no guar-
antee that trade in strategic goods was conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the law. 
Separate procedures exist in cases of control of trade
in goods, which are not included on control list and
goods in transit. A system of control of foreign trade
in goods, technologies and services of strategic
importance for the security of the state and interna-
tional peace and security came into effect on 1
January 2001. By introducing a control system
imposing restrictions on deliveries of arms, military
equipment as well as goods and technologies which
might be used by terrorist organisations for produc-
tion of mass destruction weapons Poland supports
international community in a common policy to
save international peace and security. The Ministry
of Economy and Labour has launched a series of
training schemes for businessmen. The said training
schemes cover university-level schools, research
and development and technological centres. 
Issuance of licences
Polish current legislation provides for the following
licenses, issued by the Minister of Economy and
Labour:
• individual licenses: covering a specific goods or a
service pertaining to such, and a country, with
which the particular entrepreneur may enter into
trade,
• general licenses in the form of regulation: covering
a type or a category of dual-use goods, in which
trade may be conducted with one or more coun-
tries specified therein,
• global licenses: covering a type or a category of
dual use goods, in which trade may be conducted
by the particular entrepreneur with specified one
or more partner countries,
Licenses are required for:
• export and transit of dual use goods as well as for
export, import and transit of munitions and mili-
tary equipment,
• grant, loan, leasing or other form of disposal of
those goods to other persons,
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• forwarding services, shipment and loading ser-
vices,
• all associated services including brokering and
technical assistance, 
For trade or services in connection with munitions,
solely individual licenses can be issued.
Licenses are granted only to those companies which
have introduced internal control systems.
In licensing process Minister of Economy and
Labour co-operates with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of National Defence, Minister of
Finance, Minister of Internal Affairs and
Administration, Head of the Internal Security
Agency, President of the National Atomic Energy
Agency and Head of Foreign Intelligence Agency.
No licence can be issued without opinions given by
the above institutions.
Minister of Economy and Labour refuses to issue an
export, import or transit licence, if:
• the pursuit of such trade would be in breach of
obligations assumed by the Republic of Poland
under international agreements,
• the issuance of a licences is incompatible with the
interests of the foreign policy of the Republic of
Poland, national defence or security-related con-
siderations, or important economic interests of the
Republic of Poland, or 
• the applicant does not make any warranty as to
the lawful conduct of his operations,
• there is a risk the end use or destination of strate-
gic goods can be changed, and
• the applicant has been in breach of regulations
governing trade in strategic goods.
Minister of Economy and Labour can at any time on
the basis of administrative decision revoke or alter a
licence already issued to an individual operator if at
least one of the circumstances listed above come
into play, or the operator action is in breach with the
terms laid down in the licence.
Internal system of control
Pursuant to the 29 November 2000 law, the enter-
prise owner is under the obligation to check
whether:
• the end-user intends to use the armaments for
breaking or suppressing human rights and funda-
mental freedoms,
• the arms he is about to deliver will raise a threat to
peace or in some other way will contribute to
upsetting the region’s stability, 
• the country of ultimate destination supports, facil-
itates or encourages terrorism or international
crime,
• the arms to be exported can be used for a purpose
other than meeting the legitimate defence and
security-related needs of the receiving state.
To comply with the above requirements, the contrac-
tor is duty-bound to create and apply an internal con-
trol system and management of trade in strategic
goods to help him run each and every transaction. An
internal control system, being an instrument for safe-
guarding a company against actions incompatible
with national trade control requirements and relevant
international arrangements was introduced. Fitted
with their own, internal control systems, Polish firms
are able to protect both their commercial interests and
their respective images internationally. 
d. NBC Defence Capability of the Polish Armed
Forces (peace time)
The position of Ministry of National Defence regard-
ing the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons and their means of
delivery derives from the fact that nowadays there are
increasing threats related to the spread of WMD and
possibility of their terrorist use. Polish Armed Forces
fully contribute to the work arising from NATO NBC
Defence Initiatives taken at Prague Summit, and have
offered a national support in this field.
Polish Armed Forces are interested in developing
measures aimed at limiting the threat of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the
Polish NBC Defence Staffs and Units are obliged to
be ready to protect and support troops and civilians
when necessary. 
The main mission of the Polish NBC Defence Corps is:
• to protect of the forces and allowing them to fight
and win under NBC (TIM, LLR) threat or environ-
ment;
• to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons in Armed Forces.
NBC Defence units conduct special NBC tasks. The
main of them are:
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• protection against the effect of the use NBC
weapons;
• NC monitoring and reconnaissance;
• NBC warning and reporting;
• analysing and forecasting the effects of NBC strike;
• rescue, emergency-evacuation operations;
• decontamination.
In peacetime, Polish Armed Forces include the fol-
lowing types of chemical units:
1. NBC Regiment consisting of reconnaissance,
decontamination, smoke, and logistic subunits. 
The unit is prepared for:
• providing NC reconnaissance, NBC warning and
reporting, decontamination, large smoke area sup-
port for elements of a central subordination or
corps;
• providing rescue operation in toxic industrial envi-
ronment.
2. NBC Battalion consisting of NC reconnaissance,
decontamination, smoke, and logistic subunits.
The unit is prepared to conduct the same tasks as
regiment.
3. NBC Companies designed for Armour/Mecha-
nised Divisions, Main Air Force Bases and Main
Navy Bases.
4. NBC Platoons designed for Armour/Mechanised
Brigades.
Although the main task of troops is to be ready for
war, their power and technical and organisational
potential should be useful also during peacetime. It
certainly also refers to chemical troops or the NBC
Defence system as a whole. One of the main peace-
time roles for this system results from Chernobyl dis-
aster is monitoring the level of radioactive pollution
environment. 
Basing on the current documents, the Polish Armed
Forces Early Warning System was established as a
part of National Measurement Network. 
This system comprises:
• an automated radiological contamination mea-
surement network;
• analytical centres;
• data collection and situation analysis units.
The automated radiological contamination mea-
surement network consist of 13 SAPOS 90 MS
devices. The meters are located within the on-duty
staffs and military units connected to a dispatch
computer in the NBC Area Control Centre.
Other sources of hazard and in result task for NBC
Defence units are Industrial Toxic Materials. Over
the country we can find chemical plants, storage or
various other installations with TIM are located and
create a real threat of contamination in case of ter-
rorist’s attack.
In 1989 Radiological and Chemical Emergency
Teams were established in order to survey and neu-
tralise the results of chemical and radiological acci-
dents. The teams may operate within military instal-
lations and also provide the help for civilians.
Altogether there are 4 teams which operate on
Military Districts and Navy area of responsibilities.
Each team consist of:
• an operational group consisting of NBC, engineer-
ing and medical specialists - the OG which task is
to manage the whole team;
• data collection and situation analysis group;
• rescue group and NBC, engineering and medical
units and others if needed.
The Polish Armed Forces both in peace and wartime
are equipped with individual respiratory and skin
protective gear. Mainly, personnel use MP-4 filtra-
tion masks. However, High Readiness Forces are
equipped with MP-5 masks. Apart from that, soldiers
are equipped with protective overalls (type OP-1)
that protect skin against impacts of WMD effects.
Special units, such as NBC and some other units are
equipped with protective overall - L-2 based on rub-
berised cotton clothing. The main units of High
Readiness Forces are equipping with new protective
suit (FOO) based on SARATOGA fabric. Moreover,
Military Group of Chemical Rescue Specialists is
issued with gas-proof protective clothes and oxygen
masks that meet the standards of western rescue ser-
vices. Collective NBC protection is implemented
through the use of armored vehicles and shelters
equipped with filtration devices. There are research
and development programs underway on unhard-
ened collective protection ref. NATO standards.
5. REFERENCES TO THE OPERATIVE PART OF
RESOLUTION
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from pro-
viding any form of support to non-State actors
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that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture,
possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means
of delivery;
All activities on any form of support to non-State
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufac-
ture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery are prohibited under the Polish law.
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with
their national procedures, shall adopt and
enforce appropriate effective laws which pro-
hibit any non-State actor to manufacture,
acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
and their means of delivery, in particular for
terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage
in any of the foregoing activities, participate in
them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;
The Polish Penal Code incorporates penal sanctions
against any persons who - in violation of interna-
tional law - produce, stockpile, acquire, sell, or
transport weapons of mass destruction or other
means of combat, or conduct research aimed at
producing or using such weapons. 
According to the Penal Code (Journal of Laws No.
88, item 553), Chapter XVI. Crimes against peace,
humanity and war crimes, Art. 120 states that: A per-
son, who uses the weapon of mass destruction pro-
hibited by international law, shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for the time not shorter than 10 years,
for 25 years or for life.
In Art. 121.1. A person, who in contradiction to the
prohibitions of the international law or provisions of
law (statute), manufactures, collects, acquires, sells,
stores, transports or transmits the weapons of mass
destruction or develops them with the view to their
manufacturing or use, shall be sentenced to impris-
onment for 1 year up to 10 years.
The same penalty shall be applicable to a person,
who allows the commitment of the act referred to in
paragraph. 1.
Atomic Law of 29 November 2000, (Journal of Laws
No. 3 item 18 of 2001; last update: Journal of Laws
No. 70, No. 96 of 2004) establishes licensing system
and explicitly  forbids development of nuclear
weapons
Accordingly to Article 4 of the Law of 22 June 2001
on the implementation of the Convention on the
prohibition of the development, production, stock-
piling and use of chemical weapons and on their
destruction (J. of L. No. 76, item 812) it is prohibited
in the territory of the Republic of Poland:
1) development, production, manufacturing, pro-
cessing, consumption or otherwise acquiring, col-
lecting, stockpiling, sale or transfer to anyone of
chemical weapons,
2) use of chemical weapons,
3) engaging in any military preparations to use
chemical weapons,
4) use  of riot control agents as a method of warfare,
5) abetting or assistance in engaging in the activity
prohibited under subparagraphs 1-4 above.
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce
effective measures to establish domestic controls
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons and their means of deliv-
ery, including by establishing appropriate con-
trols over related materials and to this end shall:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective
measures to account for and secure such items in
production, use, storage or transport;
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective
physical protection measures;
Law of 29 November 2000 on external trade in
goods, technologies and services of strategic impor-
tance both for state security and for the keeping
international peace and security introduces general
and global licences covering export, import or tran-
sit of goods or technologies subject to control and,
in particular:
• extends control to commodities which do not fig-
ure on control lists if there is no certainty about
their end use,
• ushers in control of trade in "intangible" technolo-
gies, i.e. which can be transmitted by way of com-
puters, fax machines and telephones, or conveyed
during training courses,
• makes possible involvement of a company in the
exercise of control of external trade in strategic
goods,
• lays the groundwork for development of partner-
ship and co-operation of business operators with
government administration.
Domestic controls in the nuclear sphere are based
on legal acts:
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1. Agreement between Poland and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - INFCIRC
179 (based on the IAEA INFCIRC/153) which
entered into force on 11 of October 1972. This
document establishes the rules for nuclear safe-
guards in Poland prohibiting access to nuclear
materials to non-state entities.
2. Atomic Law of 29 November 2000, (Journal of
Laws No. 3, item 18 of 2001; last update: Journal
of Laws  No. 70, No. 96 of 2004)
The Law requires that activities involving use of
radioactive materials shall be licensed and requires
physical protection of nuclear materials as well as
safeguards procedures for their control.
3. Regulation of Council of Ministers of 27 April
2004 on Nuclear Material Safeguards (Journal of
Laws No. 98, item 982 of 2004) pursuant to oblig-
ations contained in the Agreement on Safeguards
between Poland and the IAEA, ratified in 1972. 
4. Regulation of Council of Ministers of 31 July 2004
on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
(Journal of Laws No. 90, item 997 of 2001), pur-
suant to obligations under the Convention of
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (open for
signature in 1980 and ratified  by Poland  on
3.03.1989) and to requirements for a State System
for physical protection of nuclear materials
defined in the recommendation INFCIRC/225 rev.
4 of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
Regulation requires that users of nuclear materials
ensure their physical protection according to
principles of the IAEA. 
Starting 11 September 2001 more stringent proce-
dures of physical protection have been implement-
ed in the facilities of the Institute of Atomic Energy.
Domestic controls in the chemical sphere are based
on the Law of 22 June 2001 on the implementation
of the CWC. Its Article 5 states that "The production,
manufacturing, processing, consumption, acquiring,
collecting, storage, sale, transfer or use of toxic
chemicals or their precursors, mentioned in
Schedule 1 of the Annex of Chemicals to the
Convention, hereinafter referred to as "the Schedule
1", may be carried out only for the purposes not pro-
hibited under the Convention and in the amounts
allowed for therein and in accordance with its
requirements"
Any activity involving the chemicals included in
Schedule 1 of the Convention may be conducted
only for purposes not prohibited under the
Convention, for allowed quantities and in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Conventions, sub-
ject to obtaining the appropriate permission for such
activity. The permission can be obtained from the
Minister of Economy, Labour and Social Policy (for
civilian area) or from the Minister of National
Defense (for military area). Export, import, and tran-
sit of Schedule 1 chemicals to and from States not
Parties to the Convention are prohibited, whereas to
and from States Parties to the Convention are per-
missible only for the purpose not prohibited by the
Convention and in permissible quantities, if duly
licensed by the Minister of Economy and Labour.
Export, import, and transit of Schedule 2 or 3 chem-
icals are permitted exclusively in relation to the
States Parties to the Convention subject to obtaining
the license.
Domestic controls in the biological sphere is based
on various legal acts, including Penal Code, Law of
29 November 2000 on external trade in goods, tech-
nologies and services of strategic importance both
for state security and for the keeping international
peace and security, and others.
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective
border controls and law enforcement efforts
to detect, deter, prevent and combat, includ-
ing through international cooperation when
necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering
in such items in accordance with their nation-
al legal authorities and legislation and consis-
tent with international law
Law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and
combat, including through international coopera-
tion when necessary, the illicit trafficking and bro-
kering in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
and their means of delivery are covered by three
agencies, i.e.: Border Guard, Custom Service and
Internal Security Agency.
Border Guard
In order to protect from illegal entry (transit) of
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radioactive sources and substances, nuclear, chemi-
cal, biological materials constituting a potential
threat to human life and health, in October of 1990
chemical and radiometric (ecological) control of
individuals and goods was introduced in all border
crossing points. The system of this control is being
systematically expanded. BG officers (specialists in
radiation control) undertake this control in border
crossing points based on the following documents
presented by the carrier or forwarding agent: bill of
lading, permit for transportation or export, export
declaration, customs application, SAD form, etc.
The officers also undertake external inspection of
vehicle and freight, its sign-shields according to
binding patterns and check the level of contamina-
tion with technical equipment.  
According to the Act on Border Guard of October
12, 1990 (Journal of Laws no. 78, item 462 with
later amendments), one of the tasks carried into
effect by the BG is "preventing transportation, with-
out the permit required  in accordance with separate
regulations, through the state border of waste, harm-
ful chemical substances also nuclear and radioac-
tive materials,  as well as polluting border waters".
Furthermore BG organizational border units share
action plans and cooperation plans with bodies and
institutions functioning in border crossing points in
event of employment of mass destruction weapon,
threat to human life and health or natural environ-
ment within the territorial range of the border cross-
ing point. These plans include: 
 types of threats, 
 principles of conduct in threat situations,
 utilization of own forces and resources, 
 notification and  communication system.
Installation of stationary equipment for contamina-
tion control begun in the year 1990 by placing so-
called radiometric gates in border crossing points.
With time radiometric gates were modernized or
adapted to specific conditions e.g. in airports and
seaports.
Currently the total number of stationary equipment
for contamination control of persons and vehicles
on the state border totals 182 sets, including 8
devices of the new PM 500 type construction that
can detect neutrons. These tools have been manu-
factured in Poland. 
Custom Service
The Law of 24 July 1999 on Custom Service (Journal
of Laws of 2004, No. 156, item 1641) remains a
legal basis for Custom Service activity, in the imple-
mentation of particular tasks, emerging from two
acts:
• Council Regulation (EC) no 1334/2000 setting up
a Community regime for the control of exports of
dual-use items and technology
• Law of 29 November 2000 on external trade in
goods, technologies and services of strategic
importance both for state security and for the
keeping international peace and security 
• Changes to the Law on Custom Service, done after
Poland’s accession to EU, enables CS to conduct
investigation activities. 
Internal Security Agency
The legal basis for Internal Security Agency (ABW) is
Law of 24 May 2002 on Internal Security Agency,
which, in its art. 5 regulates ABW role in countering
WMD proliferation. It includes:
1. Recognizing, preventing, and exposing crimes of:
 Illicit production and trade in goods, technologies
and services of strategic importance (including
dual-use goods)
 Illegal production, possession and trade in arms
2. Performing intelligence and investigative activi-
ties in order to recognize, prevent and expose
mentioned above crimes;
3. Prosecuting the perpetrators of the crimes men-
tioned above;
4. Acquiring, analyzing, processing and forwarding
to appropriate authorities information which may
be vital to the fight against WMD proliferation;
5. Investigating forms and methods of national and
international individuals illegal activity; 
6. Investigating individuals, groups and organiza-
tions suspected or identified as being involved in
proliferation-related activity and countering
threats arising from their activity;
7. Collecting intelligence about any proliferation-
related activity on Polish territory;
8. Direct co-operation with other Polish law enfor-
cement agencies; 
9. Co-operation and exchange of information with
partner services.
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appro-
priate effective national export and trans-ship-
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ment controls over such items, including appro-
priate laws and regulations to control export,
transit, trans-shipment and re-export and con-
trols on providing funds and services related to
such export and trans-shipment such as financ-
ing, and transporting that would contribute to
proliferation, as well as establishing end-user
controls; and establishing and enforcing appro-
priate criminal or civil penalties for violations of
such export control laws and regulations
The tasks under paragraph 4(d) of the Resolution
1540 are implemented on the basis of Law of 29
November 2000 on external trade in goods, tech-
nologies and services of strategic importance both
for state security and for the keeping international
peace and security 
5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in
this Resolution shall be interpreted so as to con-
flict with or alter the rights and obligations of
State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
or alter the responsibilities of the International
Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
Poland is a State party to the all above-mentioned
international treaties and fully implements their pro-
visions. 
6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this
Resolution of effective national control lists and
calls upon all Member States, when necessary,
to pursue at the earliest opportunity the devel-
opment of such lists;
Poland, as an active member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control
Regime, Australia Group, Zangger Committee and
Wassenaar Arrangement develops and regularly
updates its national export control lists. 
7. Recognizes that some States may require assis-
tance in implementing the provisions of this
Resolution within their territories and invites
States in a position to do so to offer assistance as
appropriate in response to specific requests to
the States lacking the legal and regulatory infra-
structure, implementation experience and/or
resources for fulfilling the above provisions;
Poland is willing to offer its assistance in implementing
the provisions of the Resolution. Our activity in this
regard will be directed to the States of the region of
Central and Eastern Europe. We are ready to provide
assistance in building legal and administrative infra-
structure, sharing with implementation experience, and
training respective national authorities.
8. Calls upon all States:
(a) To promote the universal adoption and full
implementation, and, where necessary, strengt-
hening of multilateral treaties to which they
are parties, whose aim is to prevent the prolif-
eration of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons;
Poland promotes universalisation of multilateral
instruments on non-proliferation. 
As a next Chair of the Conference of the States
Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention, Poland
will pay a special attention to this subject. 
(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where
it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance
with their commitments under the key multi-
lateral non-proliferation treaties;
Poland has begun a study to review its obligations
under BTWC with an aim to revise and  if neces-
sary  to adopt new, regulations on implementation
the BTWC provisions, accordingly to the review
process conducted in Geneva.
(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multi-
lateral cooperation, in particular within the
framework of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons and the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, as important
means of pursuing and achieving their com-
mon objectives in the area of non-proliferation
and of promoting international cooperation for
peaceful purposes;
Poland fully supports the aims and objectives of all
international treaties and promotes full compliance
to their provisions.
As a next Chair of the Conference of the States
Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention, Poland
will take measures to strengthen efforts for promot-
ing objectives of CWC.
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(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and
inform industry and the public regarding their
obligations under such laws;
Poland’s authorities (Ministry of Economy and
Labour) conduct a series of actions with the aim to: 
• involve Poland’s manufacturers, merchants, ser-
vice providers and scientific research facilities in
the actions aimed against those organizations that
seek to instigate local or regional armed conflicts.
• involve Poland’s industry in joint efforts against
identified or possible terrorist organisations in pur-
suit of international peace and stability.
• harmonize actions taken by the Poland’s industry
and the Polish administration with those taken by
the Member States of the EU to prevent prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction and preclude  
the destabilizing effects of stockpiling of conven-
tional weapons, as well as to forestall uncontrolled
transfers of dual-use goods and technologies that
can be detrimental to regional and global peace
and stability.
• Following the example set by the EU and NATO
Member States - to create an environment conduc-
tive to a dialog and information exchange between
the industry and governmental administration in
the field of control of international trade in strate-
gically relevant goods.
9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and
cooperation on non-proliferation so as to
address the threat posed by proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and
their means of delivery
Poland is ready to host, by the end of 2005, interna-
tional conference on the UNSC Resolution 1540
(2004). The conference aims shall include promot-
ing dialogue and co-operation on non-proliferation
and providing overall support UNSCR 1540 (2004)
implementation. 
A detailed proposal will be presented in due course.  
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all
States, in accordance with their national legal
authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law, to take cooperative action
to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemi-
cal or biological weapons, their means of
delivery, and related materials;
Poland takes appropriate actions to prevent illicit
trafficking in WMD. Our participation in the Krakow
Initiative (PSI) is aimed, inter alia, at efforts to build
an internal mechanism of effective implementation
of the Initiative, including improvement of inter-
agency mechanism of cooperation in the sphere of
illicit trafficking prevention. 
******
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Mr. President,
Please accept my congratulations on your election
to the presidency of this distinguished body.
May I also reaffirm the assurances of my highest
appreciation and support to the SecretaryGeneral
of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan.
It is with satisfaction that Poland welcomes in our
midst the new Member of the United Nations 
Switzerland and is looking forward to welcome soon
the Republic of East Timor.
Mr. President,
Distinguished Delegates,
Wislawa Szymborska, a Polish poetess and Nobel
Prize winner, wrote the following words dedicated
to the victims of September 11:
"They plunged down from heights ablaze (...) For
them I can do but two things  depict their fight and
have the last sentence unfinished... "
I believe that every one of us traveling to this brave
city shared similar thoughts. We all must have asked
ourselves a question  what is being expected of us,
where are we today, what obligations are we to ful-
fill to make sure that such horror will never happen
again?
No doubt, September 11 was a wakeup call for all
of us. It may have not changed the world but cer-
tainly it has fundamentally changed the way we per-
ceive it. Yet again the history has placed with us the
responsibility to face the challenge and deliver to
the future generations a better and safer world. But
than  after all  isn’t that really what we are here
for?!
Many of my distinguished colleagues have touched
upon this issue in recent days. The messages deliv-
ered here, just four days ago, by Secretary General
Kofi Annan and President George W. Bush are espe-
cially significant. In that regard we also share the
opinion expressed by a number of other speakers, in
particular Prime Minister of Denmark, Mr. Anders F.
Rasmussen, speaking in his capacity of the President
of the European Union.
Today, United Nations stands at the crossroads, fac-
ing a choice that needs to be made. Either we will
find internal strength to stand up to the challenge
and prove to be more than a mere discussion forum
or forever loose the credibility. Once again, as was
the case at the onset over half a century ago, we
must take the issues of security seriously especially
that terrorism has given it a new dimension.
Poland as the founding member of the United
Nations will continue to support all efforts aimed at
preserving its unique position. We fully agree with
what the UN Secretary General said, that we "can
only succeed, if we make full use of multinational
institutions". We share the position of President
Bush, that the United Nations must be effective and
successful and that UN Resolutions must be
enforced. We are convinced that the Security
Council must find enough strength in the nearest
future to set the course for the decisionmaking
process of the United Nations aimed at concrete
actions. This time we are left with very little margin.
This is the test that international community has to
pass  failure would undermine both the United
Nation’s integrity and the security of the whole
world.
Mr. President,
I think the most appropriate motto for my further
reflections on the future of the United Nations is
ANNEX: 
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contained in the SecretaryGeneral’s Millennium
Report. He wrote: "If the international community
were to create a new United Nations tomorrow, its
makeup would be surely different from the one we
have ".
It would be highly unfortunate if the Millennium
Report, and especially its conclusions relating to the
role of the United Nations and the reform of the
Organization faded into oblivion. Only the United
Nations, given its exceptional legitimacy stemming
from the universal character of both its membership
and mandate can  and, indeed, ought to  rise to
the challenges posed to the international communi-
ty. But for this to happen, its prerogatives, its rules
and the instruments would have to be geared to the
needs of today and the threats of tomorrow. This
must be done by member states themselves,
because, after all, the UN is  and will remain  an
intergovernmental organization.
Mr. President,
We should consider elaboration of a document,
which would be neither a draft revision of the
Charter, nor its supplement, nor its enlarged version.
What I would like to suggest is that we make an
attempt to acknowledge the new reality and try a
new road. By no means am I original or prece-
dentsetting: the Atlantic Charter and the New
Atlantic Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the
1990 Paris Charter of New Europe have all been
there before. In other words, adapting an organiza-
tion’s mandate to make it relevant to the new needs,
without actually revising its foundation act, have
already been tested.
There is a widespread awareness of some provisions
of the United Nations Charter actually becoming a
dead letter. That applies to both their substance and
the procedural solutions they offer. Some of the
Charter’s provisions and organs have completed the
tasks assigned to them. The decolonization process
made the Trusteeship Council redundant. But the
Organization does need new mechanisms to run
peacekeeping operations. It is impossible to com-
prehend why we still keep in place the "clauses on
enemy states" while the UN has no regulations to
properly address the problems related to its human-
itarian interventions. There is a general acceptance
of the need for clear lines to be drawn to mark new
areas of responsibility for a number of important UN
organs.
Mr. President,
The values, purposes and principles of the United
Nations, enshrined in the Preamble and Articles 1 and
2 of the Charter have not lost their relevance. They
have stood the test of time. A document that could be
considered as "New Act of the United Nations at the
Dawn of the 21st Century" could give a fresh impetus
to the principles, organs and mechanisms of the
United Nations and make them more responsive to
the needs and challenges that have dominated the life
of the international community today.
Let me point out four groups of problems that should
be tackled  starting with new threats to security:
 The Charter makes reference to threats traditionally
raised by states; the Charter’s provisions concerning
the Security Council, its composition, instruments
and the remaining chapters dealing with security
are now insufficient  the fact exposed by numerous
developments of the recent years, including the
September 11th attack and its consequences;
 Then comes acute poverty, evident in many parts of
the world, chronic underdevelopment, pandemic
diseases, lack of education and medical care, the
deepening differences in living conditions and
developmental standards  all these being unac-
ceptable and untenable politically and morally;
 Human rights, the rule of law, democracy, good
governance and civil society are the third group of
problems I have been thinking about;
 The fourth group is made up of sustainable devel-
opment related themes focusing on the protection
of both the human habitat, indispensable for the
survival of the human race, and of the common
heritage of mankind.
On top of that, the existing UN principles must be
expanded or new ones developed for the
Organization to pursue its actions in the following
three dimensions, namely:
1. manifestations of multilateralism in UN work
(reconciling broad representation and necessary
collectivism with effectiveness);
2. subsidiarity in UN work to better utilize the
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means and resources available to UN member
states (relation: UN  regional arrangements);
3. getting nongovernmental entities (including pri-
vate capital) involved in UN work in a way which
will not detract from the democratic nature of the
Organization, will not erode its governmental
character or its efficiency while increasing its
resources and effectiveness.
I dare to say, that no country, group of countries or
regional agencies meeting the Organization’s crite-
ria would be capable of taking within its range the
totality of problems such an undertaking would have
to address.
Subject to appropriate consultations involving the
UN membership and the Secretary General we
might wish to establish a Group of Sages made up of
outstanding personalities. The Group would draft an
appropriate document, which would then be
assessed and approved by member states. That doc-
ument should have a politically binding nature,
which would combine with its legal anchorage in
the Charter to provide a platform for the UN actions
over the coming decades.
Mr. President,
Distinguished Delegates,
We should think about the future, and work on its
foundations without losing sight of presentday
achievements.
The enactment of the statute of the International
Criminal Court is one such achievement. It turns a
new page in both international relations and inter-
national law. It is Poland’s desire for the treaty estab-
lishing the Court to become one of the most universal   
documents of its kind. We trust that the existing
divergences between respective stands and views
can be resolved through dialogue and compromise,
according to international law. We have to act so as
not to disappoint the hopes and expectations, which
the international community places in the Court.
Mr. President,
A year ago the whole world has joined together in
an unprecedented example of solidarity. Today we
are more aware of the source and the character of
the threat. We are indeed more capable of dealing
with it through providing for the implementation of
relevant international instruments, taking steps to
control the flow of finances and persons, state bor-
ders and the arms trade. Poland has joined the ongo-
ing antiterrorist operation. Our soldiers are now
deployed in Afghanistan, alongside their colleagues
from other countries, and are doing their utmost to
strengthen security there and help raise the country
from rubble and ruin inflicted upon it by two
decades of war and internal strife.
For us it is a natural obligation that stems from the
symbolic signature, which we have placed on the
Charter bringing this institution to life. But we can-
not avoid asking ourselves a question  are we any
closer today to fulfilling the ideals that we have set
sail for half a century ago....?
We now have another chance to revitalize solidari-
ty, work together for values that are priceless both to
us, and generations to come. Let us all create the
axis of good that will bring back the proper meaning
to the term we are so proud of  The United Nations.
Thank you, Mr. President. 
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Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th
meeting, on 28 April 2004
The Security Council, 
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as their means of deliv-
ery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and
security, 
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its
President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the
level of Heads of State and Government on 31
January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all
Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to
arms control and disarmament and to prevent prolif-
eration in all its aspects of all weapons of mass
destruction, 
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the
need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in
accordance with the Charter any problems in that
context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of
regional and global stability, 
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective
actions against any threat to international peace and
security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chem-
ical and biological weapons and their means of deliv-
ery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as
provided for in the United Nations Charter,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties
whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
the importance for all States parties to these treaties
to implement them fully in order to promote inter-
national stability, 
Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral
arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation, 
Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons should not ham-
per international cooperation in materials, equip-
ment and technology for peaceful purposes while
goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a
cover for proliferation, 
Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and
the risk that non-State actors* such as those identi-
fied in the United Nations list established and main-
tained by the Committee established under Security
Council Resolution 1267 and those to whom
Resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traf-
fic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their means of delivery, 
Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking
in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and
their means of delivery, and related materials,*
which adds a new dimension to the issue of prolif-
eration of such weapons and also poses a threat to
international peace and security, 
Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of
efforts on national, subregional, regional and inter-
national levels in order to strengthen a global
response to this serious challenge and threat to inter-
national security, 
Recognizing that most States have undertaken bind-
ing legal obligations under treaties to which they are
parties, or have made other commitments aimed at
preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, and have taken effective mea-
sures to account for, secure and physically protect
sensitive materials, such as those required by the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code
of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources, 
Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to
take additional effective measures to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, 
ANNEX:
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
Encouraging all Member States to implement fully
the disarmament treaties and agreements to which
they are party, 
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts, 
Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective
response to global threats in the area of non-prolif-
eration, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, 
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing
any form of support to non-State actors that attempt
to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, trans-
port, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery;
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with
their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any
non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chem-
ical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as
well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing
activities, participate in them as an accomplice,
assist or finance them; 
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce
effective measures to establish domestic controls
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons and their means of deliv-
ery, including by establishing appropriate con-
trols over related materials and to this end shall: 
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective
measures to account for and secure such items
in production, use, storage or transport; 
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective
physical protection measures; 
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective
border controls and law enforcement efforts to
detect, deter, prevent and combat, including
through international cooperation when neces-
sary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such
items in accordance with their national legal
authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law; 
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appro-
priate effective national export and trans-ship-
ment controls over such items, including
appropriate laws and regulations to control
export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export
and controls on providing funds and services
related to such export and trans-shipment such
as financing, and transporting that would con-
tribute to proliferation, as well as establishing
end-user controls; and establishing and enforc-
ing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for
violations of such export control laws and reg-
ulations; 
4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28
of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period
of no longer than two years, a Committee of the
Security Council, consisting of all members of the
Council, which will, calling as appropriate on
other expertise, report to the Security Council for
its examination, on the implementation of this
Resolution, and to this end calls upon States to
present a first report no later than six months from
the adoption of this Resolution to the Committee
on steps they have taken or intend to take to
implement this Resolution; 
5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in
this Resolution shall be interpreted so as to con-
flict with or alter the rights and obligations of State
Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or
alter the responsibilities of the International
Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 
6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this
Resolution of effective national control lists and
calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to
pursue at the earliest opportunity the develop-
ment of such lists; 
7. Recognizes that some States may require assis-
tance in implementing the provisions of this
Resolution within their territories and invites
States in a position to do so to offer assistance as
appropriate in response to specific requests to the
States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastruc-
ture, implementation experience and/or resources
for fulfilling the above provisions; 
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8. Calls upon all States: 
(a) To promote the universal adoption and full
implementation, and, where necessary,
strengthening of multilateral treaties to which
they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons; 
(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where
it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance
with their commitments under the key multilat-
eral nonproliferation treaties; 
(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multi-
lateral cooperation, in particular within the
framework of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons and the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, as important
means of pursuing and achieving their com-
mon objectives in the area of non-proliferation
and of promoting international cooperation for
peaceful purposes; 
(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and
inform industry and the public regarding their
obligations under such laws; 
9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and
cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address
the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, and their means
of delivery; 
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all
States, in accordance with their national legal
authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law, to take cooperative action to
prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, their means of delivery, and
related materials; 
11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the
implementation of this Resolution and, at the
appropriate level, to take further decisions
which may be required to this end; 
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
___________________________ 
* Definitions for the purpose of this Resolution only:
 Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other
unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially
designed for such use. 
 Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under
the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities
which come within the scope of this Resolution. 
 Related materials: materials, equipment and technology
covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrange-
ments, or included on national control lists, which
could be used for the design, development, production
or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
their means of delivery. 
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1) Poland in the Cracow Initiative  Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI)
Poland was among the first group of countries invit-
ed to the PSI in May 2003 (namely: Germany,
Australia, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Portugal and the United Kingdom). 
The participation of Poland in PSI is a visible confir-
mation of great importance Poland attaches to effec-
tive nonproliferation regime as an essential ele-
ment of international peace and security. 
Poland considers the Initiative as an important ele-
ment in building an effective mechanism to prevent
and counter proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, their means of production and delivery.
Initiative serves as an important tool in accommo-
dating recent nonproliferation mechanisms and
structures to new security threats and challenges. 
During the first year of Poland’s participation to the
PSI the internal system of cooperation on the
PSIrelated issues was created. The main govern-
mental agencies were involved in the process of
preparing the Poland’s position on Initiative. The
appropriate steps were also taken in order to pro-
mote the aims and objectives of the Initiative.
Therefore, the Information Meeting for Central and
Eastern European States (Warsaw, 12 January 2004)
was an element of our outreach activity. 
Organization of the first ground interdiction exercise
in April 2004 became another proof of our active
stand on PSI. It has also served as another tool for
promoting the Initiative in the region. Some coun-
tries of the Central Europe took active part in this
Exercise.  
This short brief should serve as a comprehensive
guide to the Poland’s position on Cracow Initiative 
PSI and our activity in this regard. 
Information meeting for the Countries of Central
and Eastern Europe on the Proliferation Security
Initiative, Warsaw, 12 January 2004
The first information meeting for the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe on the Proliferation
Security Initiative that was held in Warsaw on 12
January 2004. The aim of the meeting was to present
the objectives and development of the Initiative.
The representatives of the following countries of the region
attended: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and
Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. All represen-
tatives of the PSI countries (Australia, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK and
USA) were also present at the meeting.
The meeting was opened by Prof. Adam Daniel
Rotfeld, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Poland. 
Minister Rotfeld stressed, inter alia: "WMDrelated
materials, technologies, means of delivery and exper-
tise are more accessible today than ever.
Globalisation and the liberalisation of trade, which
fuels economic growth, creates also more opportuni-
ties for countries or subjects of concern to seek
WMD. (...) Unfortunately, threats and challenges of
today are responded by the approaches and institu-
tions deeply rooted in the past and dominated by the
reasoning relevant to the Cold War reality. The key
priority as we want to build an effective nonprolifer-
ation regime for today and tomorrow should therefore
be to adapt the existing structures, instruments, and
procedures to the challenges of the new security envi-
ronment.
Therefore, Poland supports the strengthening of the
multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation
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regime through the effective implementation and
verification of Weapons of Mass Destruction treaties,
through strengthening the export controls regimes,
and through maintaining national export controls
and enforcement tools".
The speakers included also Mrs. Susan F. Burk,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, US
Department of State. 
The participants of the meeting were informed about
development of the PSI and the position of Poland
on issues of nonproliferation. Two case studies
were presented by the Polish authorities: on inter-
diction operations at the Baltic Sea and ground
interdiction.
The participants expressed opinions that this first
meeting would help to establish a more regular dia-
log and promote a firm commitment to enhance the
effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts, including
the PSI’s Statement of Interdiction Principles.
"Safe Borders" Ground Interdiction Exercise,
Wroc‡aw, 19  21 April 2004
In developing the interdiction potential Poland con-
ducted the First PSI Ground Interdiction Exercise.  The
following countries took part in the exercise: Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania and USA. Australia, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain also attended the
exercise. Except for the countries mentioned above,
representatives of the following countries took part in
a Post  Exercise Meeting: Belarus, Croatia, Finland,
France, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Russian Federation,
Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey and Ukraine.
The objectives of the exercise, that was divided into
Table Top Exercise and Ground Interdiction
Exercise, were to review law enforcement, custom
and border control procedures related to the illegal
flow of shipments of dual  use chemical precursors
and other WMD  related equipment and supplies
moved through border points, the examination of
procedures for coordination among countries
when these items move across borders, to uncover
shortfalls in the procedures and recommend ways
these procedures can be revised, strengthened and
improved. The exercise confirmed the ability to con-
duct common interdiction operations.
The ground interdiction exercise was based on pre 
arranged scenario. It provided for an existence of a
Bad Guys Company (BGC), which operated in CEE
region and was going to sell chemical precursors
and equipment necessary to make chemical
weapons for an unknown end  user. During the
Table Top Exercise participants had a chance to dis-
cuss procedures applicable to this scenario in their
countries as well as review information sharing
arrangements. The Ground Interdiction Exercise
allowed to present the effectiveness of Polish special
services (Border Guard and Internal Security
Service). It also presented the active involvement
that Poland takes in non  proliferation efforts and
hopefully allowed to convince other likeminded
countries of the region to support PSI Interdiction
Principles and activities conducted in the Initiative’s
framework.  
The Participants confirmed the crucial importance
of information exchange and efficiency of fast com-
munication channels. In this context, it has to be
stressed that all participating countries declared that
they possess legal means to stop/interdict suspicious
cargoes, such as catchall clause and criminalisa-
tion of WMDproliferation activities. 
During the PostExercise meeting national interdic-
tion procedures were presented and discussed.
Participating countries declared readiness and capa-
bilities (operational and prosecutional) to conduct
interdiction operations when and where the situa-
tion arises, and demonstrated participant’s strong
resolve and commitment to stem the flow of WMD. 
Crucial importance was given to ensuring effective
information exchange and efficiency of fast commu-
nication channels. Information Exchange should be
Sectoral ( eg. Customs to Customs, Intelligence to
Intelligence), Intersectoral: via diplomatic and other
governmental channels, and Internal (domestic
level). Discussion revealed that different govern-
mental institutions were responsible for coordinating
and conducting PSI activities in participating coun-
tries. Therefore importance of getting precise infor-
mation on national PSI responsibilities (points of
contact) was raised. 
New European Union members stressed that joining
EU what improved access to information on for-
warding activities, improved their capabilities to
respond to illegal shipments and transports. 
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Future of the Polish engagement in the PSI 
We are going to maintain Poland’s active engage-
ment in the development and implementation of
Cracow Initiative. We consider our participation in
this Initiative as an important element of Polish pol-
icy in the area of international security. 
Taking the above into account main areas of
Poland’s interest in this regard will further include: 
 Maintaining a leading role in the region of Central
and Eastern Europe (point of reference), by pro-
moting regional implementation of Initiatives
goals, conducting bilateral meetings and coorga-
nizing exercises;
 Furthering and promoting the results of the First
Anniversary PSI Meeting in Kraków. We promote
the new name of PSI  the Cracow Initiative. An
idea to continue Cracow Process (periodical meet-
ings gathering all countries supporting Initiative)
could be considered.
 Building internal mechanism of our participation
in the Initiative (interagency mechanism of coop-
eration). 
Chairman’s Statement at the First Anniversary PSI
Meeting (Cracow, 31 May  1 June 2004) 
The First Anniversary Proliferation Security Initiative
(the PSI) Meeting took place in Kraków, on 31 May
 1 June 2004. The Meeting was to commemorate
the first anniversary of launching the Initiative by the
US President, George W. Bush in his speech at the
Wawel Royal Castle in Kraków, on 31 May 2003.
Thus, the Proliferation Security Initiative will also be
known as the Cracow Initiative.
The meeting brought together senior representatives
from over 60 countries. The participation of a broad
representation of countries across the globe in the
Anniversary Meeting confirms the growing awareness
of the danger of proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, related materials and their means of
delivery. It also highlights the worldwide support of
the PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles.
The meeting was conducted under the patronage of
Aleksander Kwaniewski, President of the Republic
of Poland. 
During the meeting the Addresses by the President
of the Republic of Poland, Aleksander Kwaniewski
and President of the United States of America,
George W. Bush, were transmitted.
The aims of the meeting included emphasising the
PSI as a global initiative, further development of
international support for the aims and objectives of
the PSI, and promotion of broad international
cooperation and participation in PSI activities. The
Cracow Initiative is not about structure and organi-
sation, but operation and cooperation.
During one year the Proliferation Security Initiative
has been transformed from a vision into an active
network of partnership and practical cooperation.
Common principles have been defined. Interdiction
capabilities developed and tested. Regional activi-
ties undertaken. 
During the meeting, a series of presentations on the
nature of PSI, its prospects, character, future devel-
opment and outreach efforts were made. A special
emphasise was made on the extensive exercise pro-
gram where many countries have actively partici-
pated.
It was stressed that the Proliferation Security
Initiative is an important element in responding to
the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems, and related materials to or from states and
non  state actors worldwide. It was further stressed
that the PSI activities had to be consistent with
national and international law and frameworks. 
The PSI builds on efforts by the international com-
munity to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their
delivery systems or related materials and comple-
ments existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent
with newly adopted United Nation’s Security
Council Resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004.
The UN Security Council Resolution states that the
Council is "gravely concerned by the threat of illic-
it trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, and related
materials". It calls upon all states "to take coopera-
tive actions to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons, their means of
delivery and related materials". 
The transparent nature of the PSI activities was reit-
erated and the contributions from countries that
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share PSI concerns, principles and goals were wel-
comed. An emphasis was made that the PSI is a glob-
al endeavour with an inclusive nature. It relies on the
widest possible cooperation between states around
the world. This meeting showed the willingness of
strengthening and expanding this cooperation.
The meeting confirmed the importance of continued
outreach efforts to build the PSI and make it harder
for proliferators to engage in this deadly trade. States
participating were welcomed to engage in such
cooperation as well as to undertake national action
to identify law enforcement authorities and other
tools or assets that could be brought to bear against
efforts to stop proliferation facilitators.    
2) Poland in the Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction
AideMØmoire of the Government of the Republic
of Poland (May 2003)
In the Initiative on Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction, approved by the G8 leaders on
Kananaskis Summit, on June 27th, 2002 it was decid-
ed to support specific cooperation projects, initially
in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament,
counterterrorism and nuclear safety issues. 
The Government of Poland endorses the
Declarations approved by the G8 leaders on
Kananaskis Summit, on June 27th, 2002 and
expresses readiness to join Initiative on Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction. Subsequently the
Government of Poland fully commits to common
principles and guidelines of the G8 Global
Partnership. 
As a practical confirmation of Polish nonprolifera-
tion policy and readiness to contribute to the Global
Partnership, the Government of Poland has decided
to join the international efforts to assist the Russian
Federation in destruction of chemical weapons. 
The Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Poland and the Government of the
Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of
chemical weapons destruction was signed on
December 17th, 2002 (see Attachment 1  text of
the agreement). The Agreement concentrates on sci-
entific and technical assistance the Polish Party can
provide to the Russian Party through Polish entities.  
The Agreement introduces a new approach to the
international assistance in destruction chemical
weapons in the Russian Federation. The Agreement
concentrates on the scientific and technological
partnership and introduces commercial elements in
the cooperation (see Attachment 2  Project
Description Sheet). The Polish Party will provide
technical aid to the Russian Party, free of charge, in
the form of performance of research projects,
designing, manufacturing and delivery of spe-
cialised equipment and other material and technical
resources.
In further development of the common principles
and guidelines of the Global Partnership Poland has
initiated the concept of the PolishRussian
Technological and Industrial Park in Tarnów, Poland
(see Attachment 3  Development of Polish  Russian
Technological and Industrial Park in Tarnów,
Poland). The concept develops further the coopera-
tion with the Russian Federation in the field of
destruction of chemical weapons based on
Agreement signed at Warsaw on 17 December 2002. 
The PolishRussian Technological and Industrial
Park will provide, in general, for development of
common activities of Polish and Russian entities
(including international) in promoting technical
innovations, application of advanced technologies,
mainly from Russia, exchanging scientific and tech-
nical staff‘, conducting of common research, training
and development activities (R&D). The Park will pro-
vide an opportunity to present and market peaceful
civilian work in international conditions. Through
the Park scientists and engineers will receive training
in business, research, marketing, quality
control/quality assurance and production standards,
foreign languages and intellectual property issues.
The Park will create a place for promoting nonpro-
liferation norms and modern standards of business
through organisation of international conferences,
workshops on research and commercialisation activ-
ities, promotion of peaceful use of chemistry.
It is to be stressed that the Polish  Russian
Agreement and the concept of the Technological
Park fully comply with the G8 Global Partnership
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Principles. They meet the Global Partnership both
with regard to its subject matter (chemical weapons
destruction in Russia and employment of former
weapons scientists and engineers) and to its terms (full
verification by authorised bodies, environmental pro-
tection concerns, exemptions from duties and taxes). 
The Polish  Russian Agreement and the concept of
the PolishRussian Technological and Industrial
Park at Tarnów, Poland, meet the following
Guidelines of the Global Partnership:
1) effective monitoring, auditing and transparency
measures and procedures to confirm work perfor-
mance, to account for the funds expended and to
provide for adequate access to work sites;
2) the implementation projects will be executed an
environmentally sound manner and will maintain
the highest appropriate level of safety; 
3) Each project will be accompanied by clearly
defined milestones and tasks; 
4) The material, equipment, technology, services
and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful
purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be
used only for the purposes of implementing the
projects and will not be transferred. 
5) The Russian side ensures that the support provid-
ed will be considered free technical assistance
and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and
other charges;
6) Provision of goods and services will be conduct-
ed in accordance with open international prac-
tices and tender laws and consistent with nation-
al security requirements; 
7) The Russian side will take necessary steps to
ensure that adequate liability protections from
claims related to the cooperation will be provid-
ed for Polish participants;
8) Appropriate privileges and immunities will be
provided for Polish representatives working on
implementation projects;
9) The Parties agreed to ensure effective protection
of sensitive information and intellectual property. 
The Polish Government will seek financial assis-
tance and other material support of the G8 Partners
as well as other potential donors to expand and
develop new projects in the field of lewisite destruc-
tion through the Polish  Russian Agreement. The
Polish Government also hopes to receive financial
assistance to develop and implement the concept of
the PolishRussian Technological and Industrial
Park at Tarnów, Poland. 
It has to be noted that the Agreement and the under-
standings reached with the Russian Party provide
that other international donors both Governments
and NonGovernmental Organisations may join the
cooperation through the support programme of the
Polish Party. 
In order to intensify and facilitate cooperation in
the further development of the PolishRussian
Agreement and the concept of the Park a draft
Memorandum of Understanding regarding the assis-
tance is attached to this Aide MØmoire.
Furthermore the Polish Government is ready to par-
ticipate in the work of the G8 bodies involved in the
implementation of the Global Partnership and to
enter into bilateral cooperation with G8 Partners
and other countries. 
The participation of Poland in the G8 Global
Partnership and promotion through it Polish propos-
als and approaches contained in the bilateral agree-
ment with the Russian Federation and in the concept
of Park, constitutes an important Polish foreign poli-
cy priority.
Warsaw, May 2003
Attachment 1 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AND THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON
COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
The Government of the Republic of Poland and the
Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter
called the Parties,
Supporting the aims and principles of the
Convention on the Prohibition of Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Paris on
January 13th, 1993,  and hereinafter called the
Convention,
Striving for further development and strengthening
of cooperation in the implementation of  the
Convention, and in particular chemical weapons
destruction, 
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Taking account of the intentions of the Polish Party
to provide assistance to the Russian Party in the
implementation of the special programme
"Destruction of Chemical Weapons in the Russian
Federation," hereinafter called the Programme,
Noting that other States Parties to the Convention
have expressed their interest in providing aid to the
Russian Federation with regard to the implementa-
tion of the Programme, in view of the importance
and complexity of the tasks to be achieved and their
high cost,
Bearing in mind that the destruction of chemical
weapons is a complex task calling for significant
resources and for expertise in science and technology,
Have agreed upon the following:
ARTICLE 1
In order to provide technical support to the Russian
Party to set up chemical weapons destruction facili-
ties within the Russian Federation, the Polish Party
shall provide technical aid to the Russian Party free
of charge in the form of performance of research
projects,
designing, manufacturing and delivery of spe-
cialised equipment and other material and technical
resources, provision of materials and services.
ARTICLE 2
1. Specific projects defining the volume of deliver-
ies, services and works and other terms of provi-
sion of technical support, in accordance with this
Agreement, shall be laid down in implementation
arrangements to be signed by the authorised bod-
ies of the Parties.
2. During the first year of this Agreement, the Polish
Party shall allocate the sum of PLN 400000 to
carry out initial works related to the completion of
the first project under the implementation
arrangement.
3. Based on separate arrangements between the
Parties, other international donors may also pro-
vide support in compliance with the objectives of
this Agreement through the support programme of
the Polish Party.
ARTICLE 3
1. The authorised bodies of the Parties appointed for
the implementation of this Agreement are for the
Polish Party  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Poland, for the Russian Party  the
Russian Munitions Agency (Rosboyepripassy)
2.  The authorised bodies shall enter into implemen-
tation arrangements that define the realisation of
specific technical support projects.
3. The authorised bodies shall appoint their repre-
sentatives for liaison and for the resolving of tech-
nical issues concerning the implementation of
this Agreement, and shall inform each other in
writing of the identity of such representatives.
4. The authorised bodies shall decide on their forms
of cooperation and management of works for
specific projects, and shall hold meetings of
experts in Warsaw and in Moscow to resolve such
issues, in accordance with the time table agreed
upon by the Parties, at least two times a year.
ARTICLE 4
1. The authorised bodies shall provide the technical
and other information necessary for the imple-
mentation of this Agreement.
2. Subject to its national laws, each of the Parties
shall:
a) use all information released to it under this
Agreement exclusively for the purposes speci-
fied in this Agreement,
b) should the need arise in the execution of this
Agreement to obtain classified information, the
Receiving Party shall guarantee its confidentiali-
ty and shall not permit its transfer to a third party
without the written permission of the other Party.
Classified information released in writing by one
of the Parties shall be marked appropriately.
ARTICLE 5
1. Subject to their national laws, the Parties shall
promptly issue costfree visas to members of the
working groups and to official representatives of
their Authorised Bodies, sent to the territory of
their States for stays that are connected with the
implementation of this Agreement. 
2. The Russian Party shall, in accordance with the
legislation of the Russian Federation, provide
assistance in the registration of representatives
from the Authorised Body of the Polish Party
ARTICLE 6
1. Technical assistance between the Parties shall be
granted only for purposes envisaged by this
Agreement.
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2. In compliance with the legislation of the Russian
Federation, the Russian Party shall make every
necessary effort to create the most favourable
conditions for the implementation of this
Agreement.
3. The Polish Party shall have the right to verify the
proper use of technical support provided to the
Russian Party for the purposes of this Agreement.
The Russian Party shall ensure access to all types of
documents that are necessary for this verification.
ARTICLE 7
1. Subject to the laws in force, the Russian Party
shall exempt Polish and Russian contractors and
subcontractors, engaged within the framework of
this Agreement, from the payment of customs
duties and other levies.
2. The right of ownership to all types of equipment
and materials supplied by the Polish Party to the
Russian Party and responsibility for them shall
pass to the Russian Party, as agreed by the Parties.
ARTICLE 8
This Agreement shall not affect the rights and oblig-
ations of the Parties under other international agree-
ments to which either the Republic of Poland or the
Russian Federation is party. 
ARTICLE 9
1. The Polish Party and its official representatives
shall not incur any civil liability for death or
injury or damage to property caused by any act or
omission related to official duties carried out pur-
suant to the implementation of this Agreement or
any other actions, except for causing harm as a
result of:
a) wilful misconduct or gross negligence,
b) a road accident caused by a vehicle belonging
to or operated by an official representative of
the Polish Party where the damage is not recov-
erable under civil liability insurance.
2. The Russian Party shall not bring any claims
against the Polish Party and its official representa-
tives and shall not bring any court action or pro-
ceedings in relation to any act or omission, as set
out in Paragraph 1 of this Article, relating to
duties carried out in connection with the imple-
mentation this Agreement.
3. The Russian Party commits itself to settle claims
which may be brought by third parties in cases
mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. This article shall be without prejudice to the rights
and obligations of contractors and agents under
their contracts. 
5. Nothing in this Article shall be construed as waiv-
ing any immunity which the Polish Party and the
Russian Party may equally enjoy under interna-
tional law with respect to claims that may be
brought against either of the Parties.
ARTICLE 10
Any dispute arising out of this Agreement shall
wherever possible be resolved through consultations
between the Parties. Consultations shall take place
not later than two months after one of the Parties has
so requested. 
ARTICLE 11
1. This Agreement may be amended by written con-
sent between the Parties.
2. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date
of its signing.
3. This Agreement shall remain in force until the
completion of projects executed under its terms,
and not later than by December 31st, 2005. The
period of validity of this Agreement may be
extended by written agreement between the
Parties.
4. Upon expiry or termination of this Agreement the
provisions of Article 5 and of Paragraph 3 Article
6 shall continue to be in force for another two
years.
Done at Warsaw, 17 December, 2002
On behalf of                          On behalf of
the Government of                 the Government of
the Republic of Poland           the Russian Federation       
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz     Zinovy P. Pak
Minister of Foreign Affairs Director General
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Attachment 2
PROJECT DESCRIPTION SHEET
1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROJECT
1a. Project Title: cooperation between the
Government of the Republic of Poland and the
Government of the Russian Federation in the field of
Chemical Weapons Destruction
1b. Domain covered: Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, G8 Global Partnership
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
2a. Description of the project:
On 17 December 2002 in Warsaw Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, W‡odz-
imierz Cimoszewicz, and Director General of the
Russian Munitions Agency, Prof. Zinoviy P.Pak,
signed the agreement between the Government of
the Republic of Poland and the Government of the
Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of
chemical weapons destruction.
The Agreement concentrates on scientific and tech-
nical assistance the Polish Party can provide to the
Russian Federation through Polish entities.  
The Polish Party will provide technical aid to the
Russian Party free of charge in the form of perfor-
mance of research projects, designing, manufactur-
ing and delivery of specialised equipment and other
material and technical resources, provision of mate-
rials and services.
According to preliminary arrangements Poland’s
support would have the form of participation in
developing the technology and pilot installation for
the resolution of reaction masses and sewage pro-
duced in the destruction process of lewisite.
Specific projects defining the volume of deliveries,
services and works and other terms of provision of
technical support, in accordance with this
Agreement, shall be laid down in implementation
arrangements to be signed by the authorised bodies
of the Parties.
Based on separate arrangements between the
Parties, other international donors may also provide
support in compliance with the objectives of this
Agreement through the support programme of the
Polish Party.
Objectives:
The assistance will facilitate and accelerate the ful-
filment of the obligations that the Russian Federation
has undertaken by acceding to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. 
The Agreement fulfils the aims and principles of the
G8 Global Partnership.
The assistance is aimed to support the implementa-
tion of the Special Federal Programme on the
destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in the
Russian Federation for the timely, safe and environ-
mentally sound destruction of chemical weapons.
Duration:
The Agreement shall remain in force until the com-
pletion of projects executed under its terms, and not
later than by December 31st, 2005. The period of
validity of this Agreement may be extended by writ-
ten agreement between the Parties.
Activities:
Providing technical aid to the Russian Party free of
charge in the form of performance of research pro-
jects, designing, manufacturing and delivery of spe-
cialised equipment and other material and technical
resources, provision of materials and services.
According to preliminary arrangements Poland’s
support would have the form of participation in
developing the technology and pilot installation for
the resolution of reaction masses and sewage pro-
duced in the destruction process of lewisite.
Results: The parties established working groups and
plan of work. The parties started common research
work and preparations to carry out laboratory
works and test. 
2b. Status and presentation of the Project:
The Parties agreed on the scope and the aim of the
first implementation arrangement. The Implementa-
tion Arrangement was concluded on 19 December
2003. 
The title of the first project is: Detoxification of reac-
tion masses, including liquid waste established in
the process of lewisite destruction
The project, its aims and tasks: The aim of this pro-
ject is to develop a recycling technology for reactive
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masses and liquid waste discharged in the process of
lewisite destruction. The tasks of the projects
include:
 to design and develop an experimental industrial
installation for the recycling of reactive masses;
 to work out a proposal for the positioning of vari-
ous industrial plants within the existing capacities
of the Gorny chemical weapons destruction facility,
Project implementation plan includes:
 analysis of  research and development experiences
accumulated by Poland and Russia in the recy-
cling of products yielded by the lewisite destruc-
tion process. Market research for the products of
produced, namely arsenic;
 selection of  operation directions. 
The  beginning of work: March 2003.
The work includes:
 laboratory testing of the recycling of reactive mass-
es, established in in the   destruction of lewisite;
 development of experimental industrial plant for
recycling of reactive masses:
 designing of the installation for detoxification of
reaction masses:
 construction of the installation at the Gorny
destruction facility:
 assessment of possibilities and preparation of pro-
posals for the deployment of various industrial
plants within the existing capacities of the Gorny
chemical weapons destruction facility;
 conduct of common research on the implementa-
tion of the results on the destruction of reaction
masses in the destruction of toxic wastes contain-
ing arsenic.
3. FINANCING OF THE PROJECT
3a. Budget for the project (in Euros): The total cost
of the Project will be around 6l millions euro.
The exact amount of financial resources and
the scope of works are under consideration of
the Parties. The financial plan will be ready at
the beginning of 2005.
3b. The Polish Party will finance the preparation
of laboratories and conduct of  laboratory
works as well as the  designing of the pilot
installation for the destruction of the reaction
masses. The Polish Party has allocated the sum
of PLN 400.000 (circa 100.000 USD) to carry
out  works related to the completion of the first
project under the implementation arrangement.
The implementation of the Agreement will be
included in the Ministry’s tasks and budget over
the next few years. The Ministry’s funds will
guarantee its implementation at a minimum
level. 
The Polish Ministry of Science devoted additional
amount of 150 000 USD to carry out the laboratory
work and tests, including designing of pilot installa-
tion to destroy reaction masses.
3c. The Parties agreed to use the resources of the
other international donors to finance the pro-
ject of detoxification of reaction masses.
The implementation of the Agreement will generate
financial benefits because of the engagement of
other parties, both private and state, as well as inter-
national organisations. It should be stressed that the
Agreement provides a framework for third party
financing, both private, national and international
(including the European Union). 
3d. Nature of the financing: The Government of
Poland will release financial resources  directly
to the Polish participant of the Project who is
subcontractor ad main partner of the Russian
party .
4. COUNTERPARTS AND CONTACT POINTS
4a. POLISH SIDE:
Responsible and Lead Implementing Organisation:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Coordinator of the Agreement  on behalf of the
Polish Government
Contact point/person: Name: Krzysztof Paturej
Phone: (+4822) 523 93 06
Fax:    (+4822) 523 99 39
email: krzysztof.paturej@msz.gov.pl
5. PARTICIPATION OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL
DONORS. 
Based on separate arrangements between the
Parties, other international donors may also provide
support in compliance with the objectives of this
Agreement through the support programme of the
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Polish Party. The Polish and Russian Party agreed to
involve other donors to participate in the common
projects through PolishRussian Agreement. The
participation is open for Governments and
NonGovernmental Organisations. 
Attachment 3
Development of PolishRussian Technological and
Industrial Park in Tarnów, Poland
The concept of the PolishRussian Technological
and Industrial Park in Tarnów, Poland, develops fur-
ther the cooperation with the Russian Federation in
destruction of chemical weapons based on the
agreement between the Government of Poland and
the Government of Russian Federation on cooper-
ation in destruction of chemical weapons. The
Agreement was signed at Warsaw on 17 December
2002. 
The PolishRussian Technological and Industrial
Park provides, in general, for development of com-
mon activities of Polish and Russian entities (includ-
ing international) in promoting technical innova-
tions, application of advanced technologies, mainly
from Russia, exchanging scientific and technical
staff, conducting of common research, training and
development activities (R&D).
The concept of the Park meets one of the key G8
Global Partnership priorities, namely employment of
former weapons scientists and engineers. The Park
will provide an opportunity to present and market
peaceful civilian work in international conditions.
Through the Park scientists and engineers will receive
training in business, research, marketing, quality con-
trol/quality assurance and production standards, for-
eign languages and intellectual property issues. The
Park will create a place for promoting nonprolifera-
tion norms and modern standards of business through
organisation of international conferences, workshops
on research and commercialisation activities, promo-
tion of peaceful use of chemistry. 
The participation of Poland in the G8 Global
Partnership and promotion through it Polish propos-
als and approaches contained in the bilateral agree-
ment with the Russian Federation and in the concept
of Park, constitutes an important Polish foreign poli-
cy priority. 
The Technological and Industrial Park in Tarnow,
Poland, will be initiated by Polish and Russian
Parties, including Russian Science Centre "Applied
Chemistry" in St. Petersburg and Zak‡ady Azotowe
w TarnowieMocicach S.A. (Nitrogen Factory in
TarnowMoscice Ltd.). The Park will function as the
legal and commercial entity registered under Polish
law. The main purpose of the Park will be to gener-
ate profits from common work of Polish, Russian
and international partners at Tarnow, Poland. 
For this purpose The Parties concluded on 16 April
at Sankt Petersburg a Letter of Intent.  The Letter con-
firms the desire of both Parties to develop relations
in the area of peaceful use of chemistry and to estab-
lish the Park. The Parties specified the first Russian
technologies to be developed and introduced in the
Park. It was agreed that the Park would be open to
other Parties and entities.
Zaklady Azotowe, as the initial Polish participant of
the Park will provide highly competent research and
technical staff, production capabilities, separate ter-
ritory with labs, industrial installations, certification,
normalisation and standardisation offices, construc-
tions offices, sewage systems and water treatment
plant operating in higher environment standards,
plant sites.
The Russian partner will provide research and devel-
opment capabilities and technologies as well as sci-
entific and technical staff to operate both in Russia
and at the Park in Tarnów. 
It is expected that in a short period of time the
Technological and Industrial Park will be a centre of
international science and technical cooperation,
scientific and technical exchange and training, elab-
oration, implementation into production and mar-
keting to Western markets of new technologies,
mainly from Russia.
The Park will create broad possibilities for the
Russian entities to develop their presence in Poland,
especially in the sphere of marketing new technolo-
gies and productions, to access, through the
cooperation with the Polish entities, to Western
partners and the European Union markets.
The concept of the Park include conduct of com-
mon activities by Polish, Russian and partners from
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other countries, in industrial and commercial appli-
cation of advanced Russian technologies, their
implementation into production (certification, nor-
malisation and standardisation to EU norms) and
production of highly advanced products. The con-
cept of the Park enables to combine Polish experi-
ences in building the freemarket economy and
ability to function in the European Union with the
Russian R&D capabilities and growing demand for
the Russian technologies. 
The Park could attract Western investors to conduct
business with Russian companies in Poland, in
accordance with European standards, without
necessity to enter Russia, what may occurs potential,
negative consequences. The idea of Park is in full
conformity with EU policy of sustainable develop-
ment. Therefore it is eligible for financial support
from the European Union.
The total investment to establish and operate the tech-
nological and industrial Park at Tarnów is around 3
million dollars. This includes elaboration of business
plan and feasibility study, preparation of the site at
Tarnow, Poland, to international standards, prepara-
tion and conduct of the Park as the legal and organi-
sational structure, organisation of bilateral meetings,
training and workshops. This investment will allow
implementation of first Russian modern technologies
to raise financial resources for further functioning and
operation of the Park. 
Poland will seek international financial and material
support to implement the concept of the Park.
50
3) United Nations Resoution on the Implementation
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
First Committee 59 UNGA session
Resolution
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject of
chemical weapons, in particular resolution  58/52 of
8 December 2003, adopted without a vote, in which
it noted with appreciation the ongoing work to
achieve the objective and purpose of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of
the development, production, acquisition, transfer,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their
destruction,
Noting with satisfaction that since the adoption of
resolution 58/52,  eight additional States have rati-
fied the Convention or acceded to it, bringing the
total number of States parties to the Convention to
one hundred and  sixtysix,
Reaffirming the importance of the outcome of the
First Special Session of the Conference of the States
Parties to Review the Operation of the Convention
including the Political Declaration in which the
States parties reaffirm their commitment to achiev-
ing the object and purpose of the Convention and
the Final Report which addressed all aspects of the
Convention and made important recommendations
on its continued implementation;
1. Emphasizes that the universality of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction1 is
fundamental to the achievement of its objective
and purpose, and acknowledges progress made
on the implementation of the Action Plan for
Universality of the Convention, and calls upon all
States that have not yet done so to become parties
to the Convention without delay;
2. Underlines that the Convention and its imple-
mentation contribute to enhancing international
peace and security, and emphasizes that its full,
universal and effective implementation will con-
tribute further to that purpose by excluding com-
pletely, for the sake of all humankind, the possi-
bility of the use of chemical weapons;
3. Stresses that the full and effective implementation
of all provisions of the Convention is in itself an
important contribution to the efforts of the United
Nations in the global fight against terrorism in all
its forms and manifestations;
4. Stresses the importance to the Convention that all
possessors of chemical weapons, chemical
weapons production facilities or chemical
weapons development facilities, including previ-
ously declared possessor States, should be among
the States parties to the Convention, and wel-
comes progress to that end;
5. Notes that the effective application of the verifi-
cation system builds confidence in compliance
with the Convention by States parties;
6. Stresses the importance of the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in verifying
compliance with the provisions of the Convention
as well as in promoting the timely and efficient
accomplishment of all its objectives;
7. Urges all States parties to the Convention to meet
in full and on time their obligations under the
Convention and to support the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its imple-
mentation activities;
8. Reaffirms the undertaking of the States parties to
foster international cooperation for peaceful pur-
poses in the field of chemical activities of the
States parties and the importance of that cooper-
ation and its contribution to the promotion of the
Convention as a whole;
9. Notes with appreciation the ongoing work of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons to achieve the objective and purpose of
the Convention, to ensure the full implementation
of its provisions, including those for international
verification of compliance with it, and to provide
a forum for consultation and cooperation among
States parties; and further notes with appreciation
progress made on the implementation of the
Action Plan on the Implementation of Article VII
obligations; 
10. Welcomes the cooperation between the
United Nations and the Organization for the
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Prohibition of Chemical Weapons within the
framework of the Relationship Agreement
between the United Nations and the Organiza-
tion, in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention;
11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of
its  sixty session the item entitled "Implementation
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".
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Appendix I. Penal Code of 6 June 1997: Excerpt
and Outline (Journal of Laws of the Republic of
Poland of 1997, No. 88, item 553)
Art. 44. 1. The court shall impose the forfeiture of
items directly derived from an offence, unless they
are subject to return to the injured person or to
another entity.
2. The court may decide on the forfeiture of the
items, which served or were designed for com-
mitting the offence unless they are subject to the
return to another entity. 
3. If the forfeiture described in para. 2 shall not be
applied, the court may impose a supplementary
payment to the State Treasury.
4. In the event that the perpetrator has intentionally
prevented the possibility of imposing the forfei-
ture of items specified in para. 1 or 2, the court
may impose the obligation to pay a pecuniary
equivalent of their value.
5. In the event that the conviction has pertained to
an offence of violating a prohibition of produc-
tion, possession or dealing in or transporting spe-
cific items, the court may decide on the forfeiture
thereof.
6. If the items referred to in para. 2 or 5 are not the
property of the perpetrator, the forfeiture may be
decided by the court only in the cases provided
for in law; in the case of coownership, the deci-
sion shall cover only the forfeiture of the share
owned by the perpetrator, or the obligation to pay
a pecuniary equivalent of its value.
7. Property which is the subject of forfeiture shall be
transferred to the ownership of the State Treasury
at the time the sentence becomes final and valid.
Art. 45. 1. If the perpetrator has obtained, even if
indirectly, a financial benefit from the commission
of an offence, the court may decree its forfeiture or
the forfeiture of its equivalent. The forfeiture shall
not be decreed, in part or in whole, if the benefit or
its equivalent is to be returned to the wronged per-
son or to another entity.
2. In the case of sentencing a perpetrator referred to
in Art. 65 or a perpetrator who has obtained a
substantial benefit from the commission of an
offence, the court shall decree the forfeiture of the
benefit obtained or its financial equivalent. The
provision of para. 11, sentence two, shall apply
accordingly.
3. The financial benefit subject to forfeiture, or its
equivalent, shall become the property of the State
Treasury at the time the judgement becomes
final."
Outline of Art. 109  114 of the Penal Code
Art.109 stipulates that the Polish penal law shall
apply to Polish citizens who have committed an
offence abroad. 
Art. 110 stipulates that the Polish penal law shall
apply to aliens who have committed abroad offence
against the interests of the Republic of Poland,
Polish citizen, Polish legal person or Polish organi-
sational unit without legal personality. In accor-
dance with Art. 110 the Polish Penal Law shall apply
to aliens in the case of the commission abroad of an
offence other than mentioned above, if, under the
Polish Penal Law, such an offence is subject to a
penalty exceeding 2 years of imprisonment, and the
perpetrator remains within the territory of the
Republic of Poland and where no decision on his
extradition has been taken. 
Art. 111 states that the liability for an act committed
abroad is, however, subject to the condition that the
liability for such an act is likewise recognised as an
offence, by a law in force in the place of its com-
mission (para. 1). If there are differences between
the Polish Penal Law and the law in force in the
place of commission, the court may take these dif-
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ferences into account in favour in the perpetrator
(para. 2). The condition provided for in para. 1 shall
not apply to Polish public official who, while per-
forming his duties abroad has committed an offence
there in connection with performing his functions, nor
to a person who committed an offence in a place not
under the jurisdiction of any state authority. 
Art. 112 provides that, notwithstanding the provi-
sions in force in the place of the commission of the
offence, the Polish penal law shall be applied to
Polish citizen or alien in case of the commission of
offence against the internal or external security of
the Republic of Poland, offence against Polish
offices or public officials; offence against essential
economic interests of Poland, offence of false state-
ment made before Polish office.
Art. 113 states that the Polish penal law shall be
applied to Polish citizen or alien, with respect to
whom no decision on extradition has been taken, in
the case of the commission abroad of an offence
which the Republic of Poland is obliged to prose-
cute under international agreements.
Art. 114 states that sentencing judgement rendered
abroad shall not prejudice criminal proceedings for
the same offence from being instituted before Polish
court. Para. 2 of Art. 114 stipulates that the court
shall credit to the penalty, imposed the period of
imprisonment actually served abroad and the penal-
ty there executed, taking into consideration the dif-
ferences between these penalties. Furthermore, it is
provided that the provision of para. 1 shall not apply
when sentencing judgement rendered abroad has
been transferred to be executed within the territory
of the Republic of Poland, and also when the judge-
ment rendered abroad considered as offence, with
regard to which either a transfer of the prosecution
or extradition from the territory of the Republic of
Poland has occurred. Para. 4 of the said Art. stipu-
lates that if a Polish citizen validly and finally sen-
tenced by a court in a foreign country, has been
transferred to execute the sentence in the territory of
the Republic of Poland, the court shall determine,
under Polish law, the legal qualification of the act,
and the penalty to be executed or any other penal
measure provided for in the Code; the basis for
determination of the penalty or other measure sub-
ject to execution shall be provided by the sentenc-
ing judgement rendered by a court of a foreign
country, penalty prescribed for such an act under
Polish law, period of actual imprisonment abroad,
penalty or other measure executed there, and differ-
ences between these penalties considered to the
favour of the sentenced person. 
Art. 109114 provide for liability of both Polish
nationals and aliens under the Polish jurisdiction for
crimes committed abroad. Of paramount signifi-
cance in this case is Art. 113 of the Penal Code,
which introduces the principle of "universality" of
criminal responsibility to the Polish criminal law. In
accordance to this principle, the Polish Penal Law is
applied to a Polish national or an alien, with respect
to whom no decision on extradition has been taken,
in the case of the commission abroad of an offence,
which the Republic of Poland is obliged to prose-
cute under international agreements (these offences
are also criminalised under the Polish Penal Law). 
International agreements concluded by Poland, to
which Art. 113 of the Penal Code refers, include all
the agreements ratified by Poland, which are covered
by Art. 91 sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland. They are incorporated to the
domestic legal order and have to be taken into
account by courts. The offences referred to in resolu-
tion 1373 (2001) are prosecutable, criminalised and
extraditable offences under many international agree-
ments, including antiterrorist conventions and proto-
cols, as well as internal legislation. Accordingly, the
Polish courts are obliged to interpret the reference
made in Art. 113 as extending to offences referred to
in the resolution, also taking into account that the res-
olution was adopted by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, which obviously forms part of the internal
legal order of Poland.
Chapter XVI. 
Crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes
Art. 120. A person, who uses the weapon of mass
destruction prohibited by international law, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for the time not shorter
than 10 years, for 25 years or for life.
Art. 121. 1. A person, who in contradiction to the
prohibitions of the international law or provisions of
law (statute), manufactures, collects, acquires, sells,
stores, transports or transmits the weapons of mass
destruction or develops them with the view to their
manufacturing or use, shall be sentenced to impris-
onment for 1 year up to 10 years.
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2. The same penalty shall be applicable to a person,
who allows the commitment of the act referred to
in para. 1.
Chapter XVII. 
Crimes against the Republic of Poland
Art. 134. A person, who commits attempt on the life
of the President of the Republic of Poland, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for time not shorter than
12 years, for 25 years or for life.
Art. 136. 1. A person, who in the territory of the
Republic of Poland commits an active assault
against the head of foreign state or accredited chief
of diplomatic mission of such a state or person enti-
tled to similar protection in virtue of laws, agree-
ments and generally accepted international custom,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months up
to 5 years.
2. A person, who in the territory of the Republic of
Poland commits an active assault against a person
belonging to the personnel of the diplomatic mis-
sion of foreign state or consular official of foreign
state, in connection with discharging by him of
official functions, shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for up to 3 years.
3. The penalty referred to in para. 2 shall be applic-
able to a person, who in the territory of the
Republic of Poland publicly insults the person
referred to in para. 1.
4. A person, who in the territory of the Republic of
Poland publicly insults the person referred to in
para. 2, shall be sentenced to fine, limitation of
freedom or imprisonment for up to 1 year.
Chapter XVIII. 
Crimes against defence
Art. 140. 1. A person, who with the view to dimin-
ishing the defence powers of the Republic of Poland
commits violent assault against an unit of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Poland, destroys or damages
object or facility with defence significance, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for up to 10 years.
2. If as a result of the act human death or serious harm
to health of many persons is caused, the perpetra-
tor shall be sentenced for 2 up to 12 years.
3. A person, who makes preparations to commit
crime referred to in para. 1, shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for up to 3 years.
4. In the case concerning the crime referred to in
para. 13 the court may rule seizure referred to in
Art. 39 subpara. 4, also when, the objects do not
constitute property of the perpetrator.
Chapter XIX. 
Crimes against life and health
Art. 148. 1. A person, who kills shall be sentenced
to imprisonment for the time not shorter than 8
years, for 25 years or for life.
2. A person, who kills:
1) with particular cruelty,
2) in connection with taking a hostage,
3) as a result of motivation that is worthy of partic-
ular condemnation,
4) using fire arms or explosive materials,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the time not
shorter than 12 years, for 25 years or for life. 
3. The penalty referred to in para. 2 shall be applic-
able to the person who kills more than one per-
son or was legally convicted before for homicide.
Chapter XX. 
Crimes against public security
Art. 163. 1. A person who causes event, which
poses threat to file or health of many persons or to
property at large scale, in form of:
1) fire,
2) destruction of a building, deluge, landslip, slip
of rocks or snow,
3) explosion of explosive or flammable materials
or other violent release of energy, proliferation
of poisonous, toxic or blistering substances,
4) violent release of nuclear energy or release of
ionising radiation,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year up to
10 years.
2. The perpetrator acting unintentionally shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months up to 5
years.
3. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 1 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced for 2
up to 12 years.
4. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 2 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced for 6
months up to 8 years.
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Art. 164. 1. A person who causes direct threat of the
event referred to in Art. 163.1, shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for 6 months up to 8 years.
2. The perpetrator acting unintentionally, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
Art. 165. 1. A person who causes event, which
poses threat to file or health of many persons or to
property at large scale:
1) causing epidemiological threat or proliferation
of contagious disease or epidemic,
2) manufacturing or introducing to trade sub-
stances harmful to health, food or other articles
of common use or pharmaceutical means
which do not meet quality requirements in
force,
3) causing damage or immobilisation of facility of
public use, in particular of facility supplying
with water, light, heat, gas, or facility securing
against common danger or used to its elimina-
tion,
4) disturbing, hindering or otherwise affecting
automatic processing, collecting or transfer of
information,
5) acting otherwise in especially dangerous cir-
cumstances,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months up
to 8 years.
2. The perpetrator acting unintentionally, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
3. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 1 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is  caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced for
2 years up to 12 years.
4. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 2 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced for 6
months up to 8 years.
Art. 166. 1. A person who uses ruse or violence
against a person or threat of direct use of such vio-
lence, takes over the control of vessel or aircraft,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years up to
12 years. 
2. A person who, acting in the manner referred to in
para. 1, causes direct danger for life or health of
many persons, shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for time not shorter than 3 years.
3. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 2 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for the time not shorter than 5 years
or for 25 years.
Art. 167. 1. A person, who places on vessel or aircraft
facility or substance posing threat to safety of persons
or property with significant value, shall be sentenced
to imprisonment for 3 months up to 5 years.
2. The same penalty shall be applicable to a person
who destroys, damages or makes unserviceable
navigation instrument or hinders its operation, if it
may pose threat to the safety of persons.
Art. 168. A person who makes preparations for the
crime referred to in Art. 163. 1, Art. 165. 1, Art. 166.
1 or in Art. 167. 1, shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for up to 3 years.
Art. 171. 1. A person who without required permis-
sion or in contravention of its conditions manufac-
tures, processes, collects, possesses, uses or effects
trade in explosive substance or instrument, radioac-
tive material, facility releasing ionising radiation or
other object or substance that may pose threat to file
or health of many persons or property at large scale,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months up
to 8 years.
2. The same penalty shall be applicable to the per-
son, who in contravention of the obligation com-
mits the act referred to in para. 1.
3. The same penalty shall be applicable to the per-
son, who transfers the objects referred to in para.
1 to nonauthorised person.
Art. 172. A person who hinders the action, under-
taken with the view to preventing the danger to life
or health of many persons or to property at large
scale, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 3
months up to 5 years.
Chapter XXI. 
Crimes against safety of transportation
Art. 173. 1. A person who causes disaster in road,
water or air transport posing threat to life or health
of many persons or to property at large scale, shall
be sentenced to imprisonment for one year up to 10
years. 
2. The perpetrator acting unintentionally shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for 3 months up to 5
years.
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3. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 1 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced for 2
years up to 12 years.
4. If as a result of the act referred to in para. 2 human
death or serious harm to health of many persons
is caused, the perpetrator shall be sentenced for 6
months up to 8 years.
Art. 174. 1. A person who causes direct danger of
disaster in road, water or air transport shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for 6 months up to 8 years.
2. The perpetrator acting unintentionally, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
Art. 175. A person who makes preparations for the
crime referred to in Art. 173. 1, shall be sentenced
to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
Chapter XXXII. 
Crimes against public order
Art. 258. 1. A person who participates in organised
group or association, which aim is to commit crimes
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 3
years.
2. If the group or association referred to in para. 1 is
of military nature the perpetrator shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for 3 months up to 5
years.
3. A person who establishes the group or association
referred to in para. 1 or 2 or manages such a
group or association shall be sentenced to impris-
onment from 6 months up to 8 years.
Appendix II. Law of 29 November 2000 on exter-
nal trade in goods, technologies and services of
strategic importance both for state security and
for the keeping international peace and security
(Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 119, item 1250, last
amendments: 2 July 2004) 
Chapter 1. 
General Provisions
Art. 1. This Law regulates the principles governing
external trade in strategic goods, technologies and
services relevant to the national security, as well as
for the maintenance of international peace and
security, principles of control and recording of such
a trade as well as responsibility for illegal trade in
the said goods, technologies and services.
Art. 2. External trade, referred to in Art. 3 item 8
shall be prohibited by law, if the conditions and lim-
itations set forth in this Law, provisions of other Laws
and international agreements and other internation-
al obligations are not met.
Art. 3. The definitions used in the present Law shall
have the following meaning:
1) dual use goods  the goods and technology,
which may be used both for civilian and mili-
tary purposes, determined in the list referred to
in Art. 6 section 2 (1),
2) armaments  weapons, munitions, explosives,
products, their parts and technologies deter-
mined in the list referred to in Art. 6 section 2 (2),
3) strategic goods  dual use goods and arma-
ments,
4) Polish customs area  territory of the Republic
of Poland,
5) exportation  activity consisting in the exporta-
tion of strategic goods from the Polish customs
area, including reexportation as well as their
transfer, particularly by phone, fax and other
electronic media,
6) importation  activity consisting in the intro-
duction of strategic goods to the Polish customs
area as well as their transfer, particularly by
phone, fax and other electronic media,
7) transit  procedure set forth in Art. 97 para. 1
item 1 and 2 of the Law of 9 January 1997 
Customs Code (Journal of Laws No. 23, item
117, No. 64, item 40, No. 121, item 770, No.
157, item 1026, No. 160, item 1084, of 1998,
No. 106, item 668, No. 160, item 1063, of
1999, No. 40, item 402, No. 72, item 802, of
2000, No. 22, item 269),
8) trade:
a) any transfer through the border of the
Republic of Poland of strategic goods, caused
in particular by exportation, importation, tran-
sit or conclusion of leasing, donation, loan,
lease contracts, or contribution to a company,
b) intermediary service, trade consulting, assis-
tance in the conclusion of contracts as well as
participation in any form in the activities
referred to in subpara. (a), also abroad,
9) entrepreneur  entrepreneur in the meaning of
the provisions of the Law of 11 November 1999
 Business Activity Law (Journal of Laws No.
101, item 1178),
10) trade control organ  minister for economy,
11) consulted organs  minister for foreign affairs,
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Minister for National Defence, minister for
internal affairs, Chief of State Protection
Office, Chairman of National Customs Office,
Chairman of National Atomic Agency as well
as National Customs Inspector.
Art. 4. Importation to the Polish customs area,
exportation from the Polish customs area as well as
transit through the Polish customs area of weapons
and munitions by natural persons, for the purposes
other than commercial and industrial ones shall be
regulated by separate provisions of law.
Art. 5. To the issues not regulated in this Law the
provisions of Administrative Proceedings Code shall
apply, unless the present Law provides otherwise.
Chapter 2. Permits for trade in strategic goods
Art. 6. 1. The trade in strategic goods may be effect-
ed only on the basis and in accordance with the
scope determined in the permit for exportation,
importation or transit, as well as for intermediary ser-
vices, trade advisory services, assistance in the con-
clusion of contracts and for participation in any form
in the activities referred to in Art. 3 item 8 (a), here-
inafter referred to as "the permit", subject to Art. 19
section 1. 
2. Minister for economy, in agreement with the min-
ister for foreign affairs and Minister for National
Defence, taking into account the view of the
Chief of State Protection Office shall determine in
a regulation:
1) the list of dual use goods, for which trade the
permit is required,
2) list of armaments, for which trade the permit is
required  taking into account, when preparing
the said lists, the appropriate international lists.
3. The Council of Ministers shall determine in a regu-
lation the list of countries, to which the exportation
or transit by Polish customs area of strategic goods
is prohibited or limited, taking into account: 
1) important interest of the foreign policy of the
Republic of Poland,
2) factors of defence or security of the Republic of
Poland,
3) important economic interest of the Republic of
Poland,
4) obligations of the Republic of Poland resulting
from the international agreements, including
those related to the nonproliferation and con-
trol of strategic goods.
4. The entrepreneur shall apply for permit for expor-
tation or intermediary services in the exportation
of goods non mentioned in the lists referred to in
section 2, if he knows or he has been informed
that the exported goods will or may be used in
total or in part for the purposes or in the circum-
stances referred to in Art. 10 section 1.
Art. 7. 1. The following permits shall be issued for
the trade in dual use goods:
1) Individual permit  which covers particular
dual use good or service concerning the said
good as well as the country or countries with
which the trade may be carried out by appro-
priate intermediary,
2) general permit  which covers the type or cate-
gory of dual use goods, which may be subject
of trade with one or more particular countries,
3) global permit  which covers the type of cate-
gory of dual use good, and which may be sub-
ject to trade, without determining the country,
to which such a trade may be effected.
2. In case of the trade in armaments or rendering of
services only individual permits shall be issued.
Art. 8. 1. The minister for economy shall issue glob-
al and general permits in a regulation.
2. The permits referred to in section 1 may use entre-
preneur who evidences the application for the
period of at least 3 years of internal control and
trade administration system, referred to in Art. 10
section 2, subject to Art. 50 section 2, as well as
submits to the control organ declaration on the
commencement of external trade in strategic
goods.
Art. 9. 1. Individual permit shall be issued upon the
request of entrepreneur.
2. Trade control organ shall be competent for the
issuance of individual permits, subject to Art. 19
section 1.
3. The application for individual permit shall contain:
1) identification of the entrepreneur, its registered
place of business and address,
2) number in entrepreneurs’ register, referred to in
separate provisions,
3) determination of type and scope of business
activity carried out by entrepreneur,
4) identification of exporter or importer, their reg-
istered places of business and addresses,
5) identification of manufacturer and end user,
their registered places of business and addresses,
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6) determination of strategic goods or services,
subject to external trade, their description,
quantity and value,
7) information on the manner of use of strategic
goods by end user,
8) determination of final destination country,
9) declaration stating that entrepreneur will under-
take all steps necessary so that the goods
referred to in the application reach the end user
and that he will inform the foreign importer that
the modification of use or end user requires
prior consent of Polish trade control organ,
10) other data determined in the regulation issued
on the basis of section 6.
4. The entrepreneur shall attach in particular to the
application for individual permit for trade in
strategic goods: 
1) declaration that there are no circumstances in
the trade referred to in Art. 10 section 1,
2) copy of concession for activity related to the
trade in explosives, weapons and munitions as
well as products and technologies with military
or law enforcement destination, referred to in
the separate provisions,
3) draft agreement concerning the said trade,
4) copy of certificate referred to in Art. 11 section 4,
5) importation certificate or end user declaration
in case of exportation,
6) other documents, which in the view of the
entrepreneur may be relevant to the examina-
tion of the case.
5. The document made in foreign language shall be
accompanied by its translation into Polish made
by sworn translator.
6. Minister for economy shall determine, in a regu-
lation:
1) other data, which should be contained in the
application for individual permits,
2) specimens of applications for individual permit
for exportation, importation and transit of strate-
gic goods, intermediary services, trade consultant
services, assistance in the conclusion of contracts,
as well as participation in the actions referred to
in Art. 3 subpara. 8 (a),
3) documents other than those mentioned in section
4 that should be attached to the application
referred to in section 3,
4) specimens of individual permits for the trade tak-
ing into account the types of goods and forms of
the trade.
Art. 10. 1. Before the submission of the application
for individual permit the entrepreneur shall make
sure that:
1) end user intends to use the armaments to
infringe in the area human rights and funda-
mental freedoms,
2) delivery of armaments poses threat to peace or
otherwise contributes to the destabilisation in
the region,
3) end destination country supports, facilitates or
encourages terrorism or international crime,
4) armaments may be used for other purpose than
for the satisfaction of justified needs of defence
and security of receiver’s country.
2. For the purpose of the realisation of the obligation
referred to in section 1, the entrepreneur shall cre-
ate and apply internal control and management
system related to the strategic goods trade, here-
inafter referred to as "internal control system".
3. Should the entrepreneur, having shown the best
diligence possible, not be able to find whether
there appear circumstances referred to in section
1, it may request from the trade control organ the
binding explanation concerning that issue. Trade
control organ shall provide the entrepreneur with
the said explanation, within 3 months as from the
submission of the application. In justified cases
that period may be extended to 6 months.
Art. 11. 1. Internal control system shall determine in
particular the tasks of the enterprise organs, basic
tasks for the posts related to the control and man-
agement of the trade, manner of cooperation of
entrepreneur with governmental administration in
this area, principles of staff recruitment, archiving of
data, training, internal control, realisation of pro-
curements.
2. Internal control system shall possess the certifi-
cate of consistency with requirements of interna-
tional norms ISO 9000 and principles determined
in section 1.
3. Certification referred to in section 2 shall be car-
ried out by the authorised control units, which
possess accreditation within the national accredi-
tation system created on the basis of the Law of
28 April 2000 on the system of consistency eval-
uation, accreditation and amending certain laws
(Journal of Laws No. 43, item 489).
4. Certificate of consistency with requirements,
referred to in section 1 shall be issued by the units
referred to in section 3.
5. Certificate referred to in section 4 shall be valid
for 3 years.
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6. Within the validity period of the certificate the
authorised control units shall carry out at least 5
controls of consistency of functioning of internal
control and management system of trade with the
requirements referred to in section 1 and 2.
7. Minister for economy, shall determine in a regu-
lation the list of certifying units authorised to carry
out the certification and control of control and
trade management system, among the accredited
units in national accreditation system.
Art. 12. 1. Trade control organ, having obtained the
view of consulting organs, shall issue individual per-
mit, having found that the requirements required for
its issuance have been met.
2. The issuance of individual permit shall be effect-
ed through an administrative decision.
3. Consulting organs, when preparing their view,
referred to in section 1, shall be entitled to request
from the entrepreneur the information facilitating
the verification of the data contained in the appli-
cation for individual permit.
4. Before taking decision concerning individual per-
mit trade control organ:
1) shall require the entrepreneur to complete,
within the specified period of time, the applica-
tion with lacking certifying documentation, stat-
ing that the legal requirements necessary for the
trade in strategic goods have been met,
2) may effect trial verification of information con-
tained in the application.
5. To the control referred to in section 4 (2) the pro-
visions of Art. 29 section 4 and Art. 30 section 1
and 2 of the present Law shall apply accordingly.
6. The entrepreneur shall inform trade control organ
any alterations concerning the data contained in
the application within 14 days as from their cre-
ation.
Art. 13. When the entrepreneur knows or has justi-
fied basis to suspect that the strategic goods were or
may be used in total or in part for the purposes and
in the circumstances referred to in Art. 10 section 1,
he shall take all the steps necessary to find the fac-
tual use of the said goods and inform the trade con-
trol organ thereon.
Art. 14. 1. Individual permit as well as the rights
resulting therefrom shall be inalienable.
2. Individual permit for trade in strategic goods shall
be the document significant for the purposes of
customs clearance.
3. Original of individual permit shall be attached to
customs declaration or application for issuance of
customs destination.
4. Issuance of individual permit for exportation or
transit as well as for the intermediary services in
exportation or transit may be depending on the
meeting of additional requirements and condi-
tions determined by the trade control organ, and
in particular on the submission by foreign end
user of the declaration on the use of strategic
goods or submission if international importation
certificate.
5. Individual permit shall state the validity term
thereof, not longer however than one year.
6. A fee shall be collected for the issuance of indi-
vidual permit. It shall constitute the income of the
state budget.
7. Minister for economy in consultation with the min-
ister for public finances shall determine in a regu-
lation the amount of fees for the issuance of indi-
vidual permit. The fees shall be determined on the
level reflecting costs actually incurred by trade
control organ when issuing individual permit.
Art. 15. 1. Trade control organ shall refuse, through
administrative decision, the trade permit if:
1) trade is in breach with the obligations of the
Republic of Poland resulting from international
treaties, 
2) it is required by the important interest of foreign
policy of the Republic of Poland,
3) it is required by factors of defence or security of
the Republic of Poland,
4) it is required by important economic interest of
the Republic of Poland,
5) entrepreneur does not guarantee that the trade
would be carried out in accordance with the legal
provisions.
2. Trade control organ shall refuse, through adminis-
trative decision, the permit for trade in strategic
goods, if the said goods may be in total or in part
used for illegal or inconsistent with the interest of
the Republic of Poland implementation, produc-
tion, exploitation, service, maintenance, storage,
detection, identification or proliferation of mass
destruction weapons and in particular of chemi-
cal, biological or nuclear weapons, as well as
implementation, production, maintenance, stor-
age of the means able to transfer such weapons.
Art. 16. Trade control organ may refuse, through
administrative decision the individual permit if:
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1) there is a risk of alteration of end user of destina-
tion of strategic goods,
2) the entrepreneur in its hitherto activity infringed
the legal regulations concerning the trade in
strategic goods.
Art. 17. 1. Trade control organ, taking into account
the view of consulting organs, may at any time,
through administrative decision, withdraw or modi-
fy individual permit if:
1) it is required by important interest of foreign
policy of the Republic of Poland,
2) it is required by the factors of defence and secu-
rity of the Republic of Poland,
3) it is required by important economic interest of
the Republic of Poland,
4) it is necessary for the implementation of inter-
national treaties to which the Republic of
Poland is a party,
5) there is a risk of alteration of end use or desti-
nation of strategic goods,
6) the entrepreneur carries out the trade in the
manner inconsistent with the conditions deter-
mined in the permit,
7) the entrepreneur due to his fault, lost warrant of
trade consistent with law.
2. The withdrawal or modification of individual per-
mit caused by the entrepreneur shall be without
compensation.
Art. 18. The entrepreneur, whose permit was with-
drawn for the reasons, referred to in Art. 17 section
1 (6) may apply once again for the issuance of per-
mit not earlier than after expiration of 3 years as
from the day, on which the decision on withdrawal
of permit became final.
Art. 19. 1. Transit of foreign dual use goods, which
transport shall end outside the Polish customs area,
requires the permit to be issued by the director of
boundary customs office.
2. The permit referred to in section 1 shall be issued
on the request of the carrier.
3. Minister for public finances in consultation with
the minister for economy shall determine in a reg-
ulation the specimen of application referred to in
section 2 and specimen of permit for transit of
dual use goods.
4. The specimen of application and of permit
referred to in section 3 shall contain in particular:
the number of exportation license, country of ori-
gin of the goods, name of carrier, number of lad-
ing bill, name of exporter and its registered
address, name of receiver and its registered
address, name and full description of the goods or
technology, control number, quantity and value,
name of border crossing point, through which the
goods will be introduced to the Polish customs
area, declaration of the carrier that the goods cov-
ered by international control will be transported
through the Polish customs area on the basis of
exportation license from exporter’s country to the
indicated receiver in the same condition, in which
it was introduced to the Polish customs area.
Art. 20. 1. Exportation, importation or transit of
strategic goods may be effected in indicated customs
offices.
2. Minister for public finances, in consultation with
the minister for economy, shall determine in a
regulation the customs offices, referred to in sec-
tion 1, taking into account the assurance of prop-
er control of exportation, importation and transit
of strategic goods.
Art. 21. 1. There shall be a register, hereinafter
referred to as "the register" of granted individual per-
mits and of entrepreneurs, who met the conditions
referred to in Art. 8 section 2.
2. The register shall be carried out by trade control
organ.
3. The entry of individual permit to the register shall
be made immediately after it has been granted.
The entry of the entrepreneur shall be effected
immediately after the submission by him of a dec-
laration referred to in Art. 8 section 2.
4. Minister for economy shall determine in a regula-
tion the manner, in which the register is carried
out, taking into account in particular the types of
granted permits as well as the quantity and value
of strategic goods covered by the permit.
Chapter 3. 
Importation Certificate and end user declaration
Art. 22. 1. When it is required by the competent
authorities of the country of foreign exporter, trade
control organ, upon request of entrepreneur, may
issue importation certificate or confirm the end user
declaration.
2. To the application for the issuance of importation
certificate the provisions of Art. 9 section 35
shall apply accordingly.
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3. Importation certificate as well as end user decla-
ration shall be the documents to be shown to the
competent authorities outside the Republic of
Poland and shall certify the credibility of the
importer and the control by competent organs of
the Republic of Poland of transactions related to
the importation into the Polish customs area of
strategic goods.
4. A fee shall be collected for the issuance of impor-
tation certificate as well as the confirmation of
end user declaration. It shall constitute the
income of the state budget.
5. Minister for economy in consultation with the min-
ister for public finances shall determine in a regu-
lation the amount of fees for the issuance of impor-
tation certificate and confirmation of end user dec-
laration. These fees shall be determined on the
level reflecting the costs actually incurred by the
trade control organ when issuing importation cer-
tificate and confirmation of end user declaration.
6. Trade control organ may refuse the importation
certificate or refuse to confirm the end user decla-
ration if it is not possible to confirm the facts
referred to in section 3, due to the lack of warrant
of legal trade in strategic goods or nonapplication
by the entrepreneur of internal control system.
7. Minister for economy shall determine in a regula-
tion specimen of importation certificate.
8. Specimen referred to in section 7 shall contain in
particular: name of importer, name of exporter,
their registered places of business and addresses,
name and description of strategic goods, control
number, quantity and value, description of final
use of the strategic goods as well as the declara-
tion that the importer:
1) has pledged itself that it is going to introduce
the goods specified in the certificate to the
Polish customs area and to inform immediately
the trade control organ on any modifications of
the contract terms,
2) has submitted the declaration that he is con-
scious that the reexportation, modification of
end user or declared final use of the goods
require prior consent of the trade control organ,
3) in consultation with end user has pledged him-
self to facilitate the control of consistency of use
of goods with the conditions of permit to be car-
ried out by trade control organ, with possible
participation of the representatives of the
authorities of country of exporter and at the
place of their use during whole period while
they are in the Polish customs area.
Art. 23. 1. For the purposes of the exportation of
strategic goods, trade control organ shall request
from the entrepreneur the submission of importation
certificate or end user declaration confirmed by
competent authorities of the country of foreign
importer.
2. End user declaration shall be issued by foreign
end user and shall contain the data required by
trade control organ.
3. Declaration referred to in section 2 shall be also
confirmed by foreign importer and competent
authorities of final destination country.
4. Declaration referred to in section 2 shall contain
in particular:
1) determination of final destination country,
2) name and address of foreign end user,
3) determination of strategic goods, its description,
quantity and value,
4) description of final use of strategic goods,
5) indication of intermediary receivers and pur-
chasers,
6) obligation not to transfer the strategic goods to
any other receiver without prior consent of
trade control organ.
Art. 24. 1. Entrepreneur who has obtained importa-
tion certificate, shall, within 30 days as from the
clearance of strategic goods, apply to the director of
customs office competent for the registered place of
business of end user of the said goods for the
issuance of certificate confirming that the goods
covered by the said certificate have been actually
and in the manner consistent with the legal regula-
tions introduced to the Polish customs area. It shall
be hereinafter referred to as "delivery verification
certificate". 
2. To the issuance of delivery verification certificate
the provisions of Chapter VII of Administrative
Proceedings Code shall apply accordingly.
3. The entrepreneur shall cover the costs incurred
by customs office during the proceedings leading
to the issuance of delivery verification certificate.
4. Minister for economy, taking into account the
view of the Chairman of National Customs Office
shall determine in a regulation the specimen of
delivery verification certificate and manner of
registration of issued certificates.
5. Specimen of delivery verification certificate shall
contain in particular: name of importer, name of
exporter, their registered places of business and
addresses, name and description of goods or
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technology, control number, quantity and value,
description of end use of the goods or technolo-
gy, SAD number, number of bill of lading, bill of
consignment or other document confirming the
importation of goods or technologies and confir-
mation that the importer has submitted credible
evidence confirming the delivery and introduced
the goods or technologies mentioned in the cer-
tificate to the Republic of Poland, in accordance
with the laws in force.
6. In case of exportation of strategic goods, trade
control organ may request from the entrepreneur
the submission of delivery verification certificate,
issued by competent authorities of the importer’s
country.
Chapter 4. 
Recording of trade in strategic goods and informa-
tion concerning that trade
Art. 25. 1. The entrepreneur effecting trade in strate-
gic goods shall record the said trade.
2. Minister for economy shall determine in a regula-
tion manner of such recording, referred to in sec-
tion 1, taking into account the conditions to be
met by internal control system.
Art. 26. 1. The entrepreneur effecting trade within
general and global permits shall submit to trade con-
trol organ at least once per 6 months, the informa-
tion on the realisation of the said trade.
2. Minister for economy shall determine in a regula-
tion the scope of information referred to in sec-
tion 1, covering in particular: quantity and value
of goods, determination of country with which
the said trade is carried out, names of importer,
exporter, their registered places of business and
addresses, indication of indirect receivers and
purchasers.
Art. 27. Upon request of consulting organs trade
control organ shall submit to the said organs the
information on the realisation of trade in strategic
goods.
Chapter 5. 
Trade control
Art. 28. 1. The trade shall be subject to control.
2. The control shall include in particular:
1) observance of the consistency of trade with the
permit, including verification of the transaction
after it is done,
2) operation of internal control system,
3) correctness of recording referred to in Art. 25.
3. The control shall be carried out by trade control
organ, with the assistance of the organs referred to
in Art. 29 section 2.
4. Trade control organ may request the control to be
made by other competent state control organ.
Art. 29. 1. To the control referred to in Art. 28 sec-
tion 1 trade control organ may nominate control
team, hereinafter referred to as "the team".
2. On the request of the minister for economy, minis-
ter for foreign affairs, Minister for National
Defence, minister for public finances, minister for
interior, Chief of State Protection Office, Chairman
of National Atomic Agency, Chairman of National
Customs Office and General Customs Inspector,
shall designate to the team employees, soldiers or
employees of subjected or supervised organisation-
al units. The minister for economy may nominate
to the team the experts, upon their consent.
3. Trade control organ, when nominating the mem-
bers of the team shall designate the director, who
coordinates the control procedures as well as
prepares postcontrol protocol.
4. Control activities are carried out on the basis of
the authorisation for control issued by the trade
control organ.
5. Minister for economy shall determine, in a regu-
lation specimen of control authorisation. The
specimen shall contain in particular: indication of
person, type and number of identity document,
validity date of authorisation document as well as
the information that upon request of the authori-
sation owner who carries out control actions, the
directors, members of management as well as the
employees of controlled entrepreneurs shall give
information and show documents.
Art. 30.  1. The members of the team shall be enti-
tled in particular to:
1) Have access to the real estate, building, premises
or their parts, where the entrepreneur carries out
the business activity, on the days and within the
hours in which it is or should be carried out,
2) request oral or written explanations, documents
or other information carriers as well as submit
data related to the object of the control.
2. Control actions shall be carried out in the pres-
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ence of the controlled person, deputies of the
controlled person or employed by him, and in
case of absence of the said persons in the pres-
ence of the witness.
3. Postcontrol protocol shall be submitted by the
team leader to the trade control organ.
Art. 31. 1. In case of incorrectness in the trade,
trade control organ shall request the entrepreneur to
restore the status consistent with the present Law
within one month as from the delivery of the
request.
2. Upon ineffective expiration of the period referred
to in section 1 trade control organ shall withdraw,
through administrative decision, individual permit.
In case of global and general permits trade control
organ shall issue administrative decision prohibit-
ing to the entrepreneur the use the permit. The
trade control organ shall immediately inform con-
sulting organs on the issuance of the said decision.
3. In the case referred to in section 2 the entrepre-
neur may obtain subsequently the individual per-
mit or use global or general permit not earlier
than upon expiration of 3 years accordingly, as
from the day on which the decision on the with-
drawal of individual permit and the decision on
the prohibition of use of general or global permit
became final.
Art. 32. To the issues not regulated in this Chapter
the provisions of the Law of 28 September 1991 on
treasury control (Journal of Laws of 1999, No. 54,
item 572, No. 83, item 931, and of 2000, No. 70,
item 816) concerning control procedure shall apply.
Chapter 6. Penal provisions and monetary penalties
Art. 33. 1. He who effects trade without permit, or
even inadvertently, contrary to the conditions deter-
mined in the permit, shall be subject to imprison-
ment from one year to 10 years.
2. If the perpetrator, effecting trade contrary to the
conditions determined in the permit Laws inad-
vertently and has restored the status referred to in
Art. 31 section 1, shall be subject to fine, limita-
tion of liberty or imprisoned up to 2 years.
3. The punishment referred to in section 1 shall
apply to the perpetrator who committed the Law
determined in section 1 or 2.
4. In case of sentence for the crime determined in
sections 13 the court may decide on the seizure
of strategic goods and of other objects used in or
destined for the perpetration of or resulting direct-
ly or indirectly from the crime, including financial
means and securities, even if they are not the
property of the perpetrator.
Art. 34. He who fails to carry out obligations and
conditions referred to in Art. 24 section 1 or in Art.
26 section 1, shall be subject to fine.
Art. 35. He who impedes control referred to in Art.
28 section 1 shall be subject to fine.
Art. 36. The decision in the cases referred to in Art.
34 and 35 shall be made in accordance with the
procedures determined in the Code on procedures
in case of offences.
Art. 37. The entrepreneur who is not natural person,
and who carries out trade without valid permit, shall
be punished by the trade control organ with fine in
amount of 200.000 PLN.
Art. 38. The entrepreneur who is not natural person
and who carries out trade contrary to the conditions
determined in the permit shall be punished by trade
control organ in administrative decision with fine in
amount up to 100 000 PLN.
Art. 39. The entrepreneur who is not natural person,
and who fails to fulfil the obligations or conditions
referred to in Art. 24 section 1 or Art. 26 section 1 shall
be punished by trade control organ in administrative
decision with fine in amount up to 50.000 PLN.
Art. 40. 1. Monetary penalty shall not be sentenced
if from the day on which the basis for liability
referred to in Art. 3739 were found the period of 5
years has lapsed.
2. The sentenced monetary penalty shall not be col-
lected upon expiration of 5 years as from the day
on which the sentence became final.
Art. 41. 1. The period of payment of monetary
penalty shall amount to 30 days as from the day on
which the sentence became final.
2. Monetary penalty not regulated within the speci-
fied period shall be executed together with the
interest for delay, in accordance with the proce-
dure determined in the provisions on execution
proceedings in administration.
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Art. 42. If the payment of the monetary penalty
within the period specified in Art. 41 section 1 lim-
its considerably or impedes further realisation of
business activity by the entrepreneur, trade control
organ may, upon request of the entrepreneur, issue
administrative decision on the postponement of pay-
ment period or division thereof into instalments, for
the period not longer than one year.
Chapter 7. 
Amendments to existing provisions
Art. 43. In the Law of 9 January 1997 Customs Code
(Journal of Laws No. 157, item 1026, No. 160, item
1084, of 1998 No. 106 item 668, No. 160, item
1063, of 1999 No. 40, item 402, No. 72, item 802, as
well as of 2000, No. 22 item 269) in Art. 14 para. 6a
shall be replaced by the following: "para. 6a. To the
permits referred to in para. 6 the provisions of Art. 17
item 20 of the Law of 11 December 1997 on the
administration of external trade in goods and services
(Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 157, item 1026, of
1999, No. 5 item 587, No. 101, item 1178) shall
apply."
Art. 44. In the Law of 11 December 1997 on the
administration of external trade in goods and ser-
vices and on special trade (Journal of Laws of 1997
No. 157, item 1026, of 1999, No. 5 item 587, No.
101, item 1178) the following amendments shall be
introduced:
1) in the title the words "as well as in special trade"
shall be deleted,
2) in Art. 1 section 1 the words "as well as in spe-
cial trade" shall be deleted,
3) item 3 in Art. 2 shall be deleted,
4) Chapters 46 shall be deleted,
5) Art. 55 shall be deleted.
Art. 45. In the Law of 10 September 1999 on some
compensation agreements concluded in connection
with contracts on delivery for the purposes of
national defence and security (Journal of Laws No.
80, item 903) in Art. 3 item 5 shall be replaced by
the following: 5) armaments or military equipment 
shall mean armaments in the meaning of the Law of
29 November 2000 on external trade in goods, tech-
nologies and services of strategic importance both
for state security and for the keeping of internation-
al peace and security and amending certain laws.
Art. 46. In the Law of 7 October 1999 on the support
for industrial restructuring of defence potential and
technical modernisation of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws No. 83, item 932)
in Art. 4 item 6 shall be replaced by the following:
"6) armaments or military equipment  shall mean
armaments in the meaning of the Law of 29
November 2000 on external trade in goods, tech-
nologies and services of strategic importance both for
state security and for the keeping of international
peace and security and and amending certain laws.
Chapter 8. 
Transitional and final provisions
Art. 47. The proceedings instituted on the basis of
the provisions of the Laws referred to in Art. 44 and
51 and not finalised before the entry into force of
this Law with final decision shall be cancelled.
Art. 48. 1. The permits for importation, exportation
or transit of goods and technologies covered by the
lists of goods and technologies subject to specific
control issued on the basis of Art. 3 section 1 of the
Law of 2 December 1993 on the principles of spe-
cific control of external trade in goods and tech-
nologies in connection with the international agree-
ments and obligations (Journal of Laws No. 129,
item 598, of 1996 No. 106, item 496, of 1997 No.
88, item 554, and No. 157, item 1026 as well as of
1999 No. 70 item 775, and No. 83, item 931) with
the entry into force of the present Law shall become
individual decisions in the meaning of Art. 7 section
1 item 1 and shall remain in force for the period for
which they were issued, not longer however than
until 31 December 2001.
2. The permits issued on the basis of Art. 38 section 1
of the Law of 11 December 1997 on the adminis-
tration of external trade in goods and services and
on special trade (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 157,
item 1026, of 1999, No. 5 item 587, No. 101, item
1178) within the scope related to the special trade,
with the entry into force of the present Law shall
become individual decisions in the meaning of Art.
7 section 2 and shall remain in force for the period
for which they were issued, not longer however
than until 31 December 2001. 
Art. 49. Executive provisions concerning the lists of
goods and technologies covered by specific control
of external trade issued before the entry into force of
the present Law on the basis of hitherto existing pro-
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visions, shall remain in force until new executive
provisions on the basis of the present Law are issued,
not longer however than for 6 months as from the
entry into force of the present Law.
Art. 50. 1. Until the entry into force of the provisions
of Art. 9 section 1 and 4 and Art. 10 section 1 indi-
vidual permits may be issued to the entrepreneurs
who before the entry into force of the present Law
have been entered to the register of entrepreneurs car-
rying out special external trade on the basis of the
provisions of Art. 33 of the Law of 11 December 1997
on the administration of external trade in goods and
services and on special trade as well as to those who
submitted certificate referred to in Art. 11 section 4.
2. Before the entry into force of Art. 8 section 2 only
individual permits shall be issued for the trade in
dual use goods.
Art. 51. The Law of 2 December 1993 on the prin-
ciples of specific control of external trade in goods
and technologies in connection with the interna-
tional agreements and obligations (Journal of Laws
No. 129, item 598, of 1996 No. 106, item 496, of
1997 No. 88, item 554, and No. 157, item 1026 as
well as of 1999 No. 70 item 775, and No. 83, item
931) shall terminate.
Art. 52. The present Law shall enter into force on 1
January 2001, except:
1) Art. 8 section 2, which shall enter into force
after 3 years as from the publication of this Law,
2) Art. 9 section 4 item 1 and 4 and Art. 10 section
1, which shall enter into force on 1 January 2002.
Appendix III. Atomic Law of 29 November 2000 :
Excerpts (Journal of  Laws of 2001, No. 3, Item 18,
No. 100, Item 1085 and No.154, Item 1800)
Chapter 2  
Licences addressing nuclear safety and radiologi-
cal protection issues
Article 4
1. Any practice involving exposures and concerning: 
1) manufacturing, processing, storage, disposal,
transport or use of and trade in nuclear materi-
als, radioactive sources, radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel;
2) construction, commissioning, experimental or
steady state operation and decommissioning of
nuclear facilities;
3) construction, operation, closure and decommis-
sioning of radioactive waste repositories and
spent nuclear fuel repositories, and construction
and operation of storage facilities for spent
nuclear fuel;
4) manufacture, installation, use and maintenance
of devices containing radioactive sources and
trade in such devices;
5) manufacture, purchase, commissioning and use
of devices generating ionising radiation;
6) commissioning of laboratories and workrooms
using ionising radiation sources, including
Xray laboratories;
7) deliberate addition of radioactive substances in
the processes of manufacturing consumer and
medicinal products and trade in such goods;
8) deliberate administration of radioactive sub-
stances to humans and animals for medical or
veterinary diagnostics, therapeutic purposes or
for research;
 shall require a licence or a notification from
the viewpoint of nuclear safety and radiologi-
cal protection, subject to Article 6(1). 
2. Practices involving the addition of radioactive
substances to foodstuffs, toys, personal jewellery
or cosmetic products, as well as the import of
such products into, and export from the territory
controlled by Polish customs, shall be prohibited.
Article 5
1. Applications to issue a licence for practices
referred to in Article 4(1) or the notification of
such practices shall be submitted by the head of
the organisational entity.
2.Licences shall be issued by or the notification shall
be made to the President of the National Atomic
Energy Agency, hereinafter referred to as "the
Agency’s President", subject to paragraph 3.
3. Licence for manufacturing, acquiring, commis-
sioning and operating for medical purposes Xray
sets with radiation energy up to 300 keV (kilo
electronvolt) shall be issued by the sanitary
inspector of the Voivod (regional governor), or in
the case of organisational entities subordinated to
or supervised or established by the Minister for
National Defence  by the military sanitary
inspector.
4. The bodies referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall
establish and maintain a register of those organi-
sational entities whose practices require at least a
notification.
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5. Decisions to withdraw a licence shall establish
the method for ensuring safety of nuclear materi-
als, ionising radiation sources, radioactive waste
or spent nuclear fuel in the possession of the
organisational entity.
6. In all matters not regulated by this Act and con-
cerning the licences, the provisions of the Act of
Parliament of 19.11.1999 on Business Enterprises
(O.J. of 1999 No 101, Item 1178, and O.J. of 2000
No 86, Item 958 and No 114, Item 1193) shall
apply.
7. Use for economic purposes of industrial waste
containing natural radioactive isotopes shall be
subject to the rules defined in the regulations on
environmental protection.
Article 6
The Council of Ministers shall establish by regula-
tions:
1) cases where practices referred to in Article 4(1)
shall be exempted from obtaining a licence or
from issuing a notification, and cases where
such practices may be performed on the basis of
a notification, by defining appropriate exemp-
tion criteria in the form of limiting values for
radioactive isotopes total activity and radioac-
tivity concentration;
2) documents required together with a licence
application submitted for practices referred to in
Article 4(1) or with the notification of such prac-
tices, which are necessary to confirm that the
applicant fulfils the conditions satisfying
nuclear safety and radiological protection
requirements, taking into account specific char-
acteristics of various practices as well as the
actions of the authority issuing the licence or
receiving the notification in the event that the
content of such documents is not sufficient to
prove that these conditions have been fulfilled;
3) requirements concerning natural radioactive iso-
tope content in raw materials and in construction
materials used in the buildings intended for
humans and livestock and also in industrial
waste used in the construction industry, as well
as the control over the content of such isotopes.
Chapter 4  
Nuclear Facilities
Article 34
1. Nuclear facilities shall include in particular:
1) nuclear power plants, thermalelectric power
plants and heating plants equipped with
nuclear power reactors,
2) research, experimental and other nuclear reac-
tors,
3) facilities designed for manufacturing, process-
ing, storage and disposal of nuclear materials
and nuclear fuel
 from the start of their construction until the
completion of the decommissioning process.
2. Nuclear facilities shall be subject to physical pro-
tection.
Article 35
1. The obligation to fulfil the requirements of
nuclear safety, radiological protection and physi-
cal protection of a nuclear facility during the
stages of siting, design, construction, commission-
ing and test operation shall lie with the investor,
whereas during the stages of regular operation or
decommissioning, such responsibilities lie with
the head of the operating organisation.
2. Independently from the investor’s duties, the
obligation to fulfil nuclear safety and radiological
protection requirements shall be borne by the
other participants in the investment process,
according to the scope of their tasks.
3. During nuclear facility design, construction, com-
missioning and operation, all technical and
organisational solutions should be applied that, in
view of scientific and technological develop-
ments, are necessary to ensure that at all stages of
the facility operation, the exposure of persons on
the site or of other people, and the contamination
of the environment will be as low as possible,
when reasonably taking into account economic
and social factors, and will not exceed dose limit
values established in the regulations based on
Article 25(1).
Article 36
The authority competent to decide on construction
and development conditions on the site of a future
nuclear facility, according to the Act of Parliament of
7 July 1994 on Land Use Planning (O.J. of 1999
No15, Item 139, No 41, Item 412 and No 111, Item
1279 and of 2000 No 12, Item 136, No 109, Item
1157 and No 120, Item 1268) shall issue this deci-
sion after obtaining positive opinion from the
Agency’s President on nuclear safety and radiologi-
cal protection matters.
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Article 37
The Agency’s President shall issue a licence for con-
struction, commissioning and test operation of a
nuclear facility at the investor’s request, whereas the
licence for regular operation and decommissioning
shall be issued at the operating entity’s request. The
licence shall be a prerequisite in order to obtain per-
mit for nuclear facility construction, utilisation and dis-
mantling referred to in the Act of Parliament of 7 July
1994  Construction Law (O.J. of 2000 No 106, Item
1126, No 109, Item 1157 and No 120, Item 1268).
Article 38
1. The Voivod (regional governor) shall establish a
restricted use area surrounding the nuclear facili-
ty, referred to in the Act of Parliament of 27 April
2001  Environmental Protection Law (O.J. of
2001, No.100, Item 627).
2. After consultation with the Agency’s President,
the minister competent in environmental matters,
shall establish by regulations detailed rules for the
creation of a restricted use area surrounding the
nuclear facility, indicating relevant restrictions
concerning its uses and in particular taking into
account the site characteristics and conditions,
possible accident situations and the distribution
of ionising radiation doses at various distances
from the facility.
3. The provisions of the Act referred to in paragraph 1
shall be applicable to cases relating to damage
caused by the establishment of a restricted use
area.
Article 39
The Agency’s President shall issue an order decreas-
ing the power or stopping the operation of a nuclear
facility if, in his assessment, further operation of this
facility shall endanger nuclear safety. A subsequent
increase of power or startup of the facility shall
require the consent of the Agency’s President.
Chapter 5  
Nuclear Materials
Article 40
1. The head of the organisational entity shall be
responsible for carrying out nuclear materials
accounting and for ensuring the physical protec-
tion of nuclear materials referred to in the regula-
tions based on Article 42(1) and 42(2).
2. The system of nuclear materials accountancy
shall include:
1) an internal inventory register, systems of mater-
ial accounting and controls of nuclear materials
conducted in organisational entities engaged in
activities involving nuclear materials,
2) the central accounting and control based on the
structure of areas for nuclear materials inventory,
hereinafter referred to as "material balance areas".
3. The central nuclear materials accounting and
control shall be maintained by the Agency’s
President in cooperation with appropriate inter-
national organisations.
Article 41
1. Nuclear materials shall be subject to physical pro-
tection during their manufacturing, processing,
storage, use, transport, disposal and trade.
2. The head of the organisational entity engaged in
practices involving nuclear materials shall estab-
lish a physical protection system which, after the
approval of the Agency’s President, shall be
agreed upon with the Chief of the Police
Department of the appropriate voivodship.
3. The Agency’s President shall conduct periodic
controls of the system referred to in paragraph 2.
Article 42
The Council of Ministers shall establish by regula-
tions:
1) nuclear materials subject to accountancy, the
rules for maintaining the material balance areas
and the procedures for maintaining central and
internal accounting and control of nuclear mate-
rials, including the type of documentation and
control performance frequency,
2) nuclear materials subject to physical protection
and the types of organisational and technological
undertakings in the field of physical protection,
establishing nuclear material categories and phys-
ical protection levels for each category, as well as
the procedures for control performance referred
to in Article 41.3.
Chapter 7 
Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel
Article 47
1. Radioactive waste shall be classified into three
categories according to its activity level or surface
dose rate: low, medium and highlevel radioac-
tive waste. These categories may be further sub-
divided into subcategories according to the
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halflife of radioactive isotopes contained in the
waste, or according to its thermal power.
2. Disused (spent) sealed radioactive sources shall
form an additional category of radioactive waste.
3. Spent sealed radioactive sources shall be classi-
fied into the following subcategories of spent
sealed radioactive sources according to the level
of their activity: low, medium and highlevel,
which shall be further subdivided according to
the halflife of contained radioactive isotopes into
shortlived and longlived subcategories.
Article 48
1. Radioactive waste classification shall be per-
formed by head of the organisational entity, on
whose site the waste is present.
2. Radioactive waste classification may be per-
formed by the Agency’s President in cases of:
1) discrepancies in waste classification performed
by the head of the organisational entity on
whose site the waste is present and the classifi-
cation performed by the head of the organisa-
tional entity receiving the waste;
2) evidence of irregularities in waste classification
by head of the organisational entity on whose
site the waste is present.
Article 49
1. Head of the organisational entity, on whose site
the radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel is pre-
sent, shall be responsible for keeping inventory
registers. Inventory registers shall be kept for each
type of practice involving radioactive waste or
spent nuclear fuel.
2. Radioactive waste containing nuclear materials
and spent nuclear fuel shall be subject to physical
protection.
Article 50
Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel shall be
stored in conditions allowing their segregation and
in a manner which ensures adequate protection of
humans and the environment.
Article 51
The Council of Ministers shall establish by regulations:
1) a method to classify radioactive waste into cate-
gories and subcategories, taking into account the
criteria referred to in Article 47(1) and 47(3);
2) procedures for maintaining inventory registers
and performing controls of radioactive wastes as
well as a standard inventory form, taking into
account the procedures for maintaining common
inventory registers for various practices involved
in dealing with radioactive waste or with spent
nuclear fuel, and the types of control activities,
3) conditions for storage of radioactive waste or
spent nuclear fuel and the requirements to be met
by the facilities, rooms and packaging designed
for the storage of  radioactive waste belonging to
various categories, taking into account the state of
matter and other physicochemical properties of
the waste, as well as the requirements to be met
by storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel.
Article 52
1. Liquid or gaseous radioactive waste generated as
a result of practices referred to in Article 4(1), may
be discharged into the environment provided that
its radioactive concentration in the environment
may be disregarded from the radiological protec-
tion point of view. The method for waste dis-
charge and its permissible activity shall be speci-
fied in the licence.
2. Radioactive waste that has been treated or which
do not require treatment, and spent nuclear fuel
which will not be reprocessed, shall be disposed
of in repositories.
3. Spent nuclear fuel intended for disposal shall be
considered as highlevel radioactive waste.
4. Radioactive waste shall be disposed of exclusively in
solid form and packaged in a manner which ensures
radiological safety for humans and the environment,
ensuring heat transfer, prevention of critical mass for-
mation and continuous control of these factors dur-
ing the disposal and after repository closure.
Article 53
1. Radioactive waste repositories may be divided
into nearsurface and deep repositories.
2. By decision of the Agency’s President, a radioac-
tive waste repository may be declared as the
National Radioactive Waste Repository.
Article 54
The authority which, according to the Act referred to
in Article 36, is competent to issue decisions on the
conditions for construction and development of the
site intended for construction of a repository, shall
issue such decision after obtaining positive opinion
from the Agency’s President from the viewpoint of
nuclear safety, radiological protection and physical
protection.
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Article 55
The Council of Ministers shall establish by regulations:
1) radioactive waste categories and subcategories
which may be disposed of in specified types of
repositories, taking into account the state of
matter and physicochemical properties of the
waste intended for disposal,
2) detailed requirements for specific types of
repositories concerning siting, construction,
operation and closure, taking into account nat-
ural phenomena, geological conditions and sys-
tems of control,
3) conditions which a repository must fulfil in
order to be granted the status of National
Radioactive Waste Repository, taking into
account the type of repository, categories of
radioactive waste and time during which waste
can be admitted into the repository,
4) detailed requirements for radioactive waste
preparation for disposal, including the types of
packaging of the waste placed for disposal.
Article 56
1. Activities involved in dealing with radioactive
waste and spent nuclear fuel shall be conducted
by the enterprise of public utility referred to in
Chapter 14.
2. Activities referred to in paragraph 1, with the
exclusion of radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel disposal and transport to the repository, may
be conducted by some other organisational enti-
ty, provided that this organisational entity shall
fulfil the requirements for nuclear safety and radi-
ological protection and shall obtain the appropri-
ate licence. In particular, the organisational entity
in whose facility the radioactive waste or spent
nuclear fuel was generated, may process and
store them for the time specified in the licence.
Article 57
1. The "gmina" (commune) on whose territory the
National Radioactive Waste Repository is sited, is
qualified to receive an annual payment from the
national budget:
1) from the date on which the first shipment of
waste is accepted for disposal until the date on
which the decision to close the repository is
made  which shall amount to 400% of the pre-
vious year’s income from local real estate tax,
increased proportionally to the rise in the retail
and consumer services price index, established
according to the procedure provided  in the Act of
Parliament of 12 January 1991 on local taxes and
duties (O.J. No 9, Item 31 and No 101, Item 444;
of 1992 No 21, Item 86; of 1994 No 123, Item
600; of 1996 No 91, Item 409 and No 149, Item
704; of 1997 No 5, Item 24, No 107, Item 689,
No 121, Item 770 and No 123, Item 780; of 1998
No 106, Item 668, No 150, Item 983 and No 160,
Item 1058, and of 2000 No 88, Item983, No 95,
Item 1041 and No 122, Item 1315),
2) after the decision to close the repository has
been made  which shall amount to 50% of the
payment referred to in paragraph 1, for the peri-
od corresponding to the duration of operation
of the repository.
2. The payment referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
transferred to the commune from the national bud-
get in equal quarterly instalments, not later than 14
days after the last month of a given quarter.
3. The commune shall not be entitled to such a
quarterly instalment if, due to the decisions of
appropriate authorities of the commune or of the
"powiat" (district) where the commune is located,
during any period of the given quarter the admis-
sion of radioactive waste shipments into the
repository was not possible.
Chapter 8  
Transport of Nuclear Materials, Ionising Radiation
Sources, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel
Article 58
Nuclear materials shall be prepared for transport
and transported in a manner which prevents the
occurrence of a selfsustaining chain nuclear fission
reaction and which complies with physical protec-
tion principles.
Article 59
In preparation for transport and during the transport
of nuclear materials, ionising radiation sources,
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, one should
take into account the risks that may result from their
physicochemical properties and fulfil the conditions
and requirements imposed on hazardous materials
transport, established in other regulations.
Article 60
Exposure of individuals participating in the trans-
port, including persons loading and unloading
nuclear materials, ionising radiation sources,
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radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, shall be
subject to control and the doses received by these
individuals shall not exceed the dose limits for occu-
pationally exposed workers established in the regu-
lations issued on the basis of Article 25(1).
Article 61
Conditions and requirements governing the onsite
transport, within the site of the organisational entity
engaged in manufacturing, processing, use, storage
and disposal of nuclear materials, ionising radiation
sources with the exception of devices generating
ionising radiation, radioactive waste and spent
nuclear fuel, shall be established by the Agency’s
President in the licence.
Article 62
1. Import into and export from the territory con-
trolled by Polish customs of nuclear materials,
radioactive sources and devices containing such
sources, import of consumer goods emitting ion-
ising radiation, as well as import and export of
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, shall be
conducted on the basis of a licence for the per-
formance of practices referred to in Article 4(1),
subject to Article 4(2).
2. Import into, export from and transit through the
territory controlled by Polish customs of radioac-
tive waste and spent nuclear fuel shall require the
consent of the Agency’s President.
3. Export from the territory controlled by Polish cus-
toms and transit through this territory of radioac-
tive waste and spent nuclear fuel shall be prohib-
ited if the destination of such shipment lies south
of 60o southern latitude. 
4. The Council of Ministers shall establish by regu-
lations:
1) conditions governing import into, export from
and transit through the territory controlled by
Polish customs of nuclear materials, radioactive
sources and equipment containing such sources,
2) the basics for granting the consent referred to in
paragraph 2, the procedure for applying for such
consent and the standard document for this pro-
cedure.
Chapter 14 
Stateowned public utility "Radio-active Waste
Management Plant"
Article 114
1. The Stateowned public utility named "Radioactive
Waste Management Plant" located in
Otwockwierk, hereinafter referred to as "the
Plant", shall be established for conducting the
activities involving radioactive waste management
and spent nuclear fuel management, and  above
all  aiming at ensuring permanent feasibility of
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel disposal.
2. The Plant may also perform activities in the field of
hazardous waste management referred to in the
regulations governing waste, and other activities
specified in the statute referred to in Article 121.
Article 115
1. The Plant shall be invested with legal personality.
2. Governmental bodies may undertake decisions
concerning the Plant’s activity only in the cases
covered by this Act.
Article 116
1. Supervision over the Plant and the founder’s func-
tions shall be executed by the minister competent
for economic affairs. 
2. The minister competent for economic affairs shall
control the Plant’s activities and submit those
activities to an annual evaluation , which he shall
present to the Prime Minister not later than on 30
March of the following year.
3. Minister competent for economic affairs may
establish a commission to evaluate the Plant’s
administration and to prepare conclusions result-
ing from this evaluation.
4. On the basis of the commission’s conclusions, the
minister competent for economic affairs may
oblige the Plant’s director to improve the Plant’s
administration or to submit and implement a cor-
rective action program. Such program shall be
approved by the minister competent for economic
affairs.
5. The minister competent for economic affairs,
upon finding that the Plant’s director decision vio-
lates some law or regulation, shall order the sus-
pension of the execution of the decision and shall
oblige the Plant’s director to modify or cancel this
decision.
6. The Plant’s director shall be entitled to appeal
against the decisions taken by the minister com-
petent for economic affairs, according to the rules
and procedures established in the regulations
governing stateowned enterprises.
Article 117
1. The Plant shall be managed and externally repre-
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sented by the director, who shall constitute the
Plant’s official organ.
2. The Plant’s director shall be nominated and
recalled by the minister competent for economic
affairs.
3. The director may nominate and recall the Plant’s
deputy directors and its agents, who shall act
independently within their scope of competence.
4. Agents shall be granted their power of attorney in
written form, otherwise it shall be considered null
and void.
5. Power of attorney granting and revocation shall
be entered into the register of stateowned enter-
prises, with the exception of powers of attorney
for the performance of specific activities and for
powers of attorney in legal proceedings.
6. Employee selfgoverning bodies shall not be
active in the Plant.
Article 118
1. In business transactions the Plant shall act in its
own name and on its own account.
2. The Plant shall collect payments for performed
activities.
3. The sale and management of tangible fixed assets
or of organised parts of the property shall be reg-
ulated by the regulations for stateowned enter-
prises.
4. Tangible fixed assets shall not be used for settle-
ment of the Plant’s monetary obligations.
Article 119
1. The Plant shall receive from the national budget
an allocated subsidy for radioactive waste man-
agement and spent nuclear fuel management.
2. The amount of this subsidy shall be established in
budgetary legislation, upon request of the minis-
ter competent for economical affaires.
3. The Plant’s director shall submit to the minister
competent for economic affairs the accounting for
the disposal of the subsidy, according to the regu-
lations based on Article 120(2).
Article 120
1. The Plant’s finances shall be managed according
to the rules for finance management in
stateowned enterprises, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Act.
2. The Council of Ministers shall establish by regula-
tions accountability procedures for the subsidy
referred to in Article 119(1), including the type of
documentation and the data required for such
accounting procedures, the method for fixing the
payments referred to in Article 118(2), together
with the factors which should be taken into
account while fixing the payments, the procedures
and timing for issuing public announcements on
such payments and detailed rules for the Plant’s
finances management, including financial reports
and rules for choosing the experts for performing
audits and the competent authority for final
approval of the Plant’s annual financial reports,
procedures for disposal of property, financing of
salaries and investments, and also the procedures
for decision making on financial issues.
Article 121
1. The Plant’s detailed tasks, organisational scheme,
procedures for creating outer branch offices and
their powers, internal control system and operat-
ing rules shall be established in the Plant’s statute;
additional tasks shall be specified taking into
account the necessity for ensuring the implemen-
tation of the tasks for which the Plant has been
created, the division of the Plant into the task and
service departments, the scope of issues which
shall not be delegated to outer branch offices.
2. The statute may provide for the establishment of
advisory and opinionmaking bodies for the
Plant’s director.
3. The Plant shall receive its statute in the form of a
regulation issued by the minister competent for
economic affairs.
Article 122
The provisions of the act of Parliament of 30 August
1996 on the commercialisation and privatisation of
stateowned enterprises (O.J. No 118, Item 561 and
No 156, Item 775; of 1997 No 32, Item 184, No 98,
Item 603, No 106, Item 673, No 121, Item 770, No
137, Item 926 and No 141, Item 945; of 1998 No
106, Item 668; of 1999 No 40, Item 400 and No
101, Item 1178; of 2000 No 15, Item 180, No 26,
Item 306, No 31, Item 383, No 60, Item 703, No
84< Item 948 and No 122, Item 1315) shall not be
applicable to the Plant.
Chapter 15  
Penal regulations
Article 123
1. A fine of an amount not exceeding five times the
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average monthly pay in the national economy,
calculated for three quarters of the year prior to
the occurrence of the violation and published by
the President of the Central Statistical Office on
the basis of the act of Parliament of 26 July 1991
on personal income tax (O.J. of 2000, No 14 Item
176, No 22 Item270, No 60 Item 703, No 70 Item
816, No 104, Item 1104, No 117, Item 1228 and
No 122, Item 1324), shall be imposed on the
head of the organisational entity, who:
1) without the required licence, or in violation of
the conditions attached to such a licence,
engages in the activities referred to in Article
4 (1), paragraphs 2 to 8, or in the import or
export referred to in Article 62(1), or employs
workers who do not possess the qualifications
or skills established in this Act,
2) bearing the responsibility for nuclear safety and
radiological protection, allows the exposure of
a worker or some other individual in violation
of the provisions in Article 14(1) concerning the
provisions of Article 25(1), and of Article 19(1)
and Article 20, paragraphs 1 to 3,
3) does not fulfil his responsibilities concerning
nuclear safety and radiological protection in
work involving nuclear materials, ionising radi-
ation sources, radioactive waste and spent
nuclear fuel and during the preparation of those
materials for transport and disposal,
4) loses or leaves without proper protection
nuclear material, ionising radiation source,
radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel con-
signed to his care,
5) does not fulfil the requirements concerning
dosimetric control or the inventory of nuclear
materials, ionising radioactive sources, radioac-
tive waste and spent nuclear fuel,
6) prevents or impedes the conduct of regulatory
inspection concerning nuclear safety or radio-
logical protection, or refuses to give information
or gives false information or conceals the truth
in matters concerning nuclear safety and radio-
logical protection.
2. A fine of an amount not twice the average month-
ly pay in the national economy, calculated for the
year prior to the occurrence of the violation and
published by the President of Central Statistical
Office basing on the act referred to in paragraph
1, shall be imposed on the nuclear facility
employee, who does not notify his supervisor or
the regulatory body of the event or condition
which may cause a threat to nuclear safety or
radiological protection.
Article 124
1. Financial penalties referred to in Article 123, in
the form of an administrative decision, shall be
imposed by:
1) the Chief Nuclear Regulatory Inspector  in the
cases when the Agency’s President issues the
licence for, or receives the notification of, the
practice,
2) the regional sanitary inspector or military
inspector  in the cases when the licence is
issued by those bodies.
2. Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be exe-
cuted immediately.
Article 125
1. Fines shall not be imposed after a lapse of 5 years
since the perpetration of the offence.
2. Fines shall not be collected after a lapse of 5 years
since the time of the final decision to impose the
fine.
Article 126
1. Penalties imposed on the basis of Article 123,
together with the default interest, shall be collect-
ed according to the procedure established in the
regulations on the administrative execution pro-
ceedings.
2. Revenue obtained from fines shall constitute
income for the national budget.
Article 127
Persons who do not respect the:
1) order for temporary relocation,
2) order on sheltering indoors,
3) ban on cattle grazing on contaminated area or the
ban on feeding contaminated feeding stuffs to
domestic animals
 shall be subject to imposition of a fine or arrest.
Chapter 16
Transitional, adaptive and final provisions
Article 132
The Minister of Defence with regard to the organisa-
tional entities under his authority, and the minister
competent for internal affairs with regards to the
General Police, National Fire Service, National
Border Guard and other subordinated organisation-
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al units, after consulting the Agency’s President,
shall establish implementation procedures for this
Act by regulations.
Article 133
1. The Chief Nuclear Regulatory Inspector and reg-
ulatory inspectors who have been appointed or
authorised before the date of entry into force of
this Act, shall become respectively the Chief
Nuclear Regulatory Inspector and regulatory
inspectors within the meaning of this Act.
2. Licences issued according to the act referred to in
Article 138 shall be valid for the time established
in the licence.
3. Authorisations obtained according to the provi-
sions of Article 33(3)(1) and 33(4) of the act
referred to in Article 138, shall be valid for the
time established in the authorisation.
4. Licences concerning radioactive substances pur-
chase and use, issued according to the regulations
valid before the act referred to in Article 138
entered into force, and in particular those issued
according to the:
1) Council of Ministers regulation of 18 June 1968
on safety and hygiene in work involving ionis-
ing radiation applications (Official Journal No
20, Item122);
2) Council of Ministers resolution No 266/64 of 29
August 1964 on radioactive substances use; 
3) Regulation No 23/70 of 21 July 1970 by the
Government Plenipotentiary for Nuclear Energy
Uses on radioactive materials purchase and
applications
 shall be valid until their replacement by
licences issued according to the provisions of
this Act, but not longer than for 24 months as
from the date of its entry into force.
5. The National Radioactive Waste Repository in
Ró¿an, established according to the regulations
based on the provisions of the act referred to in
Article 138, shall be recognized as the National
Radioactive Repository Facility within the mean-
ing of this Act.
6. Proceedings which have been started before the
date of this Act entry into force shall be continued
and concluded in accordance with previous regu-
lations.
Appendix IV. Law of 22 June 2001 on the imple-
mentation of the Convention on the prohibition of
the development, production, stockpiling and use
of chemical weapons and on their destruction
(Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland of
2001, No. 76, item 812)
Chapter 1. 
General provisions
Art. 1. This Law determines the principles of the
implementation in the territory of the Republic of
Poland of the obligations resulting from the
Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons and on their destruction, done at Paris on
13 January 1993 (Journal of Laws of 1999, No. 63,
item 703), hereinafter referred to as "the
Convention".
Art. 2. 1. The provisions of this Law shall apply to
the natural persons in the territory of the Republic of
Poland, legal persons and organisational units with-
out legal personality and other entities with place of
business in the territory of the Republic of Poland, as
well as foreign entrepreneurs carrying out in the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Poland the activity with
chemicals and their precursors, covered by the
Convention. 
2. The territory of the Republic of Poland shall also
include aircraft and vessels as well as other navi-
gating units, of the Polish nationality.
Art. 3. 1. Whenever this Law refers to the "chemical
weapons", "toxic chemicals", "discrete organic chem-
icals", "precursors", "riot control agents", "chemical
weapons production facilities" as well as "purposes
not prohibited under the Convention", these terms
shall have the meaning used by the Convention. 
2. The term "escorting team" shall mean "incountry
escort" in the meaning of the Convention.
Chapter 2. 
Prohibitions and restrictions
Art. 4. It is prohibited in the territory of the Republic
of Poland, subject to Art. 5:
1) development, production, manufacturing, pro-
cessing, consumption or otherwise acquiring,
collecting, stockpiling, sale or transfer to any-
one of chemical weapons,
2) use of chemical weapons,
3) engaging in any military preparations to use
chemical weapons,
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4) use of riot control agents as a method of warfare,
5) abetting or assistance in engaging in the activity
prohibited under subparas 14 above.
Art. 5. The production, manufacturing, processing,
consumption, acquiring, collecting, storage, sale,
transfer or use of toxic chemicals or their precursors,
mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Annex of Chemicals
to the Convention, hereinafter referred to as "the
Schedule 1", may be carried out only for the pur-
poses not prohibited under the Convention and in
the amounts allowed therein and in accordance
with its requirements.
Art. 6. 1. The production, manufacturing, process-
ing, consumption, acquiring, collecting, storage,
sale, transfer of use of toxic chemicals or their pre-
cursors mentioned in the Schedule 1 may be carried
out on the basis of a permit.
2. The permit referred to in para. 1 shall be issued by
the minister for economy, subject to para. 3.
3. The permits referred to in para. 1, for the organi-
sational units and cells subjected to the Minister
for National Defence and supervised by it, as well
as for stateowned enterprises, for which it is
founding organ, shall be issued by the Minister for
National Defence.
Art. 7. 1. The permit for production, manufacturing,
processing, consumption, acquiring, collecting, stor-
age, sale, transfer or use of toxic chemicals or their
precursors, mentioned in the Schedule 1 is indepen-
dent of the entry to the record of entrepreneurs as
well as of the concession and permission, referred to
in the provisions related to the business activity.
2. Granting, refusal to grant, modification and with-
drawal of permit or limitation of the scope there-
of in relation with the application shall be effect-
ed through administrative decision.
3. The permit shall be granted for a limited period of
time, not shorter than 2 years and not longer than
50 years. 
4. To granting, refusal to grant, modification and with-
drawal of permit or limitation of the scope thereof
in relation with the application the provisions of Art.
16, Art. 17 paras. 1 and 2, Art. 18, Art. 20, Art. 21
paras. 15, Art. 22, Art. 23 and Art. 26 of the Law
of 19 November 1999  Law on Business Activity
(Journal of Laws No. 101, item 1178, of 2000, No.
86, item 958, No. 114, item 1193 and of 2001 No.
49, item 509) shall apply accordingly.
Art. 8. The minister for economy shall determine
through regulation the procedure of issuing of per-
mits for the production, manufacturing, processing,
consumption, acquiring, collecting, storage, sale,
transfer or use of toxic chemicals or their precursors
mentioned in the Schedule 1. The said regulation
shall determine in particular:
1) the specimen of applications to issue permit for
production, manufacturing, processing, acquir-
ing, collecting, storage, sale, transfer or use of
toxic chemicals or their precursors mentioned
in the Schedule 1,
2) documents to be attached to the applications,
referred to in subpara. 1,
3) specimen of permit for production, manufactur-
ing, processing, acquiring, collecting, storage,
sale, transfer or use of toxic chemicals or their
precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1.
Art. 9. 1. The Minister for National Defence shall
determine through regulation the scope and detailed
conditions of production, manufacturing, process-
ing, acquiring, collecting, storage, sale, transfer or
use of toxic chemicals or their precursors mentioned
in the Schedule 1 in the organisational units and
cells subjected to or supervised by it as well as in the
stateowned enterprises for which it is founding
organ. The regulation shall determined in particular:
1) manner of preparation of the applications for
permit to carry out the activity referred to in Art.
6 as well as the documents to be attached to the
applications,
2) organisational units authorised to produce toxic
chemicals or their precursors for protective pur-
poses,
3) conditions of production of toxic chemicals or
their precursors for research, medical or phar-
maceutical purposes,
4) procedures and periods of transfer of informa-
tion connected with the production, manufac-
turing, processing, acquiring, collecting, stor-
age, sale, transfer or use of toxic chemicals or
their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1,
5) conditions of training of military forces related
to the use of toxic chemicals.
2. The Minister for National Defence shall transfer to
the minister for economy the copies of the issued
permits for production, manufacturing, process-
ing, acquiring, collecting, storage, sale, transfer or
use of toxic chemicals or their precursors in the
organisational units and cells referred to in para. 1.
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Chapter 3. 
External trade in toxic chemicals and their precur-
sors
Art. 10. 1. The importation, exportation and transit
through the Polish customs area of toxic chemicals
and their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1 is
allowed, subject to permission, and furthermore
subject to Art. 11. The permission for importation,
exportation and transit referred to in para. 1 shall be
issued by the minister for economy in accordance
with the principles and in the manner determined in
the Law of 29 November 2000 on external trade in
goods, technologies and services of strategic impor-
tance both for state security and for the keeping of
international peace and security and amending cer-
tain laws (Journal of Laws No. 119, item 1250).
Art. 11. 1. The exportation, importation and transit
through the Polish customs area of toxic chemicals
and their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1, to
and from the States, which are not party to the
Convention is prohibited.
2. The exportation, importation and transit through
the Polish customs area of toxic chemicals and
their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1, to
and from the States  Parties to the Convention is
allowed only for the purposes not prohibited
under the Convention and in the amounts
allowed therein and in accordance with its
requirements.
Art. 12. 1. The exportation, importation and transit
through the Polish customs area of toxic chemicals
and their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 2 of
the Annex of Chemicals to the Convention, here-
inafter referred to as "the Schedule 2" is allowed
only to and from States  Parties to the Convention.
2. Export, import and transit through the Polish cus-
toms area of toxic chemicals and their precursors
mentioned in the Schedule 3 of the Annex of
Chemicals to the Convention, hereinafter referred to
as "the Schedule 3" is allowed only to and from
States  Parties to the Convention, subject to para. 3.
3. Export, import and transit through the Polish cus-
toms area of toxic chemicals and their precursors,
mentioned in the Schedule 3 from the States 
Parties to the Convention is allowed to and from
States, which are not party to the Convention,
provided that in case of the exportation and tran-
sit to these States, such exportation and transit
shall be subject to the delivery of end user decla-
ration, issued by competent authorities of the said
States. The declaration referred to in para. 3 shall
contain the data determined in the Art. 23. 4 of
the Law of 29 November 2000 on external trade
in goods, technologies and services of strategic
importance both for state security and for the
keeping of international peace and security and
amending certain laws.
Chapter 4. 
Declarations and their verification
Art. 13. 1. The minister for economy shall maintain
the national system of collection and processing of
data connected with the activity covered by the
Convention and shall prepare draft declarations
required by the Convention.
2. The minister for economy shall transmit draft dec-
larations referred to in para. 1 to the minister for
foreign affairs.
Art. 14. 1. The entities and entrepreneurs, referred
to in Art. 2, carrying out the activity with toxic
chemicals and their precursors, covered by the pro-
visions of the Convention shall transmit to the min-
ister for economy, the information on that activity
connected with:
1) production, manufacturing, consumption, pro-
cessing, acquiring, collecting, storage, sale,
transfer and use of chemicals mentioned in the
Schedule 1, taking into account the provisions
of Part VI of the Annex on implementation and
verification to the Convention,
2) production, consumption, processing or trade
in chemicals mentioned in the Schedule 2, tak-
ing into account the provisions of Part VII of the
Annex on implementation and verification to
the Convention,
3) production or trade in chemicals mentioned in
the Schedule 2, taking into account the provi-
sions of Part VIII of the Annex on implementa-
tion and verification to the Convention,
4) production of discrete organic chemicals not
mentioned in the Schedule 1, Schedule 2 and
Schedule 3, taking into account the provisions
of Part IX of the Annex on implementation and
verification to the Convention, 
5) external trade in toxic chemicals and their pre-
cursors mentioned in the Schedule 1, Schedule
2 and Schedule 3,
6) possessing of riot control agents.
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2. The entities and entrepreneurs referred to in Art. 2
shall transmit every year the information referred
to in para. 1, within the following periods:
1) before 30 September  in case of the information,
which relates to the activity planned in the fol-
lowing calendar year,
2) before 28 February  in case of the information,
which relates to the activity carried out in the pre-
ceding calendar year.
3. The information referred to in para. 1 shall be
true, reliable and full as well as shall meet the
requirements determined in the Convention.
4. The minister for economy, in consultation with
the minister for foreign affairs and Minister for
National Defence shall determine through regula-
tion the detailed data, which should be included
by the information referred to in para. 1. The reg-
ulation shall determine in particular:
1) the specimen of declarations, which should con-
tain the information on the activity with chemi-
cals and their precursors covered by the provi-
sions of the Convention,
2) procedure and periods of transmission of infor-
mation for the purposes of the preparation of the
declarations.
Art. 15. 1. The information referred to in Art. 14
paras. 13 shall be subject to verification.
2. The minister for economy shall be the organ com-
petent for the verification referred to in para. 1,
except the organisational units and cells subject-
ed to the Minister for National Defence and
supervised by it, as well as stateowned enter-
prises, for which it is founding organ.
3. The verification referred to in para. 1, in the
organisational units and cells subjected to the
Minister for National Defence and supervised by
it, as well as in the stateowned enterprises for
which it is founding organ, shall be carried out by
the Minister for National Defence.
To the verification referred to in para. 1 the provi-
sions of the Law of 28 September 1991 on treasury
control (Journal of Laws of 1999, No. 54, item 572,
No. 83, item 931, of 2000 No. 70, item 816, No.
104, item 1103, No. 116, item 1216 as well as of
2001 No. 14, item 143) concerning control pro-
ceedings as well as the provisions of Art. 2931 of
the Law of 29 November 2000 on external trade in
goods, technologies and services of strategic impor-
tance both for state security and for keeping of inter-
national peace and security, shall apply accordingly.
Chapter 5.  
Inspection activity
Art. 16. The inspection team, within its tasks deter-
mined in the Annex on implementation and verifi-
cation to the Convention shall be entitled to:
1) enter the premises of each facility in the territo-
ry of the Republic of Poland in relation with
which:
a) the information or declaration was submitted
in connection with the activity carried out in
accordance with Art. VI of the Convention,
b) challenge inspection was requested in accor-
dance with Art. IX para. 8 of the Convention,
c) an investigation has been initiated in accor-
dance with Art. X para. 9 of the Convention,
2) carry out other inspection activity, in accor-
dance with the Convention,
3) use equipment authorised in accordance with
the Convention, including installation of equip-
ment used for permanent monitoring of the
facilities,
4) interview the owner of the controlled facility or
his/her representative,
5) review documents and records,
6) take samples for analysis.
Art. 17. 1. The inspection team shall be accompa-
nied by escorting team, designated by the minister
competent for the controlled facility, in consultation
with the minister for foreign affairs.
2. The members of the escorting team shall have the
same rights as the members of the inspection
team referred to in Art. 16.
Art. 18. 1. During the inspection the controlled
entities and entrepreneurs, referred to in Art. 2
above, shall in relation with the inspection team and
the escorting team:
1) make available the facilities and plants, in
which the activity is carried out with chemicals
and their precursors covered by the provisions
of the Convention,
2) be present during the inspection,
3) provide with relevant information and facilitate
insight into the documents and records within
the scope of control,
4) make copies of requested documents and
records,
5) take samples or cooperate in taking of samples,
6) facilitate to the inspection team the use of com-
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munications services as well as, if possible,
other equipment in the controlled facility, 
7) ensure appropriate working conditions, including
individual premises and places for storage of doc-
uments.
2. During the inspection the provisions of Art. 17
para. 2, 3 and 5 of the Law of 28 September 1991
on treasury control shall apply accordingly.
Art. 19. During the inspection the controlled entities
and entrepreneurs, referred to in Art. 2 above shall
be entitled to:
1) participate in the works of the escorting team,
2) submit explanations and formulate reservations
during the inspections,
3) be acquainted with findings of the inspection and
collected documentation,
4) receive the report of the inspection and formulate
observations thereto,
5) participate in debriefing meetings of the inspec-
tion and formulate observations.
Art. 20. 1. The costs connected with the inspection
shall be borne from the funds of the state budget,
which shall be planned by appropriate ministers
regarding their respective parts of the budget.
2. The ministers competent for the inspections shall
submit to the minister for foreign affairs the appli-
cation for the compensation of the incurred costs,
which shall be transmitted to the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, hereinafter
referred to as "the Organisation".
Art. 21. The Council of Ministers shall determine
through regulation the detailed procedure for the
receipt of inspections of the Organisation in the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Poland. The regulation shall
determine in particular:
1) procedure of notification on the inspection,
2) composition of the escorting team,
3) obligations of the minister competent for
inspected facility, related to:
a) notification of competent authorities as well
as owner of the facility on planned inspec-
tion,
b) preparation of the inspection,
c) assurance to the inspection team and escort-
ing team of access to the facility covered by
the inspection, transportation to and from the
inspection site, accommodation, working
premises, translations, use of communication
services as well as medical care,
d) assurance that the inspection is carried out in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the
Convention,
4) manner of coverage of inspection costs as well as
procedure of application to the Organisation for
the compensation of incurred costs.
Chapter 6. 
Protection of information
Art. 22. 1. The information obtained in connection
with the implementation of the Convention, marked
with the clause "OPCW restricted" shall be protect-
ed and made available in accordance with the prin-
ciples determined in the law of 22 January 1999 on
the protection of secret information (Journal of Laws
No. 11, item 95, of 2000 No. 12, item 136, No. 39,
item 162 and of 2001 No. 22, item 247 and No. 27,
item 298) related to the secret information marked
with the clause "restricted".
2. The information obtained in connection with the
implementation of the Convention, marked with
the clause "OPCW protected" shall be protected
and made available in accordance with the prin-
ciples determined in the law referred to in para. 1,
related to the secret information marked with the
clause "confidential".
3. The information obtained in connection with the
implementation of the Convention, marked with
the clause "OPCW highly protected" shall be pro-
tected and made available in accordance with the
principles determined in the law referred to in
para. 1, related to the secret information marked
with the clause "secret".
4. The information obtained from the entities and
entrepreneurs, referred to in Art. 2 above, in con-
nection with the obligation referred to in Art. 14,
and marked with appropriate clauses shall be
protected and made available in accordance with
the principles determined in the law referred to in
para.1, accordingly to the clause attributed to it.
Chapter 7. 
Competencies of the organs of public administration
Art. 23. 1. The functions of the National Authority
referred to in the Convention shall be carried out by
the minister for foreign affairs.
2. The tasks of the minister for foreign affairs, as
National Authority, shall include:
1) preparation and realisation of the assumptions
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of the policy of the Republic of Poland in rela-
tion with the Organisation,
2) contacts with the Organisation and with other
States  Parties to the Convention within the
issues connected with the implementation of its
provisions,
3) coparticipation in the receipt of inspections of
the Organisation in the territory of the Republic
of Poland,
4) coordination of actions undertaken in the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Poland in connection
with the implementation of the obligations
resulting from the Convention,
5) provision to the States  Parties to the
Convention, in consultation with the Minister
for National Defence, through the Organisation,
of assistance in case of threat of use or use
against them of chemical weapons, in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Convention.
Art. 24. 1. Minister for economy shall supervise the
activity connected with the implementation of the
provisions of the Convention in the territory of the
Republic of Poland.
2. When supervising the activity referred to in para.
1 the minister for economy shall:
1) maintain national system of collection and pro-
cessing of data resulting from the activity
referred to in Art. 512, as well as shall prepare
draft declarations required by the Convention
and shall transmit them to the minister for for-
eign affairs,
2) monitor the activity of entities and entrepre-
neurs referred to in Art. 2 above, in the sphere
of the implementation of the Convention in the
Republic of Poland, except the organisational
units and cells subjected to the Minister for
National Defence and supervised by it as well
as stateowned enterprises for which it is found-
ing organ; in particular it shall ensure the mon-
itoring of external trade in toxic chemicals and
their precursors, mentioned in the Schedule 1,
Schedule 2 and Schedule 3,
3) ensure, in cooperation with the Minister for
National Defence the possibility of chemical
analyses connected with the implementation of
the Convention,
4) carry out, in cooperation with the minister for
foreign affairs, Minister for National Defence
and minister for interior the activity connected
with the preparation, receipt and realisation of
inspections of the Organisation in the territory
of the Republic of Poland, except the organisa-
tional units and cells subjected to the Minister
for National Defence and supervised by it as
well as stateowned enterprises for which it is
founding organ, as well as the organs and
organisational units subjected to and supervised
by the minister for interior.
Art. 25. 1. The Minister for National Defence shall
ensure the implementation of the Convention by the
organisational units and cells subjected to and
supervised by it as well as stateowned enterprises
for which it is founding organ, through:
1) monitoring of the implementation of the
Convention,
2) assurance, in cooperation with the minister for
economy, of possibility of chemical analyses
connected with the implementation of the
Convention,
3) in cooperation with the minister for foreign
affairs, minister for economy and minister for
interior  the activity connected with the prepa-
ration, receipt and carrying out of the inspec-
tions of the Organisation.
2. The Minister for National Defence may designate,
upon request of the minister for foreign affairs,
within possessed forces and assets destined for
the protection against the chemical weapons, the
part thereof in order to provide, through the
Organisation, other States  Parties to the
Convention, with the assistance in case of threat
of use or use against them of chemical weapons.
Art. 26. 1. The minister for interior shall monitor the
implementation of the Convention in the organs and
organisational units subjected to or supervised by it,
as well as shall determine the tasks of the said organs
and units to this end.
2. The minister for interior shall ensure:
1) border control of inspection teams in accor-
dance with the principles applied to the mem-
bers of diplomatic personnel in designated bor-
der crossing points,
2) security to the members of the inspection reams
during their stay in the territory of the Republic
of Poland and during their transit,
3) in cooperation with the minister for foreign
affairs and minister for economy  the activity
connected with the preparation, receipt and
carrying out of inspections of the Organisation
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in the organisational units subjected to and
supervised by it.
Chapter 8. Penal sanctions
Art. 27. A person who uses riot control agents as a
method of warfare, shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for 1 year up to 10 years.
Art. 28. 1. A person who, without required permit or
in contravention of its conditions, for the purposes
not prohibited under the Convention, produces,
manufactures, processes, acquires, collects, stores,
sells, transfers, uses or possesses toxic chemicals or
their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1, shall
be sentenced to fine, limitation of freedom or impris-
onment for 3 months up to 5 years.
2. The same penalty shall be applicable to a person
who transfers the toxic chemicals or their precur-
sors mentioned in the Schedule 1 to unauthorised
person.
Art. 29. A person, who without required permit or in
contravention of its conditions, effects external trade
in toxic chemicals or their precursors, mentioned in
the Schedule 1, shall be sentenced to fine, limitation
of freedom or imprisonment for 3 months up to 5
years.
Art. 30. 1. A person who fails to meet the obligation
to inform authorised organ or transmits false infor-
mation on the activity connected with toxic chemi-
cals or their precursors, covered by the Convention,
shall be sentenced to fine, limitation of freedom or
imprisonment for 3 months up to 5 years.
2. The perpetrator of the act referred to in para. 1 act-
ing unintentionally, shall be sentenced to fine, lim-
itation of freedom or imprisonment for up to 1 year.
Art. 31. A person who refuses the access to the
inspection team or escorting team to the controlled
facility, submits false information to the members of
the said teams or otherwise impedes or hinders the
inspection, shall be sentenced to fine, limitation of
freedom or imprisonment for up to 3 years.
Art. 32. 1. In case of sentence for the crime deter-
mined in Art. 2729 the court may rule the seizure
of goods, technologies and other objects used in or
destined for the commitment of crime or obtained
directly or indirectly. 
2 This Law does not repeat the sanctions contained
in the Penal Code of the Republic of Poland,
which relate to the weapons of mass destruction. 
Chapter 9. 
Transitional and final provisions
Art. 33. The entities and entrepreneurs carrying out
on the day of the entry into force of this Law the
activity without permit, referred to in Art. 6 para. 1
may within 30 days as from the entry into force of
this Law apply to the competent organ for the
issuance of required permit.
Art. 34. This Law shall enter into force after 3
months as from its publication (The Law entered into
force on 26 October 2001).
Appendix V. The Internal Security Agency and
Foreign Intelligence Agency Act of 24 May 2002 
Excerpts 
Article 5
1. The tasks of the ABW shall include:
1) recognising, preventing and fighting threats
aimed against the internal security of the state
and against its constitutional order, and espe-
cially against its sovereignty and international
position, independence and inviolability of its
territory and against its defence system,
2) recognising, preventing and exposing:
a) crimes of espionage, terrorism, breach of the
state secret and other crimes aimed against
the state’s security,
b) crimes of production and trade in goods,
technologies and services of strategic impor-
tance to the state’s security,
c) crimes of illegal production, possession and
trade in weapons, ammunition and explosive
materials, weapons of massdestruction, stu-
pefacients and psychotropic substances in
international trade, and prosecuting the per-
petrators of these crimes,
Chapter 4
The Powers of the Officers of the Internal Security
Agency and of Foreign Intelligence Agency
Article 21
1. Within the scope of the tasks referred to in Article
5 paragraph 1, the ABW officers shall perform:
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1) intelligence and investigative activities in order
to recognise, prevent and expose crimes and to
prosecute their perpetrators,
2) intelligence and analytic  informative activities
in order to acquire and process information vital
to the protection of state security and its consti-
tutional order.
2. The ABW shall also perform the tasks commis-
sioned by the court or prosecutor to the extent
defined in the Penal Code.
3. The ABW officers shall perform their activities
only within the competence of this Agency and
within this competence they are entitled to the
prosecutorial powers of the Police, resulting from
the Penal Code.
Article 23
1. The officers of the ABW, while performing the
activities referred to in Article 21, shall have the
power to:
1) order a particular behaviour,
2) check identity documents in order to ascertain
the identity of persons,
3) detain people in the course and in the cases
defined in the regulations of the Penal Code,
4) search people and premises in the course and in
the cases defined in the regulations of the Penal
Code,
5) make body or baggage search and also check
the cargo of land, air, and water transport vehi-
cles  in case of justified suspicion that a pun-
ishable wrong act has been committed,
6) observe and record, with the use of technical
devices, the vision and accompanying sound of
events that take place in public places, 
7) demand necessary help from state institutions,
government administration organs, organs of
local authorities and entrepreneurs in the sector
of public utilities; the above mentioned institu-
tions, organs and entrepreneurs are obliged,
within the scope of their activity, to grant this
help gratuitously, in accordance with the cur-
rent legal regulations,
8) ask entrepreneurs, organisational units and
social institutions other than the referred to in
subparagraph 7 for the necessary help and also,
in emergency cases, to ask any person to give
immediate assistance, in accordance with the
current legal regulations.
2. The person who is detained, searched or whose
premises have been searched on the basis of para-
graph 1 subparagraphs 3 and 4, shall have the
rights provided for by the Penal Code.
3. The detention of a person may be applied only
when other measures have proved to be aimless
and ineffective. 
4. The detained person, if it is justified, must imme-
diately undergo medical treatment or must be
given the first aid.
5. The activities referred to in paragraph 1 subpara-
graphs 15, should be carried out in a way that
would to the least extent violate the personal
properties and rights of the person toward whom
they were undertaken.
6. The person shall have the right to lodge a com-
plaint with the court or the prosecutor respective-
ly against the way of carrying out the activities
referred to in paragraph 1 subparagraphs 25.
7. The Council of Ministers shall define, by means of
its order, the detailed way of carrying out and
documenting the activities referred to in para-
graph 1 subparagraphs 25, with taking into
account they way, adjusted to the circumstances,
of performing by the ABW officers the activities
undertaken within their statutory powers and the
officers’ duties while performing these activities.
Article 30
1.In criminal cases referred to in Article 5 paragraph
1, subparagraph 2, in the frames of intelligence
activities in order to record such crimes, or to
establish the identity of the participants thereof, or
to confiscate the objects of crime, the Head of the
Internal Security Agency may, prior to the initia-
tion of the criminal procedure, order a secret sur-
veillance of the production, transfer, storage and
trade in objects of crime, if this should not endan-
ger human life or freedom.
Appendix VI. Law of 12 October 1990 on the
Borders Guard  Excerpts
Art. 4 item 12   preventing transportation, without
the permit required  in accordance with separate
regulations, through the state border of waste, harm-
ful chemical substances also nuclear and radioac-
tive materials,  as well as polluting border waters;
Art. 4 item 13  preventing transfers, without the per-
mit required  in accordance with separate regula-
tions, through the state border of intoxicants and
psychotropic substances, weapons, ammunition and
explosive materials;
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Appendix VII. Law of 24 July 1999 on Custon
Service  Excerpts
Art. 1 item 1. A uniform uniformed Customs Service
is created in order to ensureconformance to the law
for the import of goods to the European
Unioncustoms territory, export of goods from the
European Union customsterritory as well as per-
forming duties set forth in separate regulations,
particularly related to the excise tax.
Art. 1 item. 2.  Tasks of the Customs Service include
realisation of the nation’scustoms policy in the part
concerning the import and export of goods aswell as
performing other tasks resulting from separate regu-
lations,specifically:
Art. 1 item 2. 5. identifying, detecting, preventing
and combatting crimes andmisdemeanors associat-
ed with violation of regulations concerning thepro-
tection of cultural goods and protection of intellec-
tual property, aswell as crimes and misdemeanors
associated with bringing goods subject to
limitation or prohibitions into the Polish customs ter-
ritory, inparticular such as: hazardous waste, chem-
ical substances, nuclear andradioactive materials,
narcotics and psychotropic substances as well
asweapons, ammunition, explosives and technolo-
gies subject to international control.
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